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
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**Sermon before Men and Women.**  
**(Peter is believed to be preaching.)**



# **HISTORY**

**OF THE**

# **GERMAN PEOPLE**

**FROM THE FIRST AUTHENTIC  
ANNALS TO THE PRESENT TIME**

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**VOLUME SEVEN**

**The Reformation and Counter Reformation**

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Edited by  
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and  
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# THE REFORMATION AND COUNTER REFORMATION

## I

### THE BAPTISTS

**T**HE German Reformation entered the world as a renaissance of Christendom, a return to the original and real. Against the old sanctified order of things in the visible Church, it brought to bear the still older Christian liberty in the place of an enforced belief, the individual's privilege of studying the Scriptures, and—instead of the firmly organized hierarchical state of God—the “assembling of hearts in one belief.”

In the course of this movement the reformers were frequently forced away from their original ideals, and under the impressions and demands of the moment were even obliged to found churches. It has already been explained or at least indicated why these new foundations of a religiously and deeply stirred age did not fully suffice, and particularly why they did not satisfy the masses of the people. Not only for the apologist, but also for the writer of history of the Reformation, was in-

tended Nippold's warning against the error of identifying "the great movement as such with the dogmatic-hierarchical overthrow of the prevailing unrest, or of expelling the Baptist heretics."

At the present time nobody is apt to make the old mistake of judging the entire evangelical radicalism of the sixteenth century solely by the repulsive Swiss and Low German details of baptism. The irreconcilable hatred with which not only the old but the evangelical church fought the "sects and bands," from the very start, proves a state of religious and social illness more markedly than the plainest utterances. Moreover, the element was very strong and capable of propagation. While the so-called Baptists in Germany and the Netherlands were partly eradicated and had partly perished, the germs of their views carried to England bore abundant fruit much later. As with Wickliffe's doctrine, which exercised its mightiest effect in Bohemia, the movement of the independents grew and thrived after the penetration of Baptist mysticism into England. In a small pamphlet of the seventeenth century, the author of which claimed to be one of Cromwell's soldiers, there were undeniable approaches to the apocalypse of German Baptists and to the prophecies of Abbot Joachim. Many ideas were almost indestructibly harsh; they could remain hidden through many generations to reappear suddenly in a different form but with their old power.

There is no doubt that in the radicalism of reformation of the so-called Baptists the very old ascetic ideal, on which the medieval view of the world was based, again became very active for the purpose of improving the favorable opportunity of church revolution, and at the same time preventing the reformatory reconciliation between Christianity and the world. It would be difficult to determine whether the different forms of this evangelical radicalism were in some measure due to the ever recurring consequences of religious unrest, or simply to the privilege of studying the Scriptures as proclaimed by Luther. Certain symptoms, such for instance as an increased inclination to recognize in every day occurrences the direct action of higher powers, or an enlarged susceptibility for ecstatic conditions, were sure to recur during religiously agitated periods.

Besides such spontaneous expressions, the religious excitement of the reformation period showed numerous traits from which it would appear that some long exciting mental currents undoubtedly coöperated and were vivified. The hypothesis of Ritschl, according to which the Baptistical and in further development the pietistic movement originated from the order of mendicant friars, particularly from their coworkers, the laymen of the third rule, called *tertiarii*, has been recognized as untenable; on the other hand it can hardly be denied that

there was some connection between the Baptists and the old heresies found in Germany, particularly among the followers of Huss and Waldo, while a close relation to mysticism was unmistakably evident. Varied as the fruits borne by mysticism during the former centuries were, evangelical radicalism showed multifarious and apparently contradictory features, subtle speculation against overwhelming sentiment, old Christian readiness to die as opposed to the wildest fanaticism, monkish renunciation of the world and thoughts of world rule. Such contradictions cannot be considered surprising since Henry von Eicken proved the solidarity of "disowning the world and ruling the world as the mutually produced demands of Christian doctrine," for the generations of church hegemony.

While certain rationalistic tendencies, and particularly anti-trinitarian doctrines, appeared as indications of a future period within the Baptist movement, their basic character really belonged to the Middle Ages and their life's ideal was identical with the "monkery" rejected by Luther, inasmuch as in Baptist circles and in convents a strictly evangelical life, that is to say, a perfection of asceticism, was striven for. The same ideal was sought by the followers of Waldo and the Bohemian brothers, even occasionally by Erasmus. The unchristian origin of this ideal cannot be denied. That, in a new form, it tried to conquer the world is shown

not only by the existence of those mystic heretic elements but by the origin and course of the Reformation. After Luther declared war against the secularized Church and pronounced the Bible the common property of all Christians, the words of the Sermon on the Mount and the example of the oldest fraternal congregation, in the fight against hierarchical demoralization, were bound to have as much or more effect on many minds as the letters of St. Paul.

This sanctifying of the poor and persecuted, the just, the pure, and the peaceable, gained a loftier and more spiritual meaning when many of the evangelical people, confident in their true belief, abandoned everything they considered hypocritical. Luther and those assisting in his work were unanimous in complaining of the fearful decay of practical Christianity, and the ever-increasing licentiousness and greed of its professors. The great Reformer said: "The longer the gospel is preached, the deeper the people are drowned in avarice, arrogance and pomp."

The vast ecclesiastical revolution, in spite of all indignation on the part of theologians and moralists, had its economic feature, and it is not surprising that there was a strong reaction in the previous practice of investing in the church money and property in order to secure salvation. When the German Reformation strove to get closer to govern-

ment authorities, and discontinued its original effort to form a new church state organization on democratic principles, it began to appear to those who could not comprehend real Christianity without moral perfection as not less antichristian than papacy itself. The impression of many people connected with mysticism was that only a thoroughly wrong doctrine could bear such fruit. Zur Linden said: "Thus the place of the gospel of justification through belief was taken by the gospel of Christ's succession."

The first stages of evangelical radicalism in Germany have been mentioned, such as the open revolutionary actions of Huss's followers at Zwickau, Allstädt and Mühlhausen. These beginnings mingled with the enormous current of social revolution which flooded South and Middle Germany, not without a mystic-apocalyptic background, but with predominating worldly tendencies. The masses of peasants still believed in Luther; the Bildhausen crowd mobbed Münzer's messenger, whose high-sounding words were resented by a field preacher. The mostly brief activities of Münzer, Carlstadt, and other "visionary people" in several South German cities, became all the more stirring. Augsburg and Strasburg, to a greater extent than Nürnberg, were meeting places for the organization of sects, in which the various elements of developed baptism could be readily recognized. Alongside of Carl-

stadt's anxious biblicism was the individual's firm belief in godly inspiration and in the "inner word" above all Scriptures; hand in hand with mystic retirement from the world went wild chiliastic dreams of a future filled with bloodshed and victorious rejoicings.

In a certain sense Münzer, with his "bitter Christ," could hardly be regarded as the dominant personality during this initial period, since he was undeniably outranked by Hans Denck, a Bavarian, whom his contemporaries called the "Abbot" and the "Baptists' pope." He was a man of fine spirit and well schooled in languages, who absorbed the writings of German mystics, to arrive with the boldness of a pronounced idealist at the most daring conclusions, even the abolition of the belief in Christ's divinity and the sinlessness of those born again. In the strongest contrast to the doctrine of predestination maintained by Luther and Zwingli, Denck and his followers were as firmly convinced of man's "spontaneity" and his ability to elevate himself to God as were the new Platonists of the Italian renaissance. Hubmair, an enthusiast, exclaimed: "That would be a false God who said: 'Come here!' and secretly in his heart 'Stay there!' It is a curse to say that God had ordered us to do impossible things."

There can be no doubt that the belief in the presence of the "inner light" in man, and the con-

ception of sin as a mere negation, led to the denial of eternal damnation. Luther's terrible doctrine of God's choice of mercy agreed with an old popular belief, but at the same time the comfortable view that God's mercy would finally call all creatures including the devil, home to salvation was also deep-rooted.

The evangelical radicals combined the mystic with the rationalistic elements, just as was done in humanistic philosophy. Denck, Hetzer, Kautz, Hubmair, Bänderlin, and others saw in Christ a teacher and model instead of an "idol," thus abolishing either tacitly or expressly the dogma of the Trinity. The most emphatic was the "fresh, bold Hetzer," as he liked to be called, who expressed his view in rhyme about as follows:

"I am the only God and alone,  
 Who created all things, from help free,  
 If you ask whether any other shone,  
 I am alone, there are not three;  
 You may still add without hesitation,  
 That of no other person I have information."

From the beginning of 1525 the movement had a common exterior, identifying mark in the form of baptism, which was first practiced by the Swiss radicals for the purpose of separating the "servants of and those obeying God" from, above all, Zwingli's state church, but also from all other churches, and



of bringing them together in all seriousness as the often dreamed of congregation of saints. The leaders were educated as theologians and Humanists, including the afore-mentioned Louis Hetzer from Thurgau, besides Konrad Grebel and Felix Manz, both from Zurich. They were surrounded by the thinking artisans, who were able to read and write and who everywhere formed the nucleus of the Baptist movement. Soon afterward the propaganda extended to the peasants, who were the special favorites of all popular men during those decades of agitation. Cornelius said: "Two spiritual substances thus ran together,—the religious feeling of the lowly and illiterate who, Bible in hand, turned their back upon the world, and the impulse of theological radicalism to do away with the church laws."

Georg, called the "bluecoat," who first of all demanded and received the baptism from Grebel, was regarded as the interpreter mediating between those two factions. Denck, in his book concerning the law, wrote: "Nobody looks upon the exalted in this world, either in power, art or wealth, but he whose heart points toward Heaven should direct it below himself toward those who are despised and small in this world." A deep impression was made by Grebel, a refined and highly gifted man, who sacrificed his social position and, expelled from his country, preached here and there to small numbers

of people; his opponents called it "mumbling in the hiding places."

All the derision showered upon these ambulant apostles and their disciples could not hide the fact, unpleasant to reformers, that the majority of Baptists by humble and peaceable demeanor, simplicity in their mode of living, and strict morality, contrasted advantageously with the dissolute manners displayed by many so-called evangelical persons. Not only the inhabitants of Zurich but the spiritual leaders of South German Baptists, Denck at their head, sought to check the tendency toward revolution previously represented by Storch and Münzer, and particularly to thrust back as far as possible the dangerous millenarian performances. The particular stress laid upon the separation of the "brothers" from everything condemned under the name of "world," was not only an attack on Church, state and society as then existing, but a grave peril for the new Church itself. A separate organization was the evident aim of the fast expanding congregations, which by refusing certain duties toward state and citizens and by enthusiastic brotherliness really reminded one of Christianity's beginning. Cornelius said: "Frequently a few hours sufficed to found a congregation." Like magic worked the fleeting, half mysterious, modestly dressed preachers, who spoke from the bottom of their hearts. Their power seemed to increase with their wanderings and more

and more to become roads leading to death. The common love feasts were joyously celebrated as preparations for the succession of the martyred and dying Christ.

These congregations lived in constant expectation of suffering, but expelled without hesitancy all impure elements from their ranks; nobody was permitted to enter the Church except those who knew "that they were without sin." As strangers and not as friends, God's children met the children of the world. As yet they were not armed; so far they bowed without resistance to the power of penal law, and only disputed the authorities' right to interfere with their religious convictions, just as Luther and his followers had done in the beginning. As with the old Christians, so with the Baptists this passive resistance to the world matured future hopes for the victory of the good cause, which necessarily again assumed a chiliastic form. They could not repress for any length of time the old thoughts of revolution, after their protest against the world was answered by the "godless" with inhuman persecution.

In his fight with the "spiritists" (*Spiritoeser*) of Zurich, Zwingli first used violence, and this was fully in keeping with the theocratic lack of consideration which he usually showed. According to Egli's investigations it was persecution that intensified the religious excitement of the Swiss sectaries

into a hysterical state, and the authorities added to the trouble through their system of suppression. The socialistic and communistic agitation was not yet considered important enough to justify the extremely stern measures of the Zurich authorities. At first a fine was imposed for baptism, but owing to the stubbornness of many Baptists it was decided to imprison the offenders in the tower and leave them to starvation (originally it was said to "let them rot"); second offenders were to be drowned without mercy. The last named punishment was actually meted out at Mainz.

It was this same city which barely a hundred years before gave to Germany and the world one of the most wonderful inventions in the history of mankind. Investigation has proved that Johannes Gutenberg of Mainz was the true inventor of the art of employing movable types in printing. When and where the first attempts in this art were made cannot with certainty be known as the works printed by Gutenberg bear neither name nor date, but it is certain that movable wooden types were first used by him at Strasburg about the year 1438. Returning to Mainz in 1443, he formed a partnership in 1449 or 1450 with Johannes Faust, a wealthy goldsmith. Faust provided the money required to set up a printing-press, on which the Latin Bible was printed for the first time. Gutenberg was unable or unwilling to repay the advances made to him by

Faust, who as a consequence came into possession of the business, which he carried on and brought to a wonderful degree of perfection, in conjunction with Peter Schöffer of Gernsheim.

Assisted by Conrad Hummer, a councilor of Mainz, Gutenberg was soon enabled to set up another press. In 1457, he issued the Latin *Psalterium*, which is remarkable for being the first bearing the name of the printer and the locality, as well as the year and day of its completion. It was elegantly printed and a copy today is worth a fortune.

Gutenberg's printing establishment existed in Mainz until 1465. He died some three years later, shortly after the archbishop elector of Mainz appointed him one of his courtiers and raised him to the rank of noble. The stupendous service performed by the printing-press during the throes of the Reformation have been to some extent set forth,—that which followed was beyond calculation.

Returning to those wild, hysterical days it may be said that absolute insanity took possession of the Baptists, particularly at St. Gall and Appenzell. While the dangerous doctrine of sinlessness led to hypocritical aberration, after the manner of the older pantheistic sects, other unfortunates, especially women, were seized with ecstatic cramps and convulsions. The strangest manifestation was probably the appearance of biblicism driven to imbecility. In order to become like children, adults sat down on

the ground naked, and commenced to play with apples and pine cones, or they tore and burned the Bible in accordance with the saying that the letter would kill; they would then point to their breasts and cry: "Here! here!" to indicate where the life-giving spirit was located. A deep impression was made by such an insane man, who beheaded his own brother at the latter's special request, that the Father's will might be done, in frightful imitation of Christ's death in sacrifice.

These horrible outbreaks, although they disappeared quickly from Swiss soil, furnished the authorities, jurists and theologians, evangelical as well as Catholic, with the best proof that the Baptists were "ordered by the devil" to corrupt the people and should be exterminated, root and branch. Thus, in 1527, a persecution began throughout South and Middle Germany in which human cruelty put forth all its ingenuity, and still was finally defeated by the heroism of its victims.

Duke Wilhelm of Bavaria issued the direct order that those who retracted should be beheaded, and those who did not retract should be burned. An imperial edict of January, 1528, was followed in 1529 by a resolution in congress to the effect that all adult Baptists were to be condemned to death by an ecclesiastical judge, without investigation, while the Suabian Union had previously sent out troops to kill them without judgment and right. Landgrave

Philip alone protested against killing people by the sword on account of their belief, but it was in vain.

While incarceration only was resorted to in Hesse, the heads of the sectaries in the electorate of Saxony came under the special consent of Luther, who even branded the poor people's contempt of death as devilish obduracy. The fact that they stole about secretly and did not appear in public, as did regular preachers, was to him a "sure sign of the devil." It is to the credit of Strasburg preachers that, for a time at least, they rejected these views, and even a churchman like Butzer acknowledged that without a doubt "dear children of God are among these people."

Closest to them was Capito, whose mystic leaning went as far as the "inner word" and chiliasm. Finally he, too, gave his consent when, under Butzer's leadership, preachers and counselors of Strasburg by strict measures put an end to the morbid growth of sectarianism. Butzer showed "a grim joy" when attending the hearings, which were accompanied at times by torture. The sharpest fighting against the "brothers" was done in the Alps and other territories of King Ferdinand. After the first few years the number of executions at Ensisheim was estimated at six hundred, and in Tyrol and Görz at one thousand. In Moravia, where Balthasar Hubmair made Nikolsburg the center of the movement, the large property owners, even after

the execution of this prominent leader in 1528, protested for a long time against the abolition of the very industrious and peaceable Baptists, and only after the War of Schmalkalden was Ferdinand able to eject those people on a large scale.

Deeply touching were the patience and piety expressed in writings and songs by "God's children," who were hunted like wild animals. In one of the prayers Hans Schlaffer, who was later tortured and beheaded at Schwarz, said: "We also beseech thee for all our enemies that thou wilt forgive them, for they know not what they are doing." They used the expressions of baptism of blood, or sacrifice of fire, for the end of their martyrdom; boys and girls showed no dread of incarceration or place of execution; many spectators were deeply moved when, at Bruck on the Mur, the youngest of three sisters to be drowned laughed at the water instead of being horrified. Such joyful suffering drove the tormentors to the wildest frenzy. One's heart shudders at the fiendish atrocities. It was reported of one brother imprisoned in Austria that both his legs were squeezed so tight in a clamp that they rotted and, before his eyes, the mice carried his toes away. Even Satan, who in various forms visited the poor sufferers in prison, furnished many anxieties. The descriptions of these diabolical tortures, with which Baptists' records and poems abound, had only an inspiring effect upon the vic-



tims. Their history was heroic beyond description. As always, martyrdom proved contagious. Jacob Huter of Tyrol, who was an eye-witness of many bloody deeds, wrote: "The cruel, raging dragon has opened its jaw wide to swallow the woman illuminated by the sun, who is the affianced of our Lord Jesus Christ."

In the stress of this awful period of persecution the old accustomed apocalyptic pictures and ideas gained new power over human minds. Since Münzer's days they were never fully lost; Suleiman's threatening invasion again brought to the front previous notions about the Turks, who were to reform corrupted Christianity and chastise all those, particularly the authorities, who did not believe in God. These expectations were coupled with the belief that God's children would not only emerge victorious finally from the general upheaval, but that they themselves should execute God's judgment. It may easily be imagined how eagerly the outwardly subdued followers of the revolution listened when the last things were proclaimed as imminent.

The "enthusiastic" Baptists were particularly active in Franconia and Suabia; they refused to listen to an unconditional prohibition against the carrying of arms and the right of self-defense. Long before the time of Münzer's kingdom of God, Augustin Bader, a furrier, who was executed in 1530

at Stuttgart, ordered a crown, insignia and court gowns for his future kingdom in Israel. Hans Hut, whose former connection with Münzer could be noted from his gray clothes, in spite of his association with Denck and other moderate agitators, continued to preach his sermon: "The saints will rejoice and hold in their hands double-edged swords that they may do revenge in the countries."

Cornelius expressed the opinion that all these prophecies would hardly have preserved baptism from a quick decay if the still unbroken strength of Lower Germany had not been added. The movement came too late in southern Germany; there the victors eradicated revolution thoroughly during the Peasants' War. Nevertheless, Baptists in Upper Germany started the unusually successful propaganda which, in a comparatively short time, fanned the flames of fanaticism in the Netherlands and Westphalia to a fury such as had never been known before.

Melchior Hofmann, a furrier of Suabian Hall (*Schwaebisch-Hall*), was considered the most gifted among all the artisans familiar with the Bible who had been changed into preachers and prophets by the Reformation. At first he appeared in Livland as an enthusiastic apostle of Luther's gospel, but gradually became convinced that his interpretation of Daniel's prophecies and of the apocalypse contained the real "holy doctrine" in the strongest con-

trast to Luther and his followers. His efforts to gain a footing at Stockholm failed, and he was soon obliged to leave Kiel, where King Frederick I had employed him as a preacher, because he spoke of Amsdorf as a "lying, false spirit of the nose," and also attacked Luther's doctrine of the Lord's Supper. This passionate and fanciful man delved deeper and deeper into his studies of the last day, for the coming of which he longed impatiently and the time of which he tried to determine exactly, consigning to damnation meanwhile all those opposed to his views.

In spite of many differences of opinion Hofmann got very close to the Baptists. At Strasburg, where he first appeared in 1529 and was imprisoned at his own request in 1533, he was soon surrounded by enthusiastic followers, while the visions of prophetic women were filled with him. One of these ecstatic dreamers sometimes imagined that she saw him as a singing white swan and sometimes as a laughing death's-head. A certain Jost, whom Hofmann compared to Isaiah and Jeremiah, claimed that Strasburg was destined to become in spirit the New Jerusalem; from within its walls, which would extend all over the world, 144,000 virginal, apostolic messengers were to set forth. Hofmann called this the office of clearness, in opposition to the conceited, arrogant office of those versed in letters, and added that only those able to climb complacently the

"forty steps in the clearness" could count themselves among the "chosen ones."

At Strasburg these actions would hardly have left any deeper traces than many other formations of sects which appeared and disappeared in the old and more modern days. For many years, imprisoned in the tower, Hofmann waited for the last day until it came to him.

This South German dreamer, transplanted to the north in early youth, had a surprising power,—partly through his words and partly through his writings,—on the people of the Netherlands and Lower Saxony. By an unforeseen combination of circumstances, his kingdom of God was realized neither at Strasburg nor in Holland, but at Münster.

For awhile the Netherlands appeared to be the favorite gathering place for "God's blessed and chosen ones." Luther's teachings were forbidden there by the governments with unrelenting strictness, just as eagerly by Charles von Geldern and the bishop of Utrecht as by Charles V, who decreed in 1520 the burning of Luther's writings, and in 1522 gave sufficient power to a worldly inquisitor, whose place was soon taken by three ecclesiastics, to proceed against the heretics with all possible means, even by "omitting the usual forms of justice."

Here burned the first pyres for Luther's followers, at Brussels in 1523, and at Utrecht and the Hague in 1525. The Augustines of the Nether-

lands were the champions and martyrs of the gospel, as in Germany the new doctrine found the most fertile soil among the higher city classes. At Amsterdam, for instance, it was customary to say that those who wished to please the authorities had to adopt Luther's views. One of the most refined gentlemen, Ravesteyn, ventured to remark at the imperial table that at last in four hundred years, a Christian had appeared, and the pope tried to push him aside.

Contrary to his experience in Germany Charles V was able to carry out his own will in the hereditary territory of Burgundy. After the death in December, 1530, of his aunt Margaret, who was opposed to heresy, he warned the new governess (*Statthalterin*), his sister Maria, to abstain from all further participation in Lutheran sympathies, saying that he would consider his parents, brothers, sisters, wife and child, as his worst enemies if they permitted themselves to become contaminated by that sect. Thus power succeeded, outwardly at least, in getting the upper hand of the "Lutherans" and "Sacramentists."

This system of persecution, in addition to the effect of the Netherland Bible and of the translated or original evangelical writings, promoted the production of sects which, beginning secretly and strengthened by the fiery, inspiring example of the martyrs, were no longer satisfied either with

Luther's doctrine or that of Zwingli, which had also been introduced. Romantic preaching found eager listeners among the lesser people, who, deprived of their former spiritual leaders, commenced to study the Scriptures for themselves "like children," and to live entirely in pictures, biblical stories and promises. From near at hand, on the lower Rhine in Germany, Westerbürg, Cologne and other evangelical radical centers made their influence felt.

The first decisive gathering of the "confederates" was organized by Melchior Hofmann, who in 1530 gained an enthusiastic collaborator in eastern Friesland in a maker of wooden shoes named Jan Trijpmaker, who soon afterward spent a short time in Amsterdam. His "God's ordinance," with its main thought of a union between God and Christ's true followers, became fully as important for the organization of Baptists in the Netherlands as the effect of the apocalyptic oracle from Strasburg, which raised the expectations of the "Melchiorites" to fever heat.

When, however, Hofmann, who was one of the two witnesses of the revelation, submitted to imprisonment in Strasburg, for the purpose of seeing a Frisian prophet's word fulfilled, and the great things which he had announced did not occur, another leader arose among the fearfully excited people of the Netherlands and declared himself, on the strength of his own inspiration, the promised

second witness Henoeh, and as beyond the period of patience and sorrow preached by Hofmann. Jan Matthys, a baker of Haarlem, a man of tremendous energy, forced the Dutch Baptists from near and far under his orders through the dominance of his personality and the threat of God's curse. His apostles were sent out to baptize people and to call to arms those already baptized. The period of distress was ended for the saints; the revenge predicted by Hofmann, the baptism of blood for the persecutors, was at hand; the sword which the godless had drawn against God's people was to be turned against their own hearts.

This reversal from suffering to acting, from love for the enemy to his annihilation, after all that had been undergone, could not but be astounding; religious history has shown that such extremes are frequently found close together. According to Weingarten's excellent judgment, chiliasm is "the form from which the respective ideals of a period and its most extensive efforts are seen."

In a different sense from Hofmann, his Dutch pupils were chiliastics, inasmuch as they formulated much more definitely their expectation of an earthly kingdom of God under the rule of the coming Christ. It is no wonder that in this connection the spiritualism of baptism degenerated into coarse sensuality, and that this feeling emanating from the spirit and from the negation of all worldly impulse

was distorted into a hideous travesty of blood and lust. The world of the Middle Ages, from which the Baptist movement emanated, showed similar instances of outbreaks of a crazed asceticism such as was experienced, in inconceivable horror, in the city of Münster, conquered and ruled as it was by the Baptists.

The Dutch messengers sent to Westphalia regarded themselves as conquerors, although in many respects the soil for their kingdom of God had been well prepared for them. The year 1525 brought tremblings to Münster and Osnabrück, and after that the advancing gospel was carried and accompanied by democratic currents into a number of Westphalian cities and other places. Beginning in 1529, this movement throughout the succeeding few years caused a serious industrial crisis. At that time, owing to a failure of crops, commenced in earnest, "the dance of the beggars and the horrible, high cost of living," as Sebastian Franck expressed it. In some regions the price of rye was almost trebled within a year, while the misery was increased by the Turkish taxes which, in the Cleve territories, for instance, amounted to a tenth of the total income.

Political and social causes aided in the evangelization of Minden (in 1529), Herford and Lippstadt. In the last named city, immediately after the arrival of the evangelical people there was a distribution



of the common property, as well as of that of some citizens. At Minden, the city counselors were taken from the "shoe lofts and baker's ovens," while Cragius, a preacher and leader of the movement, gathered the lower populace around him and worked for a complete overthrow of things. At Soest, where in 1531 the armed citizens had temporarily expelled the counselors, reformation was helped to victory through an affecting scene. In 1533, an evangelical weaver, who was condemned to death as a disturber of peace, was poorly struck by the executioner, whereupon he seized the sword and fought in despairing desperation. Thus he became more dangerous than in life to the authorities of the old Church, through his death as "God's martyr."

The most important religious change took place in the city of Münster, a bishop's seat, where in 1531, Bernhard Rothmann, a preacher, opened the attack on the old Church and the citizens replied to the bishop's resistance by surprising and arresting his counselors and officials. The compromise, which, in 1533, was forced upon Bishop Francis von Waldeck, made Münster an evangelical city without bringing the movement to a standstill. As in many other cities of northern Germany, sympathy for Zwingli began to show itself here also. Rothmann was an ambitious and somewhat cold-hearted man, who seemed to care above everything

else for his own domination. He started to re-organize the church at Münster, after Zwingli's model, and then, under the influence of some street preachers expelled from Jülich, the so-called Wasenberger turned to evangelical radicalism. The Lutherans, who at that time were still in power, called his doctrine "strange and vacillating" when he rejected infant baptism and formed connections with the immigrating Melchiorites, but the "poor corrupt crowd" surrounding him prevented all attempts on the part of the counselors to silence the ecclesiastical revolutionary.

During the late autumn of 1533 the evangelical people, the Baptists and the rest of the Catholics, had been in arms, but a real decision was reached only in January, 1534, when the apostles of Prophet Matthys appeared in Münster, among them the handsome and eloquent Jan Beuckelssen from Leyden.

It was an ominous calm before the storm. During the day the chosen ones confined their activities to avoiding all intercourse and meeting with the non-believers. At dusk, however, they were seen running here and there, and threatening voices were heard: "Do penance, God wishes to punish you; mend your ways. Father, Father! exterminate! exterminate the godless!" On the 9th of February, 1534, they rose in arms, but the evangelical people, who negotiated with the bishop in this emergency,

showed their superiority, and could have overcome the danger by a powerful blow had they not been deceived by the concessions of the Baptists, and the almost treasonable love for peace of the mayor of Tilbeck, who promised full freedom of belief.

That settled the fate of the non-Baptists; one of the Baptists' reports contained the following: "The Christian faces again assumed beautiful color; everybody on the market place predicted the future, including children seven years old; the women took wonderful jumps, as though they intended to fly away; but the godless ones spoke; they are raving and full of sweet wine." Their power lay in this chaotic and fear-inspiring fanaticism. As in almost every religious movement, the women were the first to be won over. Only the arrival of Prophet Matthys was now needed to change Münster into the yearned for New Jerusalem of Baptist enthusiasts.

On the morning of the 27th of February, their armed hordes raised the war-cry: "Come out, you godless ones! God desires to wake up and punish you!" Those who did not consent to be baptized were driven out without mercy into the snowstorm; in the market place the preachers were seen standing with buckets of water in front of them, ready to baptize, while Mayor Knipperdollinck and many others gazed toward heaven and cried: "O, Father! O, Father! give! give!"

That which followed might be taken for the action of lunatics were it not necessary to judge carefully the undeniable relationship between this Baptist movement at Münster and the prevailing mental tendency, in addition to the social background of religious sentimentality. For many years apocalyptic and chiliastic representations exerted enormous power. There were deeply implanted an over-estimation of ecstatic and visionary conditions, which throughout were due to either God's or the devil's influence, and a general inclination to see wonders in every unusual appearance of the sky or on earth. Hartfelder explained only lately the varied superstition of Melanchthon, who not only was educationally among the foremost of his age, but was free from all mystical leaning.

Luther still lived in the expectation of seeing the end of the world, which he first predicted for 1534, and then hoped to witness in 1540. In a letter to his wife at that time, he concluded with,—“Come, dear last day.” He felt his old dislike of a sentimental abuse of such predictions when his one time admirer, Styfel, announced at Lochau the Lord's return for Sunday, the 19th of October, 1533, at eight o'clock in the morning. With sermons and the Lord's Supper the trembling congregation prepared for the great moment, and many members mistook the blowing of the departing herder's horn for the trumpet of the last judgment. Luther

caused the dismissal of the fanciful official, who soon sobered down. In reality it was only the opposition to the eschatological inclination of Baptists, which made the Lutheran as well as the Reformed Church reject the true old Christian chiliasm as a "Jewish" misconception.

In his mind's eye, Luther saw so vividly "the Son of man, who will come in the clouds of heaven with great power and splendor," that this powerful picture of evangelical prophecy convinced him firmly of the nearness of the world's end, a fact which accounted for his frequently surprising indifference toward worldly matters and particularly the great events of the day.

The communistic form of Münster's kingdom of God was closely connected with the old Christian views and with the ascetic idealism of the Middle Ages. The universal human longing for a golden age of guiltless existence and eternal spring, of a lost paradise to be found again, had gained for fifteen hundred years in the doctrine of salvation of Christianity, established forms and world importance. According to Eicken's argument, it was believed that "the ideal standard of value for all human conditions" was found in the original state of the first man prior to his fall. In attempting with Christ's succession to return to the original state, free from sin, it became necessary to abolish the institutions introduced through that sin. The

discontinuation of state, marriage, officials, labor, and property, became the last aim of Christ's succession, like negation of evil. While monkdom only tried an approach to realization of this worldwide self-command inside of the convent walls, radical mysticism, excited by chiliastic fancies, tried seriously to lead all human beings, except the incorrigible ones ripe for elimination, back to sinless happiness.

In times of social unrest such ideas move not only the minds but the fists of the masses. The last previous occasion of this kind was at the beginning of Huss's revolution; the Taborites declared the ownership of private property to be a sin punishable by death; they insisted also upon unconditional equality for the chosen ones, and condemned all refinements of life, but only a small minority dared to go to the limit of communism by asking for community of women.

Thus at Münster all the saints, freed from every skeptical element, changed into one immense war-like family, because they were forced into military organization by their obligation of godly revenge and the unmistakable necessity of preparedness for defense. Within two months, not without employing and executing the death sentence, first all money, then all property of the inhabitants, was turned over to the counselors and the prophet. Rothmann told the believers: "It is mine as well as

yours and yours as well as mine." The administration of provisions was regulated as in a convent or a military camp and meals were eaten in common. The city constitution was no longer considered suitable for the "new Israel" and soon disappeared to make room for a government by twelve elders, who had the Bible in front of them on a table during their sessions. The highest power was vested in Matthys, the Prophet; under his leadership the mob of Dutch immigrants terrorized the native brothers, whose complaints ceased when Matthys, before their eyes, felled a dissatisfied blacksmith with his own hands. The brother who asked for anything must not be refused if the other were able to spare it; front doors were to be left open day and night, because domestic privacy offended the principle that everything should be in common.

A complete community of women was not introduced, but the prophet's command that no woman should be permitted to remain without a man produced polygamy, which was not much of an improvement. The better feelings of the native brothers rebelled once more against these atrocities, but their attempt at revolution was suppressed by bloody force of arms, and the distribution of the much more numerous female inhabitants among the minority of the "gentlemen" continued. More than one of these unfortunate women had to pay with her life for resistance to the abominated com-

pulsion. Henry Gresbeck, one of the brothers at Münster, afterward wrote his experiences under the merciless rule of the foreign "fiends," and involuntarily testified for them that their fanaticism was not pretended and must be regarded as the principal cause of their actions. He said: "All the Baptists had a bad color in their faces; it was of a pale yellow shade under their eyes and they all had a troubled look; a real Baptist could be recognized from his face."

The Prophet Matthys, while making an attack with a few companions, at the spirit's suggestion, was cut to pieces by the hostile foot soldiers. The unsuccessful attempt on the bishop's life by a beautiful young Dutch woman was another eloquent proof of the terrible determination that always goes hand in hand with religious and political fanaticism. The prophet's notorious successor was not lacking in this trait, although in his case it was strongly mixed with calculation and selfish motives.

Johann von Leyden's stormy life ended when he was still a young man, in the twenties. He was the son of a Dutch peasant and, before his restless mind joined the Baptist movement, had tried his luck as a tailor, innkeeper, merchant and mastersinger (*Meistersaenger*). Displaying great ability and energy, he pushed himself into the place formerly held by the fallen Matthys, while on the surface "regents and commons of the Christian assem-



blage at Münster" continued to appear in sovereign power. The highest prophet soon changed to a king, on the strength of a revelation proclaimed by Prophet Dusentschur from Warendorf with the consent of the other prominent individuals, but without consulting the people. "Johann the Just in David's chair" was to reign not only in Münster but throughout the world, as "a king of justice everywhere." In keeping with a tailor's taste was the overdone pomp with which the new ruler surrounded himself and his assistants in the government. Magnificent processions made the city streets brilliant and they reminded one of the stage splendor indulged in by the one time "Rederyker" and actor, but the royal justice mentioned was carried out in bloody earnest.

In order to maintain his power, Johann von Leyden employed the simple means that were popular with the terrorizing men of the French convents. The boldness with which, in defiance of communistic principles, he created devoted followers from the ranks of his companions in splendor and high living, the sure judgment which caused him to form at once a mounted bodyguard, and the well calculated change from condescension to haughtiness showed that he was a born tyrant. In this instance, Machiavelli would have had an opportunity of studying a strange variety of illegitimate rulers. To this king and to his people, the "true Israelities,"

their whole existence must have appeared as unheard of and wonderful. It was not so easy as the dreamers thought to level the church steeples of New Jerusalem with the ground, but the old houses of God, called by names of derision, stood idle while the market place and cathedral square became the scene of ecstatic sermons and strange court and tribunal displays in the new state of God. The entire population,—men, women and children,—gathered at the sound of the Lord's trumpet to see the king, in full armor, the crown high on his head, arrive on horseback. Reviews and sham battles took place, followed by the immense Lord's Supper, at which the king and queen served the brothers and sisters. There, from his high chair, Johann personally announced that God had deposed him; then Dusentschur, on the strength of God's order, renewed him his kingdom.

Accompanied by the blasts of trumpets, meals were served to the king until, after copious indulgence, the spirit of baptism came over him and he sent for a captured foot soldier (*Landsknecht*), whom he beheaded with his own hands in the presence of all his table companions.

A danger to the king which should not be underestimated lay in the utterances of the baptistic spirit. One day a former leader of the Münster democracy, Knipperdollinck, tried to overthrow the royal government by running about the market place like a

lunatic, dancing and crying, until finally he proclaimed himself to be the real king. Johann always met such attacks by employing similar methods, but a weakness in his position was recognized from the fact that he had Knipperdollinck arrested and afterwards became reconciled with him. He had to keep on good terms with the man who could claim to have made him king.

In view of the empire's miserable condition, it may be easily understood that for nearly a year the fight against the communistic revolution was left to the insufficient power of the bishop of Münster, who at first sent back the Hessian reënforcements and, in spite of financial assistance supplied by Catholic authorities, could not conquer the fortified city.

Two formidable assaults were repulsed by the Baptists in 1534, and in October of that year they sent twenty-eight apostles to all parts of the globe for the purpose of announcing the king's arrival from Zion. The city of Warendorf alone accepted the proposed "peace," while in all other places the messengers were arrested and executed, but Dusentschur's threat that those cities would be swallowed up by the ground at once, did not materialize.

Cornelius claimed with reason that this was the turning point. Negotiations of authorities in neighboring cities and the empire over the Münster

question dragged for a long time until the district assembly (*Kreistag*) at Coblenz in December, 1534, and the imperial diet at Worms in April, 1535, voted the necessary means for continuing the siege, and at the same time made Count Wirich von Dhaun und Falkenstein commander-in-chief of the army in front of Münster. Even then the evangelical people, particularly the cities in the empire, pressed their efforts for a peaceful compromise. The object was to counteract by all means the evident intention of the Catholic authorities to bring the city back to the old Church after conquest, and for a while even the bishop, at the landgrave's request, seemed inclined to uphold the gospel in Münster.

The Baptists refused to accept the mediation of the cities, and their efforts to form a connection with their brothers outside of Münster were too late. A great deal of preliminary work had been successfully done; in the Netherlands and on the lower Rhine there were many congregations, both large and small, enthusiastic over what they had heard in regard to the new kingdom of God. Rothmann's widely distributed pamphlets on restitution or radical reformation, and on revenge, were written for the propaganda and especially for the lower class of people; one of these, "David's armor," called on the brothers to rise and wreak revenge

on Babylon, saying: "All they did to you, you shall now do to them."

There was some hope also of voluntary support from many princes; the new "David" heard rumors to the effect that the kings of France, England and Scotland had been converted and, above all, the landgrave was counted on as a "friendly well-wisher of the truth." He was the only one among the German gentlemen who hesitated over executing the death sentence against the Baptists, and King Johann personally honored him by a letter in which he addressed him as "Dear Lips." More important than these useless efforts were the plans for an army to relieve Münster, of which hints were heard toward the end of the year, in the Netherlands and in Cleve. Amsterdam, the hotbed of enthusiasm, at that time saw the uncanny, naked Baptists running through the wintry streets with exclamations of pain; they were following the example of a citizen whom they called the child; all had thrown their clothes into the fire.

The "banner of justice," however, did not first fly there; it was seen previously in other cities, and armed uprisings of the sect were suppressed in January at Groningen and Leyden, and in March, 1535, at West Friesland, also near Deventer and Warfum. The sectaries at Amsterdam followed in May under the leadership of Jan van Geel, a messenger from Münster, but after a hard battle they

were vanquished and the survivors were executed with extreme cruelty. The fate of New Jerusalem, where hunger had ravaged for months, was no longer in doubt, but with an iron hand Johann von Leyden and his henchmen kept down every sign of dissatisfaction. Heads fell by the dozen, while the common people tried to live on grass, boiled shoe leather, horse hides and chalk water. A Hessian ambassador was told by the counselors that the king was inclined "to renounce the world, but that things had reached a point where they could not turn back."

The reign of terror was so well organized and the besieging army had so little desire to fight that only the treason of two deserters, Gresbeck and a foot soldier (*Landsknecht*), encouraged a surprise attack during the night of the 24th of June, which came near being unsuccessful. The last of the defenders did not surrender until the following noon. Pitiful was the appearance of the spectre like, emaciated forms, whose faces resembled grinning death's-heads. The king, his governor (*Stratthalter*), Knipperdollinck, and his chancellor, Krechtinck, were taken alive and, after a long imprisonment, executed on the 22nd of January, 1536, in the public square on which had previously stood the judge's throne of the new David. The agony of execution by red-hot tongs did not prevent Johann von Leyden from showing the stoical courage of a fanatic; even

on the scaffold he loudly appealed to the Father. High up in the tower of the church of Lamberti the bodies of these martyrs were preserved for centuries in iron cages, as a horrible warning to the city of Münster which, in spite of all efforts on the part of Hesse and the empire cities, was henceforth lost to the gospel.

The ardent Baptist movement was at an end. Of very little importance were the small aftermaths, particularly in the Netherlands under the influence of "King" Battenburg, who was executed in 1538, and David Joris, a painter on glass. Joris became the center of the apocalyptic sect at Münster for a short time, but a victorious champion arose from the ranks of the brothers to fight against his doctrine of the three-world ages, with all its mass of fantasm and sensuality in keeping with the man's degraded nature. It is told that Joris sent his own followers, including his mother, to death while he saved himself by pretending, under a false name, that he belonged to the evangelical church; he died in 1556.

A Frisian, Menno Simons, formerly a priest, who died in 1561, became the purifier and shepherd of the sorely harried Baptists. The better element among them at that time laid the foundation for a peaceful and modest future, and the introduction of a Baptists' dispersion in England was of some importance. The power of evangelical radicalism

was broken forever in Germany, where henceforward no room could be found for the few scattered followers of a mystic subjectivism, who did not wish to sacrifice their independence to any church. Among them were men like Schwenckfeld and Franck, who might be counted with the best rather than with the worst of the nation, although Luther's intolerance made them the laughing stock of the true believers through calling them Stenckfeld and Dreckhummel. It would have been a disgrace to the Germany of the sixteenth century if all the peculiar individuals who seceded from the old Church had unconditionally surrendered to the powerful man of Wittenberg, and if the desire for full religious liberty and the aversion toward all force in connection with the conscience had no longer found any voice under the stress of the recently established new Church. The pious and loquacious mystic, Caspar Schwenckfeld of Ossing, who died in 1561, was a Silesian nobleman; he was persecuted by Catholics as well as by the evangelical people, but wandering from town to town in southern Germany, he gained quite a number of followers. He became the precursor of the future pietism and its conventicle system, by opposing the "sensitiveness" of the true belief to the self-sufficiency of many evangelical ecclesiastics, who considered themselves as in Palestine, and to the appreciation of ostentatious church ceremonies.



Sebastian Franck from Donauwörth, who died about 1543, belonged to the circle of radical mystics, although he was extremely loud in blaming the weakness of sectarianism. Hase called him a "knight of reason"; he combined a strange mixture of profound speculation and historical research with a desire and talent for popular performance which, as an author, almost put him on a par with Luther. As a soapmaker and printer he barely earned a living, but desired to remain a free man without a binding office, that he might tell God's people what he received from the Lord. Inevitably he was persecuted by Lutheran zealots, which seemed almost justifiable in view of the relentless love of truth with which this most pessimistic critic treated all conditions of his period, including Reformation and its champions. His writings, particularly the "Chronica, Time Book and Historical Bible," published in 1531, are a real treasure of observations, full of candor and ability, though his historical and geographical studies were frequently superficial. He was called a fanatic in the matter of independence, and this trait, which frequently appeared among great men of the Renaissance period, occasionally misled him into a quietistic underestimation of the present filled with its strife and in need of action, but it cannot be denied to his honor that this gifted man, instead of placing his talents at the service of a popular tendency, chose

the hard lot of an outlaw for the purpose of being able to speak his mind in accordance with his best knowledge and conscience. He really touched a cancerous growth of German Reformation when referring to the replacing of the human with a paper pope, and the sanctity of work with the sanctity of word, and while boldly declaring that there was less liberty to believe and speak in the new churches than among the heathens and Turks. On one occasion he said: "The world will and must have a pope, whom it will believe implicitly to please him; if he were taken away, it soon would find another, even if it should become necessary to steal one, or dig one from the ground."

These expressions show the character of Franck, who fought on general principles against human authority, but at the same time recognized it as a necessary evil. In this manner he disapproved of all ceremonies, including the sacraments, as belonging to Judaism, of dogmatic disputes as "monkey play," and of each formation of a church as partial and sectarian. He added: "With St. Peter I stick to all my brothers, who among all nations seek God." His opinion that "nobody guessed it right" led to a demand for unconditional tolerance, while on the other hand, in spite of his theoretical attacks upon Church, state and private property, Franck condemned all revolutions. On the whole, this wonderful saint was the right

student of medieval mysticism, of Tauler and of German theology; his glowing German patriotism was apparently not harmed by his skepticism and bitterness. Nevertheless, owing to his incorrigible idealism, Franck was a real revolutionary.

It was not in the evangelical camp alone that such disturbers nourished on mysticism were found. Without formally breaking with the Church, the genial physician, Theophrastus Bombastus Paracelsus from Hohenheim, who died in 1541 and was a friend of mystical ecstasy, true to his Latin motto, "*alterius non sit, qui sui esse potest*," compared the two fighters, Luther and the pope, to two lewd women who call each other names and still are both in the same disgrace. With his extremely fantastical natural philosophy he rose above all dogmatic disputes because, as he put it, "whoever is only a believer and not a philosopher is not a wise man in belief; he is wealthy who recognizes God in his works and from them believes in him; not like the blind man believes in a color."

A Platonist like Paracelsus was the adventurous miracle man Agrippa von Nettesheim who, without desiring to sacrifice the Roman Church to "the unconquerable heretic," still with his religious magic of recognition of and community with God pushed aside all ecclesiastical mediation, and at the same time directed the most bitter attacks against princes and noblemen. There was some similarity between

these scientific reforms and the evangelical radicalism.

While characterizing Paracelsus, an opinion was expressed by Ranke, who did not desire to apply it to one person only, as follows: "Full of reason, deep, provided with rare knowledge, but reaching out much too far, self-sufficient, defiant and fantastical, as such individuals probably appeared frequently in the German nation." Among the leaders of evangelical radicalism there was more than one man of this kind. Ranke, with his matured judgment, recognized the inner relationship between all these restless elements; he remarked: "Münzer's inspirations, the socialistic attempts of the Baptists, and the theories of Paracelsus agree well together; united they would have reorganized the world."

There was still another movement, the connection of which with that of the Baptists was much feared and could have led at least temporarily to democracy's victory over the princely state. Just as was the case in the great Peasants' War, the first condition of all political success, unity of action, was also lacking in the revolution of Low German citizens.

## II

### THE FIGHT FOR DENMARK

**T**HE third and fourth decades of the sixteenth century brought a thorough reorganization of ecclesiastical and political conditions in the north of Europe. The introduction of the Reformation in Scandinavia coincided with the death grapple of Hanseatic supremacy on the sea. Not only the old opposition of German princes and cities, but the imperial policies, became involved in this chaotic struggle of widely varying interests.

The last chapter of the stupendous fight was a strife for supremacy on the Baltic Sea, which was temporarily held by Germany, Holland and England. Dietrich Schaefer said: "These nations relieved each other in ruling on the sea." Every possible reason was assigned for the decay of the Hanseatic Union, but while the union of the three Scandinavian kingdoms threatened the very existence of Hanseatic power toward the end of the fourteenth century, its real downfall came with the loss of control on the Sound, the passage way of all sea traffic between east and west, although, besides some minor mishaps, North German trade

policy suffered a heavy loss during the century through the discontinuance of the office at Novgorod. The authority of German merchants over the Sound was only possible while Denmark was politically dependent on the Hanseatic Union. If that dependency ceased, the necessary consequence would be the long desired emancipation of the Dutch, and gradually also that of the English merchants from the oppressive burden of German trade monopoly, which kept them from the Baltic and from the enormous territory back of it. Under such circumstances a change in the Danish crown, which the city of Lübeck strove to obtain, caused new conditions in the world, not only for Scandinavia and the Hanseatic Union, but for the Netherlands and England.

For a long time Lübeck had been the "Queen of the Baltic." Emperor Charles IV once addressed her mayors as "Gentlemen," and at that time the city of Lübeck was considered supreme among the entire Hanseatic Union, as well as in the closer union of the Wenden cities. However, the Hanseatic organization never was very strong and finally the western members, headed by Cologne and followed by the Dutch, began to look after their own interests without any consideration for the Baltic group. Even in the fifteenth century the Netherlands, desiring by all means to escape the exclusion from the Baltic, were regarded as Denmark's

natural allies; their efforts for mercantile and national liberty were identical; both kingdoms disliked the demand that a change on the Danish throne should depend upon the Hanseatic Union's consent, and they were alienated by the inflexible egotism which attempted to reject all intrusion upon its monopoly and all efforts for equality on the part of other merchants. On one occasion, while in England, the Hanseatic people declared that they would not permit a doubt to be thrown on one iota of their privileges, since they were of such a nature that they could neither be discontinued nor lessened. Nevertheless their office system, with compulsory storage and cash purchases, seemed antiquated in view of the increasing desire for traffic facilities, while in some quarters even the great reputation of German merchants as reliable dealers began to suffer.

Long before, through direct dealings with England, the city of Danzig had withdrawn Prussian trade from the tutelage of the other "easterlings," and, since Novgorod's fall in 1494, Lübeck's supremacy could no longer be maintained over her eastern rival, who facilitated traffic from England and Holland down to the Turkish border.

In the meantime the Netherlands' trade, favored by the support of a flourishing industry and Burgundy's more liberal policy, had moved its center from Bruges, where the previously prevailing Han-

seatic office was almost abandoned, to Antwerp. A connection very unfavorable to the Hanseatic Union was then formed between the hated northern union kingdoms and Burgundy's powerful heir, the Hapsburg dynasty. Defying Lübeck, Denmark's King Hans had opened the Sound to the Netherlands and his energetic son, Christian II, who was a brother-in-law of Charles V, set out to create a real monarchy at the expense of the Scandinavian aristocracy and of privileged German merchants. He deemed it proper to promote reformation in Denmark and even tried to bring Luther and Carlstadt to Copenhagen, but he unhesitatingly accepted ecclesiastical help for the overthrow of the Swedish nobility, and even made use of papal excommunication.

His well-considered effort was first to break the power of the privileged classes. In Denmark he tried, through the gospel and a new penal code, to abolish the pressure brought to bear on the people by the clergy and nobility. In Sweden he injured the aristocracy and the national aversion toward the Union at the same time by the horrible carnage at Stockholm in December, 1520, which with its numerous aftermaths had many hundreds of victims. In his efforts to found his government on the lower classes, Christian imitated the course of his enemies, the Swedish authorities known as "Sturen." The splendor and wealth of Dutch





**Johannes Gutenberg.**  
**Mainz Copy of a Strasburg Painting.**



citizens impressed him; he desired to make Copenhagen the center of trade between the eastern and western seas and tried to form a connection with Russia, the Fugger people and England, while founding at the same time a Scandinavian commercial company and rendering the tariff war against the Hanseatic Union more effective.

There was something impressive in Christian's government, but at the same time this royal reformer alienated the hearts of the people by a repulsive mixture of wild passion and calculating ambiguity. His double dealing with Wittenberg and Rome was shown when this champion of the oppressed Danish populace, in his negotiations with Henry VIII, declared mutual support against the ever-increasing defiance of the plebeians to be the duty of all princes. In saying this he thought of his mortal enemies, the republicans in North German cities.

This lack of restraint on Christian's part seemed to bring a favorable turn to conditions at Lübeck. That city supported the revolution, which soon made the highly ambitious union king a homeless fugitive. In Sweden a young relative of the Sturen, Gustav Wasa, became the leader of the national movement, which had the defiant peasants of Dalecarlia for its first warriors; in Denmark the clergy and the nobility, encouraged by the progress of the revolution, placed Christian's uncle, Duke Frederick

of Holstein, on the throne. After Christian II tried to save himself by fleeing, in April, 1523, the Scandinavian Union was forever at an end. At the court of his imperial brother-in-law there were many plans of changing the three northern kingdoms into imperial fiefdom, or of making them hereditary territories of the Hapsburg dynasty.

Nobody cared to support Christian; the commercial interests of the Netherlands were too important to reject a favorable treaty with the new king of Denmark. Lübeck and her Hanseatic associates could obtain from King Frederick I only equal rights with the Netherlands, but the Hanseatic people found themselves in a more favorable position toward Sweden, where the scarcity of country produce made imports from Germany necessary, while Gustav Wasa, the crowned demagogue, was not considered by any means in a firmly established position. Lübeck, Danzig, and their associates enforced there a concession of trade monopoly excluding all other foreign merchants from Sweden and preventing Swedes from taking their ships through the Sound and Belt, thus cutting connection with the West.

Under such unsettled local conditions reformation came as a new element of reorganization. The causes of its victory in the Scandinavian countries varied greatly from and were almost opposite to those at Lübeck. In the most vigorous manner

imaginable, the deposed king and his successor coöperated in Denmark for the purpose of developing what had been begun under Christian. While in exile Christian impressed Luther as a man living after the example set by Christ, and when in 1524 he sent to his old home the first Danish translations of the New Testament, decorated with his own picture, Frederick I, in spite of his promise to the clergy and nobility that he would punish heretics by death, made no longer a secret of his evangelical preferences, which he had already shown when still a duke. At one time he was even in favor of Hofmann's apocalyptical views. The head of the movement in Denmark was the son of a peasant, Hans Taussen from Fühnen, who was formerly a monk and had studied at Wittenberg. At a congress in Odense in 1527, the king, who permitted priests and lay brothers to marry, obtained full religious liberty for Lutherans and Catholics, which was confirmed by the council.

The financial side of a church reorganization, which soon assumed a prominent place in Denmark, was very highly regarded in Sweden where Gustav Wasa, after quiet consideration, used the only means in his power to strengthen his rather poor kingdom. It must not be believed that Sweden had not felt the touch of the mighty spiritual current of the preceding years. Prominent sons of the nation, such as Olaus Petri, his brother Lorenz Petri, and

the future chancellor Laurentius Andreae, came early under the influence of the great man at Wittenberg. Nevertheless the Reformation in Sweden more than anywhere else was the work of the king, who used his powerful personality in this case as effectively and successfully as he had done in the bold and truly Scandinavian adventure to which he owed his crown. In 1523, he wrote to the pope, threatening to send an appeal to the highest Pontifex—Christ. A few years later he undertook secularization, which he had prepared by liberal “loans” from the churches and convents. To one of his bishops he wrote: “Necessity breaks not alone human laws but also those of God.” On one occasion while speaking to his people in the open air, he mentioned that the good-for-nothings, the degenerated clergymen, should be driven from their property like the first people from Paradise. This, however, did not by any means represent the opinion of the Swedish people; the poor financial condition was blamed upon the new government and repeatedly, in 1525 and 1527, the Dalecarlians, who in their love of liberty always desired to be their “own masters,” revolted against their old leader.

In Sweden as well as in England the Roman Church fell against the will of the lower classes, but it was different in Germany, where the embittered common people were the first of all to raise their hands against Rome. After the execu-

tion of a few revolutionary high ecclesiastics there came, during the summer of 1527 in congress at Westeras, what Weidling called the "political stratagem" (*Staatsstreich*), which Gustav had prepared by his shrewd threat of laying down his crown. The gospel was pronounced to be the only justified institution; the booty of church property was divided between the king and the nobility; the noblemen were authorized to take back all property rented by the Church and all that it had owned in fee simple since 1454. The bishops had to be satisfied and declared their willingness to be "as rich or poor as His Grace desires us to be."

This Scandinavian development showed a strong contrast to the advance of reformation in the lower German cities. There the evangelical tendency was almost invariably due to a desire for changes in political and social conditions, while the authorities defending the old Church's cause at the same time upheld their own. In 1528, when Brunswick was evangelized, there were disorders directed not only against the old Church but against the wealthy people also. In 1533, there was an armed revolt at Hanover, where the evangelical people not only deposed the counselors but committed serious excesses.

Still more troublesome were the revolutionary outbreaks at Bremen where, from 1530 till 1532, democracy instituted a reign of terror, and it was

even worse at Lübeck. In 1528 Hamburg obtained a political and ecclesiastical reorganization without much disturbance, but the old capital of the Hanseatic Union managed to maintain its aristocratic Catholic character until 1529, when the financial position forced the counselors to grant the citizens' stormy demand for evangelical preachers. After that the progressive people held their heads higher from year to year; there was looting in churches and also in the private houses of the patricians.

Gradually this current brought forward Juergen Wullenwever, who combined a decidedly evangelical and democratic mind with real old Hanseatic self-confidence. There have been remarks about the effect of the sea climate on the mind; centuries of sea rule could hardly have passed over the proud republics of the North German coast territories without awakening and propagating a sturdy spirit of enterprise. Particularly at Lübeck the Hanseatic methods fostered a habit of political ventures. It would be hard to decide what part of the powerful plans between 1530 and 1540 should be credited to Wullenwever personally; at any rate, after being elected mayor in February, 1533, he had the assistance of a few bold associates.

Johann Oldendorp, a native of Hamburg and a prominent jurist, previously syndic in the city of Rostock, was apparently not a man of firm convictions, but, in his ambition and "restless mind"



he seems to have been the moving spirit of the demagogical triumvirate, in which the third partner, Markus Meyer, also a native of Hamburg, held an important position owing to the fact that he was a military expert. Meyer originally, was a maker of anchors; afterward he led the troops of Lübeck against the Turks; in him breathed the hardy stateliness and joy of life which that period and the home of the soldiers regarded in the nature of an ideal. In full armor, with twenty-four equipped horses and twelve shooters' horses, followed by several wagons containing women and young girls, he rode to his own wedding at Lübeck. Shortly afterward, at Copenhagen, the gallant warrior galloped to the women's house in holiday procession, preceded by drum and fife. While being tortured, Wullenwever accused Oldendorp of Baptistie sympathies and propaganda. At any rate, the democracy of Lübeck soon found itself in such condition that an alliance with any available radical element seemed desirable.

Lübeck's worst enemies, the Netherlanders, had only reluctantly assisted the expelled King Christian II when, by reëmbicing Catholicism he became reconciled with Charles V and in the autumn of 1531 started out to reconquer his lost kingdoms. Ships owned in Lübeck sailed side by side with the Danish boats against Christian, who first gained a foothold in Norway, but was unwise enough to place himself in the power of his enemies when

promised a safe return. The Danes, instead of taking him to King Frederick for an audience, led him to the fortified castle of Sonderburg in 1532. He remained in the Danish prison until his death two years later.

The Lübeck people, however, did not gain the desired help against Holland through this alliance with Denmark. Sweden even cancelled the previously mentioned humiliating treaty of 1523. Lübeck's membership in the Schmalkalden Union was of no use, because most of the evangelical princes had absolutely no desire to make common cause with the republicans, who had even abolished their old aristocratic constitution.

Thus Lübeck used the most audacious means and the most desperate plans of alliances in order to enter the great fight, which through the death of Frederick I, in 1533, was transferred from the Netherlands to Denmark. In March, 1534, an attempt was made to oust Wullenwever, but he met it by appealing to the citizens, and his position at the head of Lübeck became stronger than before. He arranged a truce with the Netherlands for the purpose of maintaining by force of arms his city's assumed privilege of disposing of the Danish crown in recollection of the glorious days of 1370. The old records said: "We know by God's grace that in Denmark, without our knowledge and will, according to privileges and justice, no king may be

elected." The son of King Frederick, Christian of Holstein, and the Danish congress made peace with the government of Burgundy, but the young duke insisted on securing a pension from the emperor. It was important that Charles V, although advised by Archbishop von Lund to annex the Scandinavian kingdoms as a "granary and bulwark against northern barbarity," refused for the time to support his brother-in-law against the duke of Holstein.

Christian was a considerate man, fully as zealous a Lutheran as he was a good German, but he was not a friend of the Danes; perhaps he would have renounced the succession sooner than the gentlemen of the Holstein nobility, who were urging him forward. Among these was the governor (*Hofmeister*) Johann von Rantzaw who, when Frederick was alive, was spoken of as the real king and greatly admired by Charles V and Francis I as a splendid warrior.

There was no inclination in these circles to receive the Danish crown from the hands of Lübeck's mayor. Rejected by Christian, Wullenwever applied to the elector of Saxony to "submit to such royal honors." In the meantime Markus Meyer, who happened to be in England, where Henry VIII formed a strong liking for him, proposed to Henry an alliance showing first, the prospects of a protectorate over a great northern union, and then

holding out to English ambition the Danish crown. In May, 1534, Meyer, by suddenly and successfully attacking a fortress in Holstein, on his own responsibility, opened the war, which was called the War of the Counts, in honor of a few Germans fighting for Lübeck.

Wullenwever did not hesitate to pick up the flag of the captured "peasant king," whose relative, the evangelical Count Christoph von Oldenburg, assumed the management of the Danish campaign, while against the "tyrant and bloodhound, the king of Sweden," his own brother-in-law, Count Johann von Hoya consented to serve. Meyer made a vain attempt to force a son of the last "Sture" to play the part of the pretender, "in the devil's name." The Lübeck people did their utmost to gain allies by using the Scandinavian crowns as a bait on various occasions; Duke Albrecht of Mecklenburg, a Catholic, was first promised Denmark and then Sweden. There were no prospects of obtaining support from many Hanseatic towns; only Rostock, Wismar and Stralsund held to Lübeck. There was, however, some sympathy felt on the part of the Danish and Swedish democracy; the mayors of Copenhagen, Malmö and Stockholm sided with their German colleagues. From the start, in Denmark and in a part of Holstein, there were serious attempts to make the war one of annihilation against the nobility.

The Danish peasants were thirsting for revenge and revolted against their old oppressors, who deserved that fate, according to an opinion expressed by the German chancellor of Frederick I. In one instance a refined woman was mercilessly killed. Many noblemen saved their lives by surrendering promptly; on the islands, even in Schonen, Count Christoph received the homage for his captured cousin. Only on the island of Fühnen and in Jutland the aristocracy remained true to Duke Christian, electing him king in July, 1534.

This democratic feature of the bold enterprise took from the Lübeck people the support of their princely co-religionists in the empire. Besides Duke Albrecht of Prussia, who at once espoused the cause of the duke of Holstein, the heads of the Schmalkalden Union, like Philip of Hesse and Ernest of Lüneburg, were entirely on this side with their sympathies, and were horrified by the "black peasant tyrant counselors" of Lübeck.

Ernest of Lüneburg wrote to the elector of Saxony: "You can hardly believe how the cities of this kind stick up their noses." John Frederick, who for a while looked longingly toward the crown offered him, declined definitely in the autumn. At the same time the movement in Münster took place. It was not to be wondered at that the princes and noblemen in northern Germany considered themselves in a great common peril. Nevertheless, the

leaders of the Lübeck democracy lacked the support of a really important power, as well as the firm backing within their own commonwealth. In September, 1534, when Christian III attacked the enemy at home and completely surrounded Lübeck, even from the side of the sea, the citizens became enraged against their leaders, whom they had previously praised. In a mock poem Wullenwever was asked: "How can we pay our debts?" and the answer was: "Repulse the enemy without fear and scratch your own ear." By a strange agreement, the opposing parties decided to maintain peace on German soil but to continue hostilities in Denmark.

However, the days of democratic power were numbered since under the stress of this "half defeat" the old constitution was resumed and the fugitive opponents were permitted to return to Lübeck. Wullenwever still kept hunting for foreign assistance, but while Henry VIII, who had granted subsidies, deferred a close connection and rendered it more difficult by making unreasonable demands, the only salvation of this evangelical democracy seemed to be in the hands of the emperor or of the Netherlands government. Wullenwever expressed his willingness to bestow the Danish crown on an imperial candidate, who had been put off for a long time, Frederick von der Pfalz, who had secured a wife at last by marrying a daughter of

Christian II. This would have given the Catholics and the House of Hapsburg-Burgundy, that is to say, the detested Netherlands, a dominant position on the Baltic. Charles V did not consider the candidacy of Frederick von der Pfalz seriously until Lübeck had retired from the war and the matter was decided.

At about the same time,—in June, 1535,—the land power of Christian III gained a victory near Assen, on the island of Fühnen, over the opponents under the leadership of Hoya; and near the island his fleet, reënforced by Prussian and Swedish ships, vanquished the Hanseatic navy which, although once powerful, was represented by only eight of its own warships.

Wullenwever fell a few months later; when, at last, hoping only for England's support, he left the city to join the foot soldiers encamped in the Hadeln country, he was made a prisoner by the archbishop of Bremen and left by him to his brother Henry of Brunswick. After a long imprisonment and cruel tortures, he was beheaded on the 24th of September, 1537, near the city of Wolfenbuettel, and his body was cut into four pieces. The serious complaints made against him, particularly that he intended to betray Lübeck to Burgundy and to join the Baptists, were not proven, and the entire proceedings might well have been called judicial murder. Waitz said: "The old forms of a court of

justice were perhaps never more strictly observed than in this case." Markus Meyer, who for some time defended a Danish fortress, was obliged to surrender in 1536 and was executed.

This settled democratic movements in Germany for centuries to follow. German democracy had tried impossibilities; its principal object,—to confine the rapidly increasing commerce of the world in its old narrow limits of the past,—was an anachronism. The seafaring nations developed such a trade as was never dreamed of and could not submit eternally to the limitations and exploitations by the "easterlings" on the Baltic coasts. Dietrich Schaefer called the Hanseatic Union "Medieval Germany on the Ocean." Everywhere the Middle Ages began to be looked upon as in the past. Even if supported by political power, the North German republics could have continued their trade supremacy abroad only by means of force. They were members of the weakest European state system and were constantly thrown upon their own resources.

Neither did the new national independence of their opponents, the Scandinavian kingdoms, present a very promising outlook. The old habitual interference by foreigners was finally checked but, in Denmark as well as in Sweden, the protection of the national kingdom developed a supremacy of the nobility of the worst nature. In 1540, a number of Swedish peasants, assisted by Catholic clergymen



and Austrian intrigues, revolted against the oppressive double government of the avaricious new state and the not less greedy "master men."

In Denmark where Christian III, after entering Copenhagen, settled the church question more violently than did Gustav Wasa by arresting all bishops and confiscating all church property, there commenced a long period of really "dog-like slavery" for the peasants. How the small tyrants, who did not pay the king any taxes and had full jurisdiction over the courts, treated the evangelical church, can be seen from the fact that the children of the preachers also remained slaves.

In 1570, one of the land owners actually had his clergyman executed. Nevertheless, it was extremely important for the future of reformation that the Scandinavian states, hardly liberated from the industrial compulsion of German merchants through the same religion, became again connected with evangelical Germany. In 1537, Bugenhagen placed the crown on the head of King Christian III. Before another century had passed the rulers of Denmark and Sweden drew the sword for the prostrate German Protestantism.

As though looking for a lost star of salvation, the decaying democracy of Lübeck waited for England's assistance. A few years later its opponents, the Protestant princes, also labored in vain for a closer union with the island kingdom, whose en-

trance into the ranks of evangelical powers would have been far more important than the reformation's victory in Scandinavia.

The church politics of Henry VIII depended too much on the fluctuations of worldly conditions and the avarice of the ruler to keep step with the German Reformation, which was controlled by different motives. For awhile the English government appeared to be on the right road to approach Lutheran doctrines, through the officially free distribution in 1535 of Bibles translated into English, and through publishing in 1536 articles which partly agreed with the Augsburg Confession. At that time Thomas Cromwell, Wolsey's successor, earned the nickname of "Hammer of the monks." With merciless energy this powerful man, by whom Archbishop Cranmer, in religious questions, was gradually forced into the background, started the great secularization of the convents. It has been calculated that 643 of these institutions, ninety colleges, and thousands of small foundations, were discontinued and that in this relentless persecution fifty-nine convent ecclesiastics were brought to the scaffold. Even the relics of St. Thomas à Becket were thrown into the fire, and the gold and jewels of the shrine went into the royal treasury.

Here, too, as in Scandinavia, the crown was obliged to divide with the nobility. Cromwell was made count of Essex and did not forget his own

purse when the division took place. In 1536, the farmers of the old belief, in the north of England revolted in favor of the monks and against the heretics, but the armed "pilgrimage of mercy" was soon suppressed and there were many victims on both sides. The royal fanaticism demanded from each a union of belief, which was to be half way between Rome and Wittenberg. Catholics were beheaded and Protestants burned; the bloody articles of 1539, "the cat of six tails," threatened every one who dared to speak for utraquistic communion and against celibacy, the doctrine of transubstantiation, and confession. Bloody footprints crimsoned the *via media anglicana* (English middle road) of Henry VIII. Cromwell came under the destructive machinery of his own system of terror when, for the purpose of strengthening England's connection with German Protestants, he brought Anna of Cleve, who was without charms, to the spoiled Tudor as a fourth wife. In 1540, the king put her away and lopped off the head of Cromwell for the poor selection he had made. When the real creator of the English Church, who in his testament provided for masses for his soul, gave up his life on Tower Hill, German Protestantism had just entered upon a decisive crisis. It was subsequently shown that, without the political and military support of foreign countries, the institution was no longer a danger to its great imperial opponent.

### III

## DECLINE OF THE SCHMALKALDEN LEAGUE

**I**N the history of the German Reformation, the forties of the sixteenth century, more than the preceding years, seem to have been given to the preparation of the great blow which Charles V. directed against the evangelical estates. It is true that just at that time the emperor was especially zealous in negotiations with heretics and that, with the old idea of a decision by a council, the efforts were directed toward the attainment of their aims by the shorter road of "religious conferences."

The advances of the emperor, however, were not voluntary and one gains the impression that he was seeking to become master of his external enemies by the help of the Protestants, in order that he might with less interference destroy these deluded ones who themselves helped him to remove the obstacles to their castigation. At any rate, the center of gravity of the imperial policy, more than before, was transferred to within the empire itself, and the personality of the ruler who step by step had become his own prime minister and commander-in-

chief continually appeared in greater prominence. That his opponents played into his hands does not take from the merits of his political and military achievements, for even the most talented statesman could never have achieved so complete a victory without such involuntary assistance.

Now both France and the German Protestants were guilty of important political sins of omission shortly after the Peace of Nice and the Frankfort Truce. In the autumn of 1539, Henry VIII pointed out to the French Ambassador that the Turk was perching on the emperor's back; that Venice felt itself aggrieved by him; that all Italy was discontented, and that there was little money in the imperial treasury. Furthermore, the ill feeling which had repeatedly manifested itself in the Netherlands against the growing demands of the imperial war policy had, in 1531-1532, led to uprisings in Liège and Ghent, and in the case of the inhabitants of Ghent, who from of old had taken a defiant attitude, they were now merging into a revolution.

The maintenance of civil independence in the face of intervention by the imperial government gradually receded into the background and gave place as a motive to the desires of the lowest classes who, rendered barbarous through horrible atrocities of mob law,—without employment and supported by the city,—aimed at absolute anarchy and the plundering of all who were possessed of property.

Already an attempt was on foot to draw the peasants of Flanders into this movement. What a temptation for Francis I to whom, as the ancient liege lord of Flanders, proposals had been made by the people of Ghent! But he hastened, on the contrary, to suggest to his new friend, the emperor, that he journey through France as the shortest way to the Netherlands. In truth, Charles V had the courage to put himself defenseless into the hands of the man on whom he had inflicted unforgettable humiliations at one time. Unharméd, as if in triumph, he journeyed through the French cities, which competed with Francis I in showing only brilliant hospitality and courtesy to their royal guest. At Poitiers they brought him a golden eagle as a gift of honor, and at Paris a huge statue of Hercules, in gilded silver, was presented to him. How then could the *Krischer* think seriously of further resistance?

When finally some twenty heads had fallen, Charles pronounced the death sentence on the liberties of the city in which he was born,—the city whose economic prosperity had for a long time been in a state of decay. Bucer, in the presence of the landgrave, at one time remarked concerning the emperor, with full justification: "Ghent well shows what his mercy is, when he is given a chance."

It is hardly possible that the proposal which

Charles V made at that time to Francis I could have been seriously intended. Could he have really had it in mind to give to the duke of Orleans with the hand of his daughter, Maria, his treasured possession, his "real Indies"—the Netherlands? Together with Burgundy, as well as with Geldern and Zutphen (which had to be snatched away from Cleve), they would certainly have represented "one of the best kingdoms in all Christendom." Francis I doubtless took care not to purchase these glowing prospects,—this "shadow picture," as he said,—with a renunciation of his pretensions in the Netherlands and Italy, and with the surrender of Savoy and Piedmont.

Soon after this friendly meeting there seemed, according to the threats of the king, to be at hand "the greatest war that had ever taken place between them." Everywhere in Italy and Germany, on the borders of the Netherlands, and in Constantinople, the French intrigues against Hapsburg were renewed with fresh vigor. By cunning treachery the republic of Venice was driven to an unfavorable peace with the Porte (May, 1540).

But most clearly spoke the marriage of the young niece of the king, Johanna of Navarre,—whom Charles V had desired for the heir to the throne, Philip,—with Duke William of Jülich-Cleve. A few days later, France closed a treaty of offense and defense with Jülich, and Charles replied with

the transfer of the dukedom of Milan,—which had been the object of much strife,—to his son. It was, according to the word of a prominent Netherlander, “a condition worse than open war.”

In such a situation it was of course impossible for the emperor to break with the German Protestants, however violent might be the complaints which the pope had raised because of the Truce of Frankfort. Paul III declared that the archbishop of Lund had been bribed, and that the queen governess (*Staahtalterin*) Maria was a secret sponsor for the heretics. He demanded the strengthening of the Catholic League by violence, or at least the threat of violence. Many voices accused Charles V of absolute schismatic intentions; but the pope had taken a good deal of force from his complaints and demands, in that he had postponed for an indefinite period the council desired by the emperor, after an abortive attempt at Vicenza on the 21st of May, 1539. Consequently the notion of the call of the emperor to be the reformer of Christianity was bound to come into prominence again in those circles which, stimulated by Erasmus and his ideals of a “loving concord of the Church,” still believed in the possibility of a reunion and could not fully understand the obstinate fight over this or that dogma.

Those holding these views were chiefly men of learning and politicians, such as Julius Pflug, the



Carlowitz, the ex-Lutheran and zealous Irenical Witzel, who had already exerted a certain influence in the Catholicizing Brandenburgian Reformation. These men had no clear understanding of the fact that it was not a matter of one or another reform, nor of an understanding on a scientific basis, but that behind the hairsplitting of the hostile dogmas, and in spite of numerous theoretical points of contact, two utterly different tendencies of thought and belief stood opposed, and could not be reconciled. Quite without warrant the effort was made at that time and later to charge one of the two parties, or even single personalities with the fruitlessness of the religious conferences which were set on foot by the emperor after the year 1540. Much more remarkable than the decision of Charles V to make use of this means was the consent of Rome, even though it was qualified, and the participation of papal envoys in negotiation whose admissibility from the strict Church standpoint it really would have been necessary to deny.

We shall revert later to the reform tendency in Italy. It was very significant, for instance, that in the spring of 1540 the nuncio Morone, while opposing religious conferences, declared the absolute necessity of a council as the only means of salvation. In the eyes of Paul III, the courtesy with which the emperor looked on the papal conquest of Camerino and compelled his daughter to a reconciliation with her

husband Ottavio (grandson of Paul) although she hated him, must have had great weight.

In spite of the blatant declarations of the old agitator Held, the envoys of the protestors already at Ghent had persuaded the emperor to announce a meeting for "Christian agreement" at Speyer. This assemblage, which had been transferred to Hagenau, met in June, 1540; but since no agreement was to be reached by the entire estates of the two confessions, there was opened a more restricted assembly at Worms in November at which Granvela presided. He and the Imperial Councilor Naves rivaled each other in courtesies toward the Protestants, but these had already declared specifically in advance that they would acknowledge as judge in the disputed religious questions only "Our Dear Lord, Jesus Christ."

In vain did Granvela assign to the papal legate Campeggi a by no means distinguished place, and bare his head only at the name of the emperor, and not at that of the pope. The opposition of the Protestants found its representative this time in that very Melanchthon who formerly had been so pliant, but whose repellent roughness now left nothing to be desired. Amid endless wrangling concerning the number of those entitled to attend and relating to all conceivable formalities, Morone strove to side track the whole discussion because he feared, in view of the uncertain attitude of three of the eleven Catholic

conferees,—Pfalz, Jülich and Brandenburg,—that a majority might finally result for the Protestants. Even before this he had bitterly complained of the German bishops declaring that they were men only in drinking and in their associations with women, but of no account against heretics. He showed, by yielding on allegedly unessential points and by the postponement of dogmatic questions to the council, that he considered them capable of bargaining away the agreement, “and in this way all Germany would be unified, but become Lutheran.”

Melanchthon and Eck had disputed for only a few days at Worms when an imperial communication postponed the continuation of negotiations to the Reichstag at Regensburg, which was finally opened in the presence of the emperor himself on the 5th of April, 1541. To understand the bitterness of the proudest of princes toward the German heretics, one must understand the impressions which Charles V received at this time. It must have been hard for him to be considerate toward them continually, to overlook and to seem not to hear the insults and scorn which more than once assailed his imperial and Catholic feelings at Regensburg.

In spite of this, however, and in spite of his experience at Worms, prospects for an agreement seemed rather to have been bettered at Regensburg. In fact, as has been frequently emphasized, the two

parties never approached one another so closely as there. Both sides worked for an understanding. Even at Worms the landgrave had held confidential negotiations with Granvela, (we shall soon see for what reasons), in consequence of which a secret religious conference took place between Bucer and Capito on the one hand and Gropper, Chancellor of Cologne, and the Imperial Councilor Veltwyck on the other. The upshot of this conference, during which the two Protestants could not rid themselves of the fear, "Might we not be serving the devil, where we thought we were serving Christ?" was a scheme of reform which was first imparted to the landgrave and then, without naming the originators, to Luther through the elector of Brandenburg, and by way of Granvela to the legate and the Catholic theologians.

The evangelical doctrine concerning "justification" was here as good as accepted; mutual adaptation at least was put in the foreground, and the irreconcilable contradictions regarding the doctrine of transubstantiation and other questions were weakened. It is indicative of the greatest degree of conciliatory advances ever made from the Catholic side that the Cardinal Legate Contarini, after effecting certain changes, declared his acceptance of the plan. Contarini's despatch to Regensburg was in itself a concession to the friends of unity, for among the priests of the old Church

probably none was better fitted for the rôle of intermediary and, aside from his views concerning "justification," he had already swerved from the orthodox conception. Sealed and with great formality, the above mentioned "Book of Regensburg" was submitted by Granvela to the six theologians whom the emperor had appointed for the conduct of the conference. These were the Catholics Eck, Pflug, and Gropper; the Protestants Melanchthon, Bucer and Pistorius. This selection testified to the serious wish of the emperor to reach a friendly solution, in spite of the threatening cries raised by the Bavarian dukes and Mainz, for in this group the noisy fanaticism of an Eck was entirely isolated.

For the moment Contarini himself was surprised, since there was no mention of his collaboration in the nominating degree. The conference began on the 27th of April, with the book transmitted by the emperor as a basis. It must have surprised the partakers in the conference themselves that, on the 2nd of May, they reached an agreement concerning the fundamental article regarding justification, in face of the fact that Melanchthon showed only a slight disposition favorable to an agreement, and that Eck gave his signature unwillingly.

Granvela with his own hand reduced the agreement to writing. True, a clause was added at the end in favor of love manifesting itself in good

works, which served as a supplement to the strictly Lutheran conception that faith alone justifies, and for this reason Contarini and other old Church theologians could look upon the article as distinctly Catholic, whereas in Wittenberg they were by no means satisfied with the "prolix and patched up thing."

Luther was willing to put up temporarily with the article only on condition that the Catholics should declare that hitherto they had taught differently, and he counseled the elector not to attend the Reichstag otherwise, unless he was willing to "make peace with the devil himself." Still more decidedly did Rome, despite all the efforts of Contarini, reject this first result of the attempt at union at Regensburg. Alexander stood for the absolutely correct view that even if the theologians should agree in every respect, yet Germany never would submit to their compact. With the same feeling Melanchthon had wished rather to see the matter wrecked in the beginning than to await further occasions for the unavoidable breach. The thing that Luther had often enough expressed and which the elector upheld unshakably, —as it were, instinctively,—the impossibility of a reconciliation between Rome and evangelical Germany, was given the stamp of finality at the Regensburg Conference and in this, and not in the above-mentioned futile reapproachment, lay its true significance.

It is characteristic that John Frederick gave his councilors specific cautions on the road that they should prevent all doubtful intercourse of Melancthon with the opponents; they were, in fact, to leave him out of their sight—or out of the house—as little as possible, but he who had been a fanatic for peace seemed as though transformed. Perhaps this time also Calvin, who now was present as the representative of Strasburg, had influenced him. Calvin argued to “his” Germany in an anonymous pamphlet, with a strength of language recalling that of Hutten, for the permanent separation from Rome,—from “the system of godlessness, of lies, of robbery and of voluptuousness.”

In vain did Charles V and Granvela still strive, through strong pressure upon the legate and the Catholics, to attain the impossible. For a man such as Held, Granvela, Naves, or Lund, were “the three evil spirits” who prompted the emperor to an improper interference with matters of belief. But the imperial project to announce as a common doctrine the articles that had been agreed upon and to exercise tolerance until the council with regard to those on which there had been no agreement, met with obstinate resistance, even in the person of Contarini, although Granvela went so far as to threaten that if union were not attained “in a few days all Germany would be Lutheran.”

A formal embassy, including two princes of An-

helt, was arranged in the name of Joachim and Georg of Brandenburg, but really on the wish of the emperor to sound Luther in regard to the project of toleration, but he clothed his declination with the demand that the emperor should order "a pure and clear" preaching of the articles agreed upon,—that is, the admittance of evangelical preachers with the Catholics.

The negotiations of the Reichstag were drawn out for months, but the emperor did not come to any better understanding with the Catholics than with the Protestants, he was able to satisfy neither the one nor the other. The imperial edicts issued by the Reichstag renewed the Nürnberg Truce and also the edict of the Augsburg diet until a general or national council, which in any event was to be held in Germany, and if neither occurred within one and a half years, until the decision of a Reichstag; the Protestants were not to write about the adjusted articles, nor to bring over to their belief anyone from the other side; processes in the imperial court of justice and proscriptions in religious matters were to remain in suspense until the holding of the council or the Reichstag. But the Protestants, by a steady refusal to help the emperor against the Turks, compelled him on the 29th of July to consent to a secret pronouncement in the Reichstag edict which extended the protection given to religious property to themselves, did away with the exclu-



sively Catholic makeup of the imperial court of justice and with the application of the Augsburg edict to religious matters, and granted to the Protestants the "Christian reformation" of monasteries and other religious foundations.

It is true that on the same day the emperor joined the Catholic League, but not before, so to speak, its teeth had been drawn. It was, according to Vetter's expression, "hardly any longer to be called a defensive union." Until the publication of the imperial Reichstag edict, the bickerings and quarrels of the estates continued. Thus far, indeed, nothing of "Spanish tyranny" could be noted in the country. Charles V still had to put on a good countenance in view of this princely anarchy,—the Catholic as well as the Protestant,—until he could draw the sword and show his real nature.

But in spite of all this the Reichstag represented a triumph of the imperial policy which was more valuable than enforcing the demand for aid against the Turks. Two evangelical princes had given binding assurances to the emperor in the matter of the Jülich question, and as regarded France. These were Elector Joachim, whose ecclesiastical organization was guaranteed in return until the date of council, and Philip Hesse. This betrayal of the Protestant cause by the landgrave—for a milder expression would fit but ill,—was, together with all that was connected with it, the darkest blot

in the history of the German Reformation even though, in the case of the chief culprit, there wrought in a most peculiar way the heightened sensitiveness of the conscience which was one of the most characteristic features of this great religious movement. Nothing perhaps is more instructive than to trace the motives which carried the chosen leader of German Protestantism from private to political immorality. It was in this that the tragic fate of Germany at this time was most clearly expressed to the effect that the adhesion of an imperial prince to his emperor could really have something politically immoral about it.

How different from the brutality of the English or the frivolity of the French king was the pricking of conscience, almost childish in fact, which seized upon the landgrave, who was as sincerely pious as he was incapable in respect to his animal nature, in consequence of his excesses. Disqualified to keep faith toward his unattractive Saxon wife, who bore him seven children, he nevertheless heaped most heavy reproaches upon himself and from the time of the Peasants' War until 1540 almost completely refrained from partaking of the Holy Communion. As early as 1526 he had inquired of Luther concerning the permissibility of polygamy, and although Luther advised against it in his reply, he had found it scripturally justifiable.

It did not escape the landgrave that the Witten-

bergers, in their pronouncement on the English divorce matter, had declared polygamy as the least questionable way out. Even the reformers themselves declared the same. If they could not free themselves from exaggerated literalness in biblical interpretation, how could the princely student of the Scriptures interpret the clear evidence of the Old, and the silence of the New Testament, as being otherwise than in accord with his wishes?

His choice of another wife fell upon Margaret von der Sale, a lady in waiting of his sister, the duchess of Rochlitz. In 1539 he was able to obtain the consent first of Bucer, then of the Wittenbergers and of the elector John Frederick; even his wife gave him her permission. His sister, however, whose "hot head" he feared, was deceived in the most shameful manner. Luther and Melanchthon were, like Bucer, weak enough to acquiesce in the wishes of the landgrave upon the condition that the matter should be kept secret, as it was not to be a law, nor a rule for all cases, but merely a dispensation for this one particular exception.

Thereupon the young lady herself was informed of the intentions of her lover, who was resolved in case of a declination to expose her in such a manner that no one else would ever want her hand. Accordingly the betrothal took place on the 4th of March, 1540, at Rothenburg, in the presence of Bucer, Melanchthon, and a councilor of electoral Saxony.

A barrel of Rhine wine was sent to Luther, although he had really believed that the landgrave would keep "an honorable girl in secret marriage" in one of his castles, without any formal wedding.

The chief immorality in the whole wretched business lay in this counsel of the theologians to deceive the world. It was revealed in all its ugliness when the matter became known, as was to be expected, first in court circles and then quite generally. The preacher Melander who had officiated at the betrothal went so far as to defend the bigamous marriage from the pulpit! Melanchthon, in anger and sorrow, fell ill, whereas Luther "a rough Saxon and a peasant," as he said, held firmly that one could and ought "for the sake of a higher good and for the Christian Church" not to fear a good strong lie. "The secret 'yea' must remain a public 'nay'." Philip's fear and indignation only stirred him to threats. "It is in truth," he wrote, "not my welfare that is at stake for I know well, when it comes to using the pen, how to wind myself out of trouble and to leave your Honorable Highness in it." The man who heretofore had been resolved rather to sacrifice himself and the whole world than the truth, now descended to a frivolous justification of his falling off from himself. "I will act," he wrote to Philip "with a good conscience, as did Christ in the gospel; the Son knows not of the day; and as does a pious confessor who

shall and must say openly in court that he knows nothing of what may be asked of him in regard to the confession made in secret."

This was no better than when Bucer sought to prove the right to deceive one's enemies from the example of Christ and the Apostles, aye, even of God himself. He was of the opinion that the landgrave should by a notary's contract declare his second wife to be a mere concubine, "such as God was accustomed to give to his good friends." In the most fearful way the poisonous effects of religious quarrels had thus contaminated the leaders of a movement which came into the world for the salvation of conscience and of truth.


This betrayal of the spirit of its origin was revenged on the German Reformation bitterly enough. For with the separation between electoral Saxony and Hesse a drift seized the Schmalkalden League, at the very time when unity and clarity of thought were most demanded by Protestant politicians. Nothing less was at stake than the taking of sides in the renewed European war between France and Spain, and to the Protestant capable of clear thinking the choice could not be doubtful.

Although Francis I might persecute heretics in his kingdom, the great enemy of the evangelic church was and would ever remain the emperor, whom only the most extreme necessity could bring to the point of seeking help from the German Lutherans and

paying them with half concessions for short periods. At the court of electoral Saxony, to be sure, they did not fully understand this, but they had the right feeling and it was very significant that the opinions of Luther and Melanchthon, as already mentioned, warned the landgrave against all trust in the ruler who was "an unfaithful, treacherous man, who had forgotten all that is just, and whose faith was that of popes, cardinals, Italians and Saracens."

The absence of John Frederick from the Reichstag at Regensburg had a significance, readily understood, since he had left the envoys at Regensburg in no doubt of his disinclination for a peace with the "murdering, burning and idolatrous crowd" of the Catholics. Electoral Saxony would have been ready for the compact which France presented to the German Protestants in the years 1540 and 1541. This compact perhaps would have meant the fall of the Hapsburg world power and the victory of the Protestant element in Germany.

Highly characteristic was the way in which the French Cardinal du Bellay referred to the close enmeshing of Satan, in addressing his friend Jacob Sturm of Strasburg. In fact, Strasburg was the real center of the endeavors aiming at an alliance, and these were furthered in the most zealous manner by such men as Bucer, Calvin, and their correspondent, the historian Johann Sleidan, but the double marriage of the landgrave spoiled all that.



**Hornberg Castle Near Neckarzimmern.  
Photograph by Dr. C. Jaeger, Aarau.**





We know the relations he had established long before with the imperialists, with Queen Maria, and with the amiable Granvela. Yet it was only the stiffly aloof attitude of the Wittenbergers and of electoral Saxony, after the disgraceful business became known, that drove him completely into the imperial camp, for in the beginning he had given hope to the Saxon elector, in return for his promised support of assistance to Jülich, and, in case of a world war, "should we retain the upper hand, of the imperial crown."

When John Frederick, however, shocked by the public scandal, refused all expression of his own approval of the bigamous marriage and, in the course of an excited exchange of letters, refused all help in case of possible judicial action on the part of the emperor, Philip threatened desertion to the latter. He even thought of turning to the pope for a dispensation, and in doing so declared he would "not worry about three or four thousand florins." In vain Butzer presented all religious and political reasons against the unnatural union of the head of the Schmalkalden League with Charles V, and in favor of the French alliance. "The Court," he wrote, "is the greatest enemy of all freedom and justice for the German Nation; that Your Highness knows. Were there leisure elsewhere they would surely be at work on us." But the promises of Granvela, with whom Philip since

the fall of 1540 was again in active negotiation, seem to have offered the deluded prince more security than a tentative reconciliation with electoral Saxony, and at the Regensburg diet, June 13, 1541, he concluded his agreement with the emperor and the Roman king, which was equivalent to a complete renunciation of all political independence. In return for the granting of amnesty, he bound himself to enter upon no agreement with Philip, with France, England, or Cleve; to hinder their entrance into the Schmalkalden League, and all German support of Francis I; upon demand to serve against the latter; to acknowledge the succession of Ferdinand in the empire, and to obtain a similar acknowledgment from those leagued with him. The dreaded champion of the evangelic cause had become a tool of the imperial policy. Philip's former fear that his enemies would seek to rob him of his freedom had fulfilled itself, though not literally.

It is to be added that the young Albertine, Moritz of Saxony had also been drawn into this contract. True, Philip had had exceptions made of the matter of religion and the Schmalkalden League, but he himself was to be protected against attack, on account of religion, only in case that "a general war was not made against all Protestants."

Thus Charles V was freed from a serious anxiety just at the time when a great coalition was being prepared against Hapsburg. The important place

which the German Protestants were to fill remained empty, for electoral Saxony was left in the lurch in its endeavors in behalf of a French alliance, even by the rest of the members of the Schmalkalden League. France, to be sure, had negotiated at the same time with the German Catholics, with Mainz and Bavaria, and had supported their complaints against the legate Contarini at Rome.

The French policy strove to win ground against the emperor on all sides, and the king furnished a most welcome foundation for condemnation of the imperial countermoves when in June, 1541, two French envoys, Rincon, the old negotiator with the Porte, and Fregoso, destined for Venice, were murdered at Pavia by Spanish troops. At that time Ferdinand's Hungarian rule was at stake and everything seemed to invite the emperor to expend his whole energy toward the East, "to save Germany itself in Hungary," as the representative of his brother said in the Reichstag. After the death of John Zápolya (July 23, 1540) the son of the deceased was acknowledged as his successor by a part of the nation, in spite of the agreement of Grosswardein and Suleiman, with whom France had been at work, to maintain the young prince against Ferdinand.

At the head of the anti-Austrian party stood "Brother Georg," a monkish diplomat of Croatian descent who had already been the right hand of

Zápolya and had risen to be the bishop of Grosswardein. It was already known at Regensburg, in June, 1541, that great preparations were being made by the Turks. Nevertheless Charles V, who later on excused himself on the ground of insufficient knowledge of these proceedings, went from the Reichstag to Italy just as the army of his brother, commanded by the old general, Roggendorf, received a serious check and the sultan himself appeared before Ofen, on the 26th of August. The widowed queen and her party learned quickly enough that Suleiman was not minded to leave Hungary in other hands any longer; it was made a Turkish province, and the Church of St. Mary at Ofen (Budapest) was turned into a mosque. The emperor had every reason to make it appear that he knew nothing of these events, while he arranged at complete leisure his meeting with the pope, which had as a consequence the summoning of the council, and put under way his belated undertaking against Algiers.

No wonder that evil-minded persons spoke of a well-planned flight from the Turks. When the imperial fleet appeared before Algiers, in the second half of October, Hassan Aga pointed triumphantly to the fact, when asked to surrender, that the sea was in league with him. Storms and rains, such as the old sea hero Doria had not experienced in fifty years, destroyed a great part of the ships and prevented any readiness for action of the troops that

had been landed. Charles V considered it good fortune that he was able to return home from his disastrous Spanish expedition at the end of November.

These North African expeditions of the emperor represented two of the most incomprehensible departures in a war policy which, in the one case as well as the other, failed to see its plainly indicated objectives. It was much less surprising that the Hungarian War, on which the empire had finally decided, in 1542, remained totally without results. Even German princes began at that time to have fears of the threatening proximity of the Turks and the direct threat hanging over Bohemia; but the aid, to which the Protestants gave their assent at the Reichstag in 1542 at Speyer,—after a five-year extension of the Regensburg peace arrangement and the suspension of court processes,—was gathered so slowly and had such an incompetent leader in the person of Elector Joachim II, that this campaign of the imperial army in Hungary greatly injured the reputation of the Germans as soldiers, though it was not so with the Turks. Not until toward the end of September did the army arrive at Budapest. An attempt of the Italians sent by the pope to attack, was not supported by the Germans. There was lack, as Ferdinand wrote, of “a head for good leadership, not of men and material.”

In the following year, on the other hand, Sulei-

man who himself crossed the new western boundary of his country won Fünfkirchen, Stuhlweissenburg and Gran, whereas Ferdinand, hampered by the lack of enthusiasm on the part of his Bohemian troops and the bad weather, again accomplished nothing. France in the meantime had strengthened its position by treaties with Denmark (1541), and Sweden (1542). In the summer of 1542, hostilities began. The successes, however, which the French won under Vendome in Artois and under Orléans, the second son of the king, in Luxemburg, were only temporary, much as they were furthered by the league with Jülich and by his army strengthened with Danes and Swedes.

In the south, the siege of Perpignan had to be given up without gaining anything, but in the spring of 1543 the victory of the leader Martin von Rossem at Cleve over the imperial forces at Sittard led to a new inundation of the southern Netherlands by French forces, while Suleiman, supported by French and Venetian money, appeared with the threat that "Vienna this time should be seized with both hands, not only with one finger." Khair-eddin Barbarossa, with the help of the French fleet, took Nice. At Marseilles the Turks were allowed to carry on the slave trade openly. *Non contra fidem, sed contra Carolum*, read the inscription of a French coin which on one side represented the lilies, and on the other the half-moon.

Instead of putting their whole strength into this widespread war, the German Protestants took advantage of the difficult situation of the emperor and the absence of every order-making factor in the realm, to carry on their territorial quarrels unmolested, just as was done in former times before the days of imperial reform. Electoral Saxony alone took an active part, so far as to send troops to the aid of Jülich. Prince John Frederick sought above all to attain the immediate aims of the particularist politics of a small state, with an unscrupulousness worthy of a better purpose. Of course, evangelical doctrine had to provide the veil for the desire for annexation on the part of the lord of the land.

It gives a peculiar impression to see the Wittenberger theologians—even a Luther—taken more and more into favor by the “Court” which they had so often condemned, and to observe how they changed their counsel as soon as the elector became insistent upon his will. It was so in the Naumburg matter, when for the first time the right of reformation, which hitherto had been exercised toward monasteries and smaller foundations, was applied to a bishopric.

In this case, while there existed a right of protection on the part of the Ernestine House, there was no authorization for the protecting prince himself to appoint the new bishop. John Frederick,

nevertheless, upon the vacating of the bishopric in 1541, dared to overturn the choice of the well known Irenikean, Julius Pflug, and to take possession of the foundation and appoint the superintendent of Magdeburg, Nikolaus Amsdorf, as bishop. Luther, who had vainly recommended the admirable Prince Georg of Anhalt, administered the rites of consecration for his old friend "without any chrism, also without butter, lard, bacon, tar, incense, charcoal, and whatever else there is so like sanctimoniousness."

These efforts were next directed against the bishopric of Meissen, over which both Saxon lines together held the right of protection, a circumstance which almost precipitated the too zealous elector into a war with his energetic young cousin Moritz, for without any further understanding with him John Frederick, in the spring of 1542 had the collegiate foundation of Wurtzan occupied and immediately reformed and provided with defenses. Not on behalf of the bishop but for his own injured rights, Moritz, who had been branded by Luther as a "mad bloodhound," took to arms. It was only with difficulty that the landgrave brought about a peaceable understanding, on the strength of which the contestants simply divided the bishopric among themselves. Meissen itself fell to the Albertine, who in the meantime, as had his cousin in Naumburg on his part, compelled the chapter at Merse-



burg to agree not to elect a bishop without his permission. Immediately thereupon the last noteworthy temporal prince who held to the old Church in North Germany was overborne by the two leaders of the Schmalkalden League.

We are already acquainted with the tension between Henry of Brunswick and his one time friend, the landgrave. There had developed between "Heinz von Wolfenbüttel" and the two Schmalkalden leaders an exchange of lampoons (*Schmähschriften*) which were highly objectionable even to their by no means delicate contemporaries, and which thoroughly revealed the low degree of culture in German court circles of the sixteenth century.

Luther, as we know, took part in this war of pens with his screed "Wider Hans Worst," but he by no means carried off the palm for coarseness, zealously as he endeavored to improve his first draft in that direction; but how could he have surpassed the official outpourings of the princes themselves? Best of all at this sort of thing was the chancellor of Brunswick, who repaid with interest the titles applied to his master, such as "cursed calumniator," "Barabbas," "Holofernes," "Satanas," and the like. In the reply the elector appears as "the unredeemed, lying, dishonorable and shameless Hans of Saxony," "the unwashed, inexperienced and untaught clown of Saxony," "the clumsy donkey," "the desperate arch knave and heretic," "the full,

drunken mole," "the drunken sot who is accustomed to intoxicate himself with his cooks and scullery boys and to soil himself with wine and beer not otherwise than a hog in the dirt," "the unformed monstrosity or freak of nature with his horribly awkward figure and deformity."

Worst of all were the heavy moral accusations to which "Heinz" and "Lips" treated one another.

While the Guelph represented the Hessian as a second King John of Münster, because of his bigamous marriage, his own private life showed blots no less ugly. Henry, too, had fallen in love with a lady-in-waiting, but instead of hitting upon the repulsive circumvention of the landgrave, he had let his Eva von Trott die, in the eyes of the world. At Gandersheim her picture was interred with all due honors. They held masses for her soul at the court and the unsuspecting duchess donned mourning, while the mistress kept herself hidden in the castles of the duke and presented him with one child after another.

The indignation of his wife, of the Trott family, and of the princes assembled at Regensburg, may be imagined when this hideous deception came to light. The frequent occurrence of arson in electoral Saxony was ascribed as a matter of course to Henry, on the ground, however, of testimony obtained under the pressure of the rack.

The actual provocation to the war was furnished

by the acts of violence in which Henry again and again indulged against the evangelical cities of Brunswick and Goslar, although the ban had been suspended over the latter city. In July, 1542, therefore, John Frederick with the landgrave fell upon their altogether unprepared opponent, who hoped in vain to find help in Bavaria, while his lands fell easily into the hands of the assailants, Wolfenbüttel alone resisting for a time. "Everything came through God," wrote Luther; but, looked at more closely, this Brunswick expedition showed the horrible barbarity of the methods of carrying on war at that period, (as well as in the twentieth century). The liberated Brunswickers themselves did not lag behind the Schmalkalden mercenaries in bestial ferocity. In a few monasteries near the city there was not only plundering and smashing of pictures, but documents and manuscripts were used as bedding for the horses; corpses were torn from their graves and thrown to the hogs. In the neighboring city of Hildesheim, which on this occasion joined the Reformation and the Schmalkalden League, things went little better. The dukedom of Brunswick was taken under the administration of the members of the Schmalkalden League, held in allegiance, and evangelized under the direction of Bugenhagen; but the innovation, because of the weakness of the provisional government at first, led only to religious and moral disorder.

At that, the questionable victories of Protestantism would have had a higher political value if the decision had been made to maintain by all means that invaluable complement to the North German Reformation which just then seemed to develop of itself along the lower Rhine. An old hope of the evangelicals was nearer realization than ever before. One of the highest prelates of the realm, the archbishop and elector of Cologne, had allowed himself to be won over. Since 1515, Duke Hermann of Wied had exercised this high office. He was a fairly good imperialist and a pretty good Catholic, but in no way a fanatic. He corresponded with Erasmus and, under the influence of John Groppers, sought to attack at least the worst ecclesiastical abuses, by means of a "reformation" in 1536.

In connection with this effort, Groppers's official hand-book for the clergy strove to combine, in the oddest way, an almost Protestant teaching regarding "justification" with the conceptions of the old Church. Since then, through intercourse with Protestant lords and scholars, and as the result of impressions received from the imperial attempts at union, the archbishop had become fully conscious of his evangelical tendencies. He supported a direction of the edict of the imperial diet of 1541 that the clergy should undertake "the Christian ordering and reformation," and entered into correspondence with Bucer who, upon his persuasion and

to the horror of the Cathedral chapter and the stout Erasmian reformer Gropper, began in December, 1549, to preach in Bonn. "The old gentleman," he asserted of the elector, "would rather give up his country than this cause; he looks altogether and fully to God." But the situation, according to his description, was a difficult one,—“rich harvest, few laborers, many enemies.”

In May, 1543, Melanchthon came. The reformers recognized with astonishment the obstinacy with which the masses in holy Cologne still held to their much-praised treasures, their sacred objects, their pictures and possessions,—all their “idolatry.” On the other hand, the majority of the temporal estates of the archbishopric showed themselves inclined toward a reformation, the main lines of which were declared by Butzer and Melanchthon in a very explicit “consideration.” At the same time Franz von Waldeck, the bishop of Münster, Minden and Osnabrück, came out openly with the expressed desire to follow the example of his superior. He had, in fact, supported the raid of the league of Schmalkalden against Brunswick, and had begun with the reformation in Osnabrück by calling in the superintendent Bonnus of Lübeck. Of course, the undertaking of Bishop von Waldeck, whose manner of life was loose, appeared in a very different light from that of the serious endeavors of the genuinely pious old elector.

What prospects were opened to Protestantism when, in the course of these beginnings of the evangelization of the German episcopate, Duke William of Jülich-Cleve personally partook of the Lord's Supper in both forms! As was the case with all North Germany, so too the lower Rhine seemed lost to the old Church, and while Jülich made deep inroads on the Netherlands by holding Geldern, the evangelicals of the imperial city of Metz, together with the duke and the bishop of Münster, sought admission to the Schmalkalden League. But from southern Germany came signs of an ever-growing evangelical tendency. In 1542, the new faith was victorious in Regensburg. Soon after followed the count palatine Otto Henry of Neuburg, deeply in debt, but for some years favorably disposed to the evangelical cause.

We know the feeling of the Austrian nobility; at the "Landtag" of 1541, the Catholic religion was openly declared, in an address to King Ferdinand, to be idolatry. Even from Venice the fiery pleas of Italian brothers penetrated to Wittenberg, seeking spiritual help and temporal protection from persecution.

But the leaders of the German Protestants on the one hand lacked the understanding, and on the other hand the strong will to seize these favors of fortune and to utilize them. There is something inexpressibly saddening about the narrow-mindedness

with which the aging hero of the Reformation, now more than ever sunk into the sterile world of dogmatic disputes, rejected everything which seemed to him in the slightest degree to obscure the pure evangelical doctrine. In his newly awakened anger against those who upheld the sacraments, he condemned the doctrine of the Holy Communion as taught by the Cologne Book of Reform, and its author—"that rattle mouth Butzer"—with "his everlasting empty talk." His reply to the Italians was delayed and cold, and he counseled strongly against the acceptance of Metzger in the league since, he maintained, there could be no reliance on foreign nations, nor on their ostensible zeal for the gospel. Much more fateful in its consequences than this distrustful pessimism of Luther was the understanding above mentioned between the landgrave and the House of Hapsburg. It is true that lofty feelings of ambition at that time carried Philip on to projects concerning an agreement between the emperor and France, and concerning the changing of the pope into a harmless "supervisor and bishop of Rome," while his intuitions that the pretty words of Granvela, the great command against France, and other promises, would prove to be vain grew continually clearer.

The younger generation of imperial princes had begun to find more grace in the eyes of the emperor and Granvela than the witnesses of the great past

days of the Reformation, whose scruples of conscience it would always be impossible completely to drive out. The zeal was significant with which Granvela set out to win Duke Moritz of Saxony, who still held himself at altogether too high a price. Still the evangelicals in the Nürnberg Reichstag of 1543 contended, although in vain, for their demand that the declaration of Regensburg should become part of the edict of the Reichstag (*Abschied*), and when this contention was denied, they refused aid against the Turks.

The admission of Jülich into the Schmalkalden League, however, did not take place. When Duke Moritz and the Nürnburgers were invited to attend a meeting of the league, only refusals were received in reply. The hostile attitude of the princes toward the cities at the Regensburg Reichstag had not remained without influence on the cities of the league. The contrast between these two elements stood out plainly enough in the Brunswick War. A Venetian observer thought he recognized in this such a weakness of Protestant Germany that, in his opinion, the emperor needed only to assume an energetic attitude in order to have his way.

Among the members of the Schmalkalden League also, it was impossible to suppress a feeling of steady decadence. "It is well," said the Frankforters at one time, with perfect justice, "that our opponents do not know how much there is among us that is



mixed and without unity; our whole house has undergone decay." John Frederick, however, sought, in accordance with the example of his Doctor Martinus, to console himself with the hope that the fulfillment of Daniel's prophecy was evidently close at hand, and that God, being above all reason, would keep his word until the end of the world.

As though paralyzed, the German Protestants awaited the approaching emperor, who could not have wished things to be better arranged for him. With Henry VIII, who had a long time before set aside his unattractive spouse of the Cleve line, a new secret treaty had been concluded in February, 1543, against Francis, "the ally of the Turks." In this agreement Charles V reserved Burgundy and Picardy for himself, and Henry took Normandy, Guienne, and the French crown, as the price of victory in the common war.

It was characteristic that the two contracting parties obligated themselves that no English book should be printed in Germany and no German book in England. Charles appeared in Germany as the true champion of the Catholic Church, in spite of the tension in his relations with Paul III, who aimed to play the rôle of a non-partisan and at the meeting with the emperor in Busseto suggested the turning over of Milan to the Farnese for a goodly sum of money. The Spanish ambassador at Venice

urged upon the emperor the same thing that the landgrave, Philip, had been carrying about in his head, that "one could do the world no greater service than to put the papal power back to its original condition." Charles V one time excitedly remarked that "everything must become Turkish but he wanted to be the last."

When William of Bavaria, however, spoke of the peril to Hungary, the emperor of course found that it was something for the Germans themselves to provide against,—he had other Turks to fight. The attempts of German princes at mediation met with no response from the duke of Jülich, who relied upon his victorious arms, his fortresses, and the help of France. In the summer of 1543 the emperor appeared on German soil, at the head of eight thousand Spaniards and Italians. Soon his fighting forces had grown to forty thousand men. The quiet and unapproachable gentleman of former times was hardly to be recognized when, arrayed in splendid armor, he took command in person and gave his orders, using the German language. "Everything was imperial," reported Bucer,—“speech and actions, looks and bearing, even his generosity.” One divines his heavy sigh when he opines “What could not this emperor do, if he would be a German emperor and a servant of Christ?” The south of France and, above all, Tunis and Algiers, had made of him the tried warrior who now rose from his

tenth attack of gout to take the field. In matters of religion, too, Bucer found the emperor, whose endeavors toward union had almost moved him two years before, quite changed, being now out and out Spanish. Three times every day he heard mass; ceaselessly he lay upon his knees praying with the rosary. In short, according to Bucer's judgment he "let himself go in superstitious fooleries such as suit old women."

Contrasted with this leader filled with Catholic devotion was the Clevish Captain van Rossen, who had his mercenaries, in feathered barret and slit-tered coat, preach the gospel to the Dutch. Upon the descent of the imperial army the professors of Lutherism were directed not to allow themselves to be seen.

In a little more than two weeks the actual campaign was over. Düren, the strongest place of the duke, had suffered all the horrors of a Spanish assault, after a short bombardment. On the 6th of September, William threw himself at the feet of the victor at Venlo. He surrendered Goldberg and Zütphen, broke his connections with France and Denmark, and promised to undo all ecclesiastical innovations in his lands.

It was an immediate consequence of these events that the Reformation at Cologne came to something in the nature of a pause. But the most important result of the war one may well regard, with Var-

rentrapp, as the enlightenment of the emperor concerning the weakness and political incapacity of the German heretics. "Observation of what happened here," thus declared the author of the memoirs of Charles, "opened the eyes of the emperor and enlightened his understanding to such a degree that not only did it no longer seem impossible to him to control such arrogance by force, but it even seemed easy to him, if he undertook it under suitable circumstances of time and with the proper means."

But these suitable conditions were not to be brought about as quickly as the emperor wished and his enemies feared. Butzer, in the winter of 1543, held the destruction of Germany and the ruin of Europe as unavoidable and as being close at hand. A Catholic voice at the same time expressed the opinion that the emperor could restore order, without even drawing his sword from its sheath; but the Catholics were just as divided as their opponents, and the emperor, weakened in will power "by frequent sickness," was surrounded by traitors. In fact, Charles, whose autumn campaign against the French had come to a standstill before fortified Landrecy, in spite of English help and his treaty with King Christian III of Denmark, could not do without the German Protestants. On the contrary, in the next succeeding period we see him making concessions on this side which can be explained

alone by the intention to withdraw them again on the very first opportunity.

While Charles V almost came to an open break with a pope unmistakably inclined toward the French, he assured himself, in addition to the support of schismatic England, of the help of the German heretics against their natural protector, France. The Protestants breathed freely when, instead of the dreaded religious war, the imperial ministers assumed the friendliest of tones and with unctuous turns concerning the Word of God promised that their master would effect the agreement on religion whether the pope liked it or not. At the Reichstag at Speyer (February, 1544), which was attended by princes of the realm in far greater number than had been the case for a long time previously, electoral Saxony and Hesse were also present. John Frederick carried the sword before the emperor and was honored with a long confidential interview, and even given the prospect of the marriage of his oldest son to a daughter of the Roman king. It is probable that the landgrave had gone with a heavy heart to Speyer, in view of the fact that shortly before word had been brought to him that the emperor planned to subdue Hesse and its allies within the year.

Charles V took pains to meet him graciously, but the apparently regretful explanation that he could not make use of the landgrave for this French war, and his reconciling him with the Turks, showed

plainly enough what was the truth in regard to Philip's receiving the imperial chief command for which he had so longed, but had failed to receive. Bucer believed that the landgrave followed the evil path against his better knowledge. True, the military and financial results of the Reichstag were negligible, yet it could be regarded as a success of the imperial policy that at least none of the estates had openly dared to declare themselves for France. The aid of the realm against the Turks and the French was granted, for Charles promised to go against the Turks after the ending of the French War with the provision that the expedition should "serve the glory of God and the advantage of the realm," and that it should in any event be within his capacity.

Furthermore, the Protestants demanded a high purchase price. In the Reichstag edict of June, 1541, as Janssen said, "the Catholic standpoint was nearly given up." In view of the uncertainty of a general council the emperor promised that by the next Reichstag he would have a Christian reformation planned and on its basis, besides the plans submitted by the estates, he would regulate religious conditions in the empire up to the council.

In addition to the suspension of proscription and of processes against the Protestants, as well as of the Augsburg Reichstag edict, the membership of the imperial court in the future was not to take

account of differences in religion. The ecclesiastical properties were left in the hands of the Protestants and their contracts affecting these were acknowledged. "A well-enough peace for religion," held Butzer, "but one that only Christ can maintain." For surely the emperor disapproved, as Drussel pointed out, "internally a proceeding that he could only justify to himself because of the pressing necessities of his situation."

The French campaign which had been opened before the close of the diet at Speyer, took a course that was by no means brilliant, however magnificent may have sounded the agreement for a simultaneous imperial and English advance upon Paris. There was lacking from the first, as in the time of Wolsey, a genuine confidence between the allied powers. In vain did Henry VIII try to dissuade the emperor from personal participation in the campaign, and endeavor to come to a clear understanding regarding the imperial plan of attack. He himself confined it to the seizure and capture of Boulogne, while hastening at the same time to open negotiations for peace.

In the meantime the imperialists under Gonzaga had fastened their grip on the small but strong place, Saint Dizier, on the upper Marne. Slowly their supreme war lord followed them. Upon his entry into Metz the two princely cavalry colonels of evangelical faith, Duke Moritz and Margrave Albrecht,

rode in advance. It was said at the imperial court that King Francis no longer found any rest and thought only of imprisonment, of the loss of his crown, and of his death.

But, however serious seemed the situation of France, the old tactics of defense without battle now proved themselves once more of value; for in the march of the emperor toward Paris one may well see a mere demonstration, in accordance with the judgment of an Italian contemporary. At Chateau Thierry Charles's army, whose undisciplined hordes seemed now to exist merely for the guarding of the immense and ever increasing baggage, left the valley of the Marne in order to swing toward the north. Soissons surrendered, and in spite of imperial promises was mercilessly looted by the Germans. A few days later came the conclusion of the Peace of Crépy (17th of September, 1544). Its provisions surprised all except the initiated. On the imperial side it was said that Francis I might have made such conditions if he had been as near to Madrid as Charles was to Paris. There was a reversion to the old thought of a dynastic adjustment. Orléans, the second son of the king, as husband of the daughter of the emperor, was to have the Netherlands, or Milan with the hand of the daughter of Ferdinand, while Francis I promised to give up Piedmont and his Italian and Dutch claims.



Of more importance than the promise of assistance of a French army against the Turks, were the arrangements concerning religion which, so far as we can determine, were more exactly defined in a secret compact to the effect that both princes, with or without the consent of the pope, were to summon the general council and put in effect its conclusions by force. Furthermore, Francis I was to refrain from entering upon new alliances, particularly with the Protestants.

Again there came more strongly into the foreground, not only the possibility of a war of religion but also the question of the council and of the relationship between the emperor and the pope. Nothing perhaps in the changeful history of those years was more remarkable than the strange entanglements which, immediately before and after the Schmalkalden War, brought the two leaders of Catholic Christianity near to a renewal of the open war carried on in the twenties.

We can here touch only passingly upon the fact that in Italy also a strengthening and deepening of religious life had taken place under the influence of the German Reformation, and that even in the see itself the idea of reform had taken root since the days of Clement VII. In the year 1540 one of the most gifted Roman diplomats, then Bishop Morone, made a gloomy prognostication for the papacy: that Germany and England could easily finish the work

begun, unite, carry with them Poland, Hungary, France, perhaps even in Spain and in a large part of Italy. But even without the menace from heresy, he thought, the pope should convene a real council in order to remove the numerous existing abuses and to restore "the defaced religion." In those days he could have named the chief town of his diocese as the seat of an evangelical community to which Luther had written in 1541. Morone himself was deeply moved by the religious agitation of his time and had experienced its changing fate,—the enthusiasm of the good, as well as the disenchantment of the death agony of the evil years.

The Italian reformation as it flourished and seemed growing for a time among the educated circles, distinguished itself essentially from the ecclesiastical revolution in Germany in that with the former there was not a tremendous reëcho of the whole nation. We could not say that its main obstacle was the fact that the higher class society, the mental aristocracy, lacked in receptiveness. It moved chiefly in this dignified atmosphere, and the period in which the skepticism of the Renaissance had celebrated its triumph in Italy was past when, out of the perishing Humanism, a new interest in religious and ecclesiastical matters emerged. But it lacked the requirements for victory,—either the coöperation of the state authorities or the elementary force of the masses. It is hardly necessary to dis-

cuss why the governments did not make use of it, but there was none who, either in holy or unholy wrath, would have shattered priest rule.

Centuries of political struggles had crumbled away, as it were, and the democratic elements and the privileged modern state form of the "Tyrannis" had often left in the governed only a dullness of the impulse of conspiracy. To accomplish a peaceable, not revolutionary, reorganization of the Church in the home of papacy was simply impossible, but there were no presuppositions for a revolution. Three different tendencies can be observed in the religious life of Italy at the time of the Reformation, if we put aside the stagnation of the incorrigible curialism.

First, the Platonism of the Renaissance had by no means died out; it cannot be sufficiently emphasized that out of those germs, not without a fruitful after effect of the imaginative German Cusanus, had grown modern philosophy. If the ecclesiastical circles shudderingly mentioned the existence of atheists and Epicureans, there was a kernel of truth in it, inasmuch as a materialistic feature was peculiarly just to those half poetical products of Italian speculation, and conspicuously so, for instance, in Giordano Bruno, the admirer of Lucretius. It was to be a long time ere the freethinkers should become really dangerous to the Church. In the sixteenth century, the attention was naturally centered far more upon those analogies and direct

offsprings of the German Reformation, as they very soon made themselves noticeable, particularly in the Venetian territory.

Petro Speziali, in Cittadella, had formulated about 1512 the fundamental principle of a vindication doctrine which forestalled, unnoticed however, the mental work of Luther; thirty years later the Inquisition seized him when he had just finished his work, and dedicated it to the emperor. Moreover, in the beginning of the twenties, writings of Luther and Melanchthon were printed in the Italian language, in Venice; the booklet on the freedom of a Christian was smuggled through under the name of Cardinal Fregoso, and Zwingli's work under some other pseudonym. French influence created a place of refuge for evangelism at the court of Ferrara, where the Duchess Renata, daughter of Louis XII, combined serious religiousness with the splendor of Renaissance culture, and not only sheltered her countryman Calvin, but made him her friend and teacher. And of a holy Protestant character, according to Benrath's judgment, was that religious movement in Naples which was connected with the names of the noble Spaniard Juan Valdes, the Florentine Vermigli, and the mightiest Capuchin preacher, Bernardino Orchino. From this circle emanated the famous book of Benedetto di Mantovo, "Of the Kindness of Jesus Christ Crucified" which, printed in 1542 at Venice, popularized Paul's doc-

trine of mercy without any pronounced polemic against Rome and, propagated by cardinals sympathizing with the Reformation, was gratuitously distributed.

As a pupil of Valdes and Orchino, the most beautiful woman in Italy, Julia Gongaza, led a sort of evangelican monastery life. Even Neapolitan nobles testified later, on the scaffold and in exile, to the deep influence of this short period of prosperity which was vouchsafed to the reformation in Italy.

The peculiar ability for development inherent in it was shown by the fact that the inclination for rationalism and skepticism, as it was manifested "in the old land of doubt," had led men like Orchino and the two Sozzimis far beyond the limits of the prevailing dogmatism. In the theological development of the intellectual ex-Capuchin, according to Benrath's view, the process through which the Protestant perception had slowly passed in the centuries, seemed to have been performed, and up to a certain point "already gone through." It may be said that those Italian anti-trinitarians were, like the unfortunate Spaniard Servetus, forerunners of the freethinkers who appeared in the next century.

But mightier than the tendencies named, there remained in Italy the idea of a Catholic ecclesiastical interior reformation, and after long resistance the church authorities had finally taken it up, to make it

subservient to their purposes, whereby a great part of its original force was lost or developed into the reverse of what was originally intended. We know of the reform pope Adrian and his companions, and of the sweeping reorganization of the sacred college by Paul III. But under Leo, almost contemporaneous with Luther's first appearance and without any stimulus from those higher up, that brotherhood of the divine love (*oratorio del divino amore*), in which reformatory sympathizers of various sorts met, had established itself in Rome. Even the humanistic poetry began again to occupy itself more with Christian subjects, and so sensitive an observer as Hettner proved the connection of this incipient restoration of Catholicism with the enhancing of the religious ardor in Raphael's later and Titian's earlier works.

Quite openly could the influences of that Roman union be recognized in North Italy, where men like the Venetian Contarini, who was accessible to everything of a noble character, were easily won and the episcopate had such brilliant representatives of the reform as Giberti in Verona and Morone in Modena. All through it was the doctrine of the vindication by faith which, more or less approaching the Lutheran conception, represented the chief bond between the educated and learned friends of reform. No wonder that one referred occasionally to Savonarola, although his doctrine of mercy dif-

ferred essentially from the new evangelican teaching.

Here and there the discussions over such religious fundamental principles—for there was no lack of zealous opponents—had penetrated into the lower strata. Morone, though still a cardinal, was one of the most enthusiastic reformers and said on one occasion, "Everywhere in those days one talked of the church dogmas and everybody wanted to be a theologian." Quite differently, however, a movement affected the masses, simultaneously with the one previously described. In close connection with many personalities, it adopted the ways of the Spanish church and, according to Maurenbrecher's expression, helped to produce a "rebirth of the medieval church idea."

Still, in the beginning of the century, a few Venetian noblemen who went into a monastery were the laughing stock of their companions, who only thought of attributing their devotion to a "low and dirty life" from melancholy, lack of humanity, of piety, of state interest, or to an offended ambition, or even from the wish to lead a lazy life at the expense of others. A few decades later Italy was teeming with new orders and cowls, never seen before. It was a monkish reformation, such as the Middle Ages had repeatedly experienced; the Camaldulians (1522) made a beginning; among the Franciscans the strictest elements segregated themselves as Capuchins (1526), and the welcome pos-

sibility for the Italian nobility offered itself in the chapter of Gaetano of Tiene,—the Theatinians (1524),—to adopt the life of the regular clerical without the full monastic restriction.

It was, however, reserved to a Spaniard to put the keystone, as it were, into the Italian creations of a newly awakened ecclesiastical spirit. On the Montmartre the "Society of Jesus" was founded in 1534, by Loyola, but only in 1540 did it receive the papal confirmation. Paul III regarded with mistrust the odd saints whom the old officer of the emperor introduced to him; for the good result of this Roman probation period, Ignatius promised no less than 3,000 masses. In 1540 his first colleague, the Savoyan Peter Faber, came to Germany as the first Jesuit; three years later the Netherlander Peter Canisius, who was won over by favor, settled in Cologne with eight companions.

We have seen how closely the men of the German Reformation and of the Italian reform approached each other in Regensburg. The failure of that attempt at a union caused an important reaction in Italy. One may say perhaps that until then the gentle, liberal, and by no means correct Venetian Contarini, a truly dignified nature, had maintained the first place among the reformers of the cardinal collegiate. Under his presidency the reform commission had met which, at the end of 1536 or beginning of 1537, presented to the pope their "opinion.



about the amelioration of the church." This document censured above all the boundless increase of the papal authority which was the main source of all evil, and frequently reminded, in its criticism of the ecclesiastical mismanagement, of the "complaints of the German nation," while on the other hand it advocated ecclesiastical censorship and turned against the "godlessness" of the philosophers specially rife in Italy.

Contarini was one of the most enthusiastic votaries of the young Society of Jesus. Not long after his return from the Regensburg discussion, the result of which offered his Roman opponents an opportunity for accusations and suspicions, the cardinal died, and it was no wonder that there were whispers of poisoning. In the year of his death, 1542, the Roman Inquisition was renewed upon the Spanish model.

At the head of the church reform in the sense of the reorganized monasticism was the fanatical Neapolitan, John Peter Caraffa. He was born in 1476, and had lived immaculately through the time of Alexander VI and Julius II, combining theological with humanistic education. Towering far above mediocrity in mentality and character, inspired with southern passion, this Italian Jiminez saw at last that his time was approaching. All Italy bowed before the new creed tribunal, but only after the elevation of Caraffa to the papal chair. Follow-

ing 1550, the executions began, when a number of evangelical leaders,—Orchino, Vermigli, and the Bishop Vergerio, had sought safety in flight.

In Venice, the hitherto asylum of reform, friendly literature appeared in 1549,—the first “*Index librorum prohibitorum*.” Naturally those Platonic or freethinking inclinations, which had resulted from the cultivation and veneration of the classic ancient times, were mortally affected by the radical contrast to those decades in which it was looked upon as indispensable for the Roman cavalier to display a certain tinge of heresy. Nothing was more characteristic of the inner reform of many profounder minds than the regret of men like Michelangelo and Vittoria Colonna for their previous errors. As such the endeavors of those reformers, in which the greatest artist and the noblest woman of Italy had taken the most active part, were now looked upon by them, not from a cringing fear of the Inquisition, but from horror at a possible menace to the ecclesiastical unity.

The widow of Pescara, celebrated as a second Sappho and the new holy Elizabeth, had previously hoped to be able to greet her friend Contarini as a reform pope; now she delivered the confidential letters of Orchino to the clergy, since he was outside the ark of salvation, and reveled in reading little and believing much. Michelangelo, however, the old Titan, lived as Hettner said “henceforth only

in the Bible and in Dante and Savonarola," and his shadowed soul sought support in the strictest church life. In 1541, he had finished his terrible "Doomsday," that glorification of inexorable justice; already the period of Italian painting began to appear in which one, according to Goethe's expression, "always is in the anatomy, the gibbet and the flaying place" and "either confronts miscreants or dead bodies."

In the first year of this Catholic restoration the long-looked-for general council convened. The bull which called it to Trient for March 14, 1545, bore the same date as the Peace of Crépy; the pope had anticipated the threatening initiative of the worldly powers. The choice of Trient, recommended by Charles V in 1524, was meant to satisfy the Germans, since it belonged to the empire, while at the same time through its position and its altogether Italian character it appeared much safer to the pope than a real German town. But, promptly as the Roman legates arrived at the place of assembly, the opening was a long time delayed,—a fault due to him who had been the most urgent in asking for the council. The emperor, whose Frankfort agreements with the Protestants were crossed by the step of the pope, was indeed justified in treating the Farnese with the greatest mistrust, and in postponing the danger of a council that was wholly dependent upon the pope. Paul III and his clique

had, during the last war, promoted their approach to France so far that the marriage of a papal grandchild with Orléans was planned. He declared before the cardinals that he now intended to act as a judge, since the princes would not listen to the voice of the shepherd,—meaning thereby the emperor.

After the unexpected conclusion of peace the pope allowed himself to be swept away and sent the dejected man a breve which condemned in the sharpest words the Speyer concessions to the Protestants, held up his predecessors before the emperor, from Nero to Frederick II,—who had all been hostile to the church,—as a warning example, and finally threatened him with the ban. Charles V did not deem this incomprehensible step of the see worthy of a reply in writing, but the remarkable spectacle was seen of Calvin and Luther taking up the pen in defense of the arch enemy of the Reformation. Calvin praised the emperor for his gentleness and reliability, while Luther, at the instance of the prince-elect himself, struck with the “tree ax,” according to the expression of Brueck, “also he has by the grace of God a higher mind than other men.” His proposal was to take the church state away from the pope, and “to tear his and all cardinals’ tongues out of their throats; after this they could hold their council on the gallows or amongst all the devils.”

This savage refutation of the assertion of the papal transfer of the empire to the Germans did not secure special attention to the last ebullition of the Reformer against Rome, but it was a striking fact that the breve, which was to be kept secret, fell into the hands of the Protestants. The possibility was hinted by Druffel that Granvela himself was the author of this indiscretion, and indirectly also of the Lutheran writing. But that reminding Paul III of the evil fate of the emperors who were the enemies of the Church, did not cause Luther's discussions about the origin of German Imperialism alone, but recalled also the little book of the "Pope's faithfulness" shown to Frederick Barbarossa, as at the same time the notorious pictures of Lukas Cranach showed, among other things, the pope treading on the neck of an emperor and having Conradin decapitated. These woodcuts which Luther provided with writings at the bottom were forcible and repulsive proofs of the coarseness of the time, which was sinking deeper and deeper into vulgarity. It was by no means the worst of these horrible jests which showed two peasants in a picture making a gesture that cannot possibly be described to the pope and his ban, to which Luther gave the elucidation:

"Nicht Papst, nicht schreck uns mit deinem bann  
 Und sei nicht so zorniger mann,  
 Wir tun sonst eine gegenwehre  
 Und zeigen dirs Belvedere."

With cunning ambiguity Charles V tried to leave both pope and Protestants in the dark as to his real intentions, and "to keep in with both." First the problem was to weave his way through the council and the war until the moment arrived when, absolutely unchecked, he could deliver the blow unexpectedly. He did not as yet dare, as Druffel said, simply to make himself the representative of the view that "the Protestants had no right to exist at all."

An attempt of Charles and his counselors to disrupt the Schmalkalden princes and the highland towns by exploiting their differences of opinion over the Brunswick affair had failed. The landgrave had been cured of his gullibility since the autumn of 1544; the news of a secret agreement between the emperor and France, which he received soon afterward, could only encourage him to persevere in the task of reaching an understanding with England, Denmark and Bavaria. Eck remarked to a Hessian delegate that he would not rest until the Lutherans had been suppressed, and all Catholics should rather become Lutherans than let the emperor gain the upper hand. With great pleasure Philip received an opinion of Butzer which advised him to refuse an eventual offer of the supreme command against the Turks. One talked freely, in the spring of 1545, of an imperial truce with the Porte, which actually was concluded in the following autumn. News came

from the Netherlands that the measures against the heretics had been made more rigorous. The preacher of Queen Maria escaped the pyre only through flight, and reported in Germany that the emperor himself did not wish to read the Bible, since that was the business of the theologians. "Pope Adrian," exclaimed Butzer, "has well deserved his papacy for the sake of the antichrist in this brood."

On the other hand, the news provoked a scandal that Charles V. had paid more attention to the duchess of Etampes,—“this brazen, adulterating, vulgar woman” who entered Brussels in a sedan chair with Queen Eleonora,—than to his own sister. The transfigured glory in which the personality of the Spanish ruler had always appeared to the Protestants began gradually to disappear. The lane formed by friars at that entry in Brussels must have been in strange contrast to the gallant saluting the ladies with kiss and embrace.

Charles had been attacked so badly by gout in the winter after the campaign that he had to leave the opening of the Worms diet to his brother, and arrived there only in May, 1545. Significantly enough the case was provided in the proposition that the Trient council could either not be continued or was not able adequately to establish the Reformation; the religious question remained to be settled by a future diet. One can imagine the indignation

of the nuncios in Worms and of the legates in Trient over this retrogression of the emperor to the often condemned national council. The postponement of the whole question to a future day showed that, in Worms at any rate, a decision was not to be reached, since the emperor made no use of the presented reform schemes. Most interesting at all events was the so-called Wittenberg reformation, which had been signed by Luther and handed to the prince-elect in January, 1545, although in Brueck's opinion "Doctor Martini's rummaging spirit could not be traced in it." It emphasized especially the desire for a union of the evangelical with the episcopal system, as the princes were too much pressed by worldly business to conduct the church régime in a satisfactory manner. Of course, only under the condition of accepting the evangelical teaching, could the bishops retain a part of their ecclesiastical jurisdiction.

With the reformation desire of so many ecclesiastical empire princes in those days this offer of the Wittenbergers would perhaps have attained a certain importance as the transition stage to complete secularization, but only if Charles V either denied his own religious convictions or left the empire again for some time to its own resources. His firm determination could be as little questioned as that of a Francis of Münster or an Erasmus of Strasburg, or the successor of the cardinal of Mainz,



who died in September, 1545,—Sebastian von Heusenstamm,—who had attained the promotion of his election by the landgrave through the promise to reform.

On the other hand, however, this Cologne affair accelerated in Charles V the resolution to have a religious war. In the spring of 1545; the storm threatened to break, but went over. It is a fact that the emperor had discussed the question in the Worms diet with Cardinal Farnese, who offered 100,000 ducats for the Turkish war, in the name of his grandfather. At the same time he agitated the acquisition of Parma and Piacenza for the House of Farnese, and about the attack upon the German Protestants.

There were no difficulties on the papal side; Paul III granted at once, out of his private means, 200,000 crowns and 12,000 men for six months, in addition to the 500,000 crowns on the account of the Spanish church. In Worms the Spaniards talked quite openly of the extermination of the Lutherans; one monk even dared to take the subject into the pulpit. However, the subtlety of the emperor justified the presumption of Cardinal Farnese that he wished to play a double game: intimidate the Protestants by securing the papal assistance, and by putting off the council compel them to supply the yet outstanding empire contribution.

On the other hand, the emperor was, as Druffel

said, "endeavoring to frighten the pope simultaneously with the council and a religious discussion by collegiate and diet, thus to keep him amenable to his wishes." Therefore the religious war was postponed and consideration for his Farnesian interest caused Paul III, in spite of the representations of his legate, not to take any further steps for such interest in matters of the council. This was in accordance with the wish of the emperor, although the final decree of the Worms diet which deferred the settlement between the two parties for another diet and a religious discussion in Regensburg, passed pope and council in absolute silence.

The deciding motives for such a contradictory policy we are not able to recognize clearly. It is not unthinkable that the well-known fear of Charles V of the irrevocable resolutions, and his always alert mistrust, may have caused him to reserve to himself once more the possibility of a peaceable solution. In truth, the general world situation could hardly have been more favorable for a quick attack; France and England were still at war, there was no immediate danger from the East, the pope was won over, and the Schmalkalden Federation was strongly shaken. It was certain that the German Catholics would not bow to the resolutions of an imperial colloquy, and calmly accept the elimination of pope and council from the decision concerning the religious question. The Protestants, however, did

not leave any doubt of the fact that they could not regard the Trient council as a free and Christian one. Luther expressed this view in a truly classic manner: "These three words, free, Christian, German, are to the pope and the Roman court nothing but poison, death, devil and hell. He cannot stand them, neither see nor hear them."

Little as we are justified in agreeing with Ranke that there was an absolute credulity on the part of the Protestants in regard to the emperor, we cannot fail to recognize that all their endeavors to forestall him in the domain of European politics were without any prospect of success from the very beginning and only, as Baumgarten said, elicited "an absolutely crushing superiority of the emperor." They could still report for a short period the success of one or the other within the empire.

When Duke Henry of Brunswick, who had appeared at the Speyer assembly to the great vexation of the Schmalkalden members, sought to regain his country with French money, he was easily overpowered by the Schmalkalden superior forces and with his eldest son was thrown into Hessian imprisonment. Wrongly there was talk of imperial and papal support of the duke; the sequestration of his territory, however, which had been arranged at Speyer, was not carried out.

As in the Brunswick affair the emperor connived at the fact that the bishopric of Merseburg fell into

the hands of the Albertinian duke, August of Saxony, and obtained a coadjutor and "evangelican bishop" in the person of Georg of Anhalt. After the example of the Neuburger Otto Henry, even Palsgrave Frederick, who had succeeded his brother Louis (1544) in the electorate, turned to the new teaching, not from religious conviction, but chiefly in order to interest the Schmalkalden men in his claims upon Denmark. A never satisfied ambition in this restless gentleman was a strange contrast to his impoverished financial circumstances, which compelled him to spend the last years previous to his elevation to the electorate partly at the expense of foreign courts which he visited and partly with an imperial annuity in a small castle in the Upper Palatinate. It was not a safe acquisition, as far as the person of the prince-elect was concerned, but at any rate it was a success for the evangelican cause when Frederick II received, in January, 1546, the Holy Communion in both forms at Heidelberg. The Schmalkalden Federation should have been better organized, but it was near its dissolution. A protracted federation day at Frankfort (December, 1545—February, 1546) resulted in a resolution to obey the call of the archbishop of Cologne and join a council, to use the good offices of a delegate for him with the emperor in Cologne, and to give him assistance in case he should be attacked. However, the uncertain action of the assembly invalidated this

last and most important part of the action referring to Cologne. Besides, no final result was reached concerning the renewal of a federation, and the drafting of an improved constitution left in force most grievous deficiencies, such for instance as the double captaincy. It was a grand farce when an English delegate could not praise highly enough the harmony among the Schmalkalden men and the strength of the federation.

Butzer hit the nail on the head when he said that the salvation of the nation depended upon the Cologne affair, and that an effective protection of the archbishop could only be brought about by the appointment of a head,—a “dictator.” Landgrave Philip, (he was, of course, the head whom Butzer had in mind), was of the opinion in the autumn of 1545 that it was absolutely necessary to secure the advantages of the offensive as long as the Turkish armistice had not been concluded. One had to be “ready in armament and not to forego the first blow.”

His quick and all-embracing foresight saw the necessity for the alliance of his old friends. In Holland the “great tyranny,” and especially the religious persecution in the case of a lower Rhenish war, would also produce allies for the Protestants. But the Schmalkalden Federation, as it was constituted, made every speculating policy impossible; one can understand that even the landgrave finally

became "really vexed and tired" and, with the niggardliness of the majority of federation members, especially of the towns, would have much preferred to look for a less unsafe and more effective alliance.

The mistrust with which he was still regarded in Saxony showed the origin of Luther's last writing which, composed at the instigation of the prince-elect, urgently argued against the liberation of the imprisoned Brunswick man and which, according to Druffel's statement, was intended to work upon none else than the landgrave. On the other hand, the latter deemed the delegation to the emperor in favor of Cologne utterly foolish, and it could create only embitterment and, "will cause the destruction of all of us."

The weakness of the Schmalkalden Federation seems to have been particularly obvious from the fact that the most gifted among the younger of the Protestant princes did not care to link his future, which loomed uncertainly but great before him, to the fate of his co-religionists. These recent successes of the Schmalkalden men were far outweighed by the resignation of Duke Moritz of Saxony, although it had been threatened for a long time.

This Albertinian had always been a man in a class by himself in whom, as in many a German hero of the Middle Ages, a demoniacal passion seemed to be coupled with the coolest calculation. The son of an insignificant father, deficiently edu-

cated at first at the court of the voluptuous cardinal of Mainz, and afterward at that of his cousin John Frederick, totally ignorant, Moritz,—who in his twenty-first year (1541) began his reign,—had from the beginning challenged the mistrust of the other Protestant principals by resigning from the Schmalkalden Federation, and surrounded himself with the counselors of his uncle Georg. Further, he was in intimate relations with his father-in-law the landgrave, and was the only one who lent his assistance to the distressed man when his double marriage became public.

We saw how this connection brought him into touch with the imperial court, that in the Turkish war he was within a hair's breadth of becoming the victim of his reckless courage, and made a good name for himself not only in Germany but with Charles V. The young prince hoped to sell his services to the emperor for the bishoprics of Meissen and Merseburg, together with the protectorship over Magdeburg and Halberstadt. Although this was denied him, he took part in the campaign of 1543-1544 as imperial colonel, but he so managed matters that only after the termination of the war did he advance against Cleve. The opposition of electoral Saxony was intensely aggravated through this ambiguous policy. It was, before all, the double design upon Magdeburg and Halberstadt which made an honest coöperation of the cousins impos-

sible. Further, according to the assumption of Voigt, "the electoral hat and the land possessions of the cousin were perhaps already in the half-veiled distant vision" for Moritz.

In such a position the remarkable proposal which he made in March, 1545, to the two heads of the Schmalkalden Federation had no prospect of consent from electoral Saxony. The ambitious young gentleman recommended nothing less than an evangelical triumvirate in place of the useless federation. This, he thought would be best to keep the opponents of the gospel in check, and one could come to the understanding with the emperor and his brother that they should give up the ecclesiastical possessions, especially the bishoprics, to the evangelicals, in return for substantial assistance against the Turks.

Butzer was mightily pleased with the prospect for the cause of Protestantism, and "will the star continue to shine, as from the brilliancy that I have seen I earnestly hope." Even the landgrave recommended to his son-in-law an open attachment to the Schmalkalden Federation as the best and simplest method. The meetings of the Saxonian cousins, however, led to "great inordinate carousings" which brought Moritz to the verge of the grave and caused much public comment, but no political agreement was reached. Moritz helped to subjugate the Brunswicker, but the rôle of the mediator which



he played was by no means free from suspicion. Shortly afterward he made proposals for a union to his father-in-law, on the occasion of the Regensburg religious discussion, which not only put the blame for the failure hitherto of the attempts at an agreement upon the Protestant theologians, but aimed to secure the decision of the casting vote at the next colloquy for the emperor.

It was like an announcement of his fatal compact with Charles V. The ecclesiastical questions were of only secondary importance to Moritz, both in consequence of his meager religious needs and because of the influence of similarly minded advisers. Nothing was more repulsive to him than the insistence of the clergy that the princes were to subordinate themselves to theological views, at the same time neglecting all worldly interests. It may have made little impression upon him that the landgrave, quite horrified at such a frivolous conception of the most sacred things, declared he would think the theologians a lot of knaves if they should deviate from the Scriptures by one letter, only to oblige the princes.

Moritz was a political schemer who esteemed religion according to its worth or worthlessness for his schemes and prospects. In the beginnings of the great movement he possibly would have rated this factor much higher. He was unwilling to abandon himself altogether to the emperor, or even to bargain

with his evangelical confession and return to the old serfdom of the Catholic church. The tall prince whose noble features, fine forehead, and sparkling eyes distinguished him outwardly from the majority of his stupid companions possessed reserve strength enough to be one of the first in their riotous life, to drink himself "chock full," to pay homage in the coarse manner of the time to the "lovely wench," and yet with all these dissipations retain the clear brain and iron will of the born ruler.

Luther, as a sincere electoral Saxon not friendly inclined to the "Meisseners and Gleissners (hypocrites)" gauged quite correctly the wide gulf between Wittenberg and Dresden. According to his habit he saw standing behind the young duke, but more behind his godless counselors, the devil incarnate. It was characteristic of the contemptuous Moritz that he took the wrathful eruptions of the old Reformer with the comment,—“It is just Luther’s way, and therefore does not matter much.”

The feeling of his uselessness may have oppressed the great prince at times when, mentally and physically worn out, "an old decrepit man," as his prince-elect once described him, he still had plenty of strenuous labor devolving upon him, without being able to dispose of it with his former strength and alacrity.

It is astonishing how long Luther’s physique withstood this burden of work at the time when he was

suffering from an agonizing gravel disease and other afflictions. Who would wish to argue with him over the fact that his last years had passed, not wholly without the glimmer of his characteristic humor, but chiefly in a gloomy and dissatisfied state of mind? Why had he not become more hopeful and broad minded? Why did the paltry conditions in Wittenberg, this "Sodoma," more and more rouse his disgust?

More than once Melanchthon trembled before his formidable friend, whose anger he feared he had incurred. Once one sought at the court to avert the danger of a break by "dividing a stag amongst the theologians, and to let Philip also partake in this," as a pacifying token of prince-electoral grace. It was natural that his disciples should fear that the frequent deep depressions of their master were due to "displeasure about somebody's teaching." For Luther now pounced more harshly than ever upon "Zwinger and all Desecrators of the sacrament." Melanchthon, upon whom he was said to have urged a future settlement of the eucharistic quarrel, did not venture to talk openly with him upon such dangerous themes. It was a correct anticipation of future times when Luther, on one occasion, made the comment that his own people compelled him through their madness to advocate to the prince-elect the erection of a "priest tower."

Luther saw the purity of the evangelical teaching

threatened from all sides; "the devil's bride," he exclaimed in his last sermon in Wittenberg; "Reason, the fine harlot comes in, and wants to be clever, and what she says, she thinks is the Holy Ghost." Worldly matters appeared equally desolate to him. He had the clear consciousness that the régimes were in need of a Luther, of a sound hero and man of wonder, whose unspoiled natural force could triumph over the paltriness of book wisdom.

That the emperor was not this wonderman the Reformer came to know only too well. "Germany," he said, "is a well fed, fine stallion, who has enough of fodder and everything else, but he wants the rider." Time and again he returned to his gloomy hope that the Turks would soon march victoriously through the whole of Germany, and then the day of reckoning would make an end of all strife and conflicts. As early as 1541, he had composed his "Children's Song" for the young generation, which was to be sung for a long time afterward as an omen and consolation chant of the distressed Protestantism. "Oh keep us Lord with thy word, and stop the popes' and the Turks' murder, who want to throw Jesus Christ, thy Son from the Throne."

The full force of his hatred against the Roman antichrist he had preserved until his last days, when he went to his native town Eisleben in order to settle a vexatious quarrel between the Mansfeld

counts. His resentment filled his last hours, when in the night between February 17 and 18, 1546, the longed-for death removed the weary Reformer from all work and suffering. Immediately before the final agony he prayed to the Heavenly Father, "whom the wicked pope and all godless people abuse, persecute and blaspheme." The body of the Reformer was brought back to Wittenberg and laid to rest in the church which had witnessed his first act of emancipation from a repudiated faith, and all Germany mourned the loss of one of her grandest and most illustrious sons.

Thus died the great liberator, with meek, child-like confidence in his Savior, and the words of combat on his lips. Well could Melanchthon declare, in the castle church in Wittenberg, at the bier of the dear departed, that Luther had been building up with the one hand and handling the sword with the other. And he bestowed only merited honor upon the beloved one when he said that this physician of a seriously ill period had labored with all violence, yet with a heart full of kindness and no falseness. It was the union of untrained force and inward gentleness, which had been preserved in the errors and embitterments of his old age.

Luther's figure will always be a sympathetic one to the Germans, and will even force the confessional opponent to admit a certain open or secret sympathy. Small minds will point only to the lesser and repel-

lent features of the mightiest of the nation, as they attach to every son of the earth, even to the noblest among them. The historical greatness of Martin Luther, who destroyed the despotism of the Roman Church in the Occident, will not be touched by all this; it is above every disparagement as well as above every palliation.

Luther in his last days regarded the negotiations with the Porte which the emperor had begun in the spring of 1545 as a sign that the world was about to come to an end. Charles V and Francis I jointly sent their representatives to Constantinople, and the armistice which was concluded in 1545, at Adrianople, removed at least for the near future a chief obstacle to the religious war. We know that Francis I in those days zealously advocated the plan of a marriage of his daughter Margaret with the lately widowed Infante Philip. Moreover, the war which was still raging between France and England, and which ended only in May, 1546, was of the greatest advantage to the emperor through the fact that it took from the Protestants all prospects of support on the part of these powers.

At the French court Charles possessed the most faithful ally in his sister, Queen Eleonora, who, as Baumgarten said, "did for him the services of the spy in the heart of the enemy's position." While he, a very ambiguous mediator between France and England, saw himself courted by both antago-

nists, the efforts of the Schmalkalden members for peace and alliance found a willing ear neither in France nor in England. The famous historian of the Schmalkalden Federation, Sleidanus, seemed to an English statesman who negotiated with him like a "real sheep" in political affairs. What was the good of all these velleities of the German Protestants, whose leaders were by no means of one opinion regarding the ways and the aims of their policy as opposed to the powerful means and the statesmanship of the emperor? He kept them in suspense,—Francis I and Henry VIII no less than the Schmalkalden men and the pope who, according to the expression of Cardinal Cervino, "had got his hand in the claws of a big lobster." That the Protestant delegation who petitioned him in matters of the archbishop of Cologne in Maastricht would be unsuccessful could be safely predicted; at the imperial court the opportunity was used to deny the rumors about a religious war. Yet, before his journey to the Regensburg diet, Charles V caused the report to be circulated that he was contemplating a new campaign against Algiers.

Without an army, in the most peaceful attitude, he started for Germany although, as he himself reported, in the full consciousness of the danger to which he exposed himself. The resolve to make war had become a firm one. In opposition to the warning voices of Granvela and others, the imperial

father confessor Pedro de Soto, "the mental father of the Protestant war," had pleasantly explained the inner disruption of the Schmalkalden Federation, the little power of its princes and the shiftlessness of the town members, the lack of homogeneous leadership and of a really eminent chief commander; the landgrave alone was the "little fighting cock," but he had never accomplished anything really great.

Charles arranged a meeting with the latter on the way to Speyer, whose real purpose,—the appearance of electoral Saxony and Hesse in the Regensburg diet,—was not attained. Three times Philip declined the imperial request, neither did he countenance a participation of the Protestants in the council. He clung to the Speyer final decree, and to the declaration that the emperor could not blame the evangelical principals if they preferred the eternal to the temporary, and always bore in mind what God asked.

The emperor and Granvela, he remarked in conversation with the latter, should read the gospel diligently. There could not be any doubt that the landgrave, completely cured of his former illusions and made doubly mistrustful through the recent threats against Cologne, was no more accessible to imperial influences. Is it likely that Charles V had seriously thought of having the two leaders of the Schmalkalden Federation apprehended in Regensburg? He stated afterward that the reverse had



been the case; electoral Palatinate and Hesse had planned to lead him forcibly away from the Rhine to Trient.

Before his arrival in Regensburg, however, the religious discussion which, chiefly conducted by the Spanish Dominican Malvenda and Butzer, had been hopelessly dragging along since January, was dissolved through the recall of the electoral Saxon members. Immediately after this a young evangelical Spaniard, Juan Diaz, fell at Neuburg under the blows of an assassin, at the instigation of his own brother,—a fanatical curialist,—who boasted years afterward of the fearful deed.

The crime was an alarming sign of the times and more than enough to prove that, with all the attempts at a peaceable settlement, nothing could be accomplished and the irreconcilable opponents must measure their strength in open battle. In the sparsely attended diet the Catholics demanded a decision of the religious question by the Trient assembly, while the Protestants clung to the Speyer final decree and to the old proposition of a national council.

These Regensburg discussions among the theologians and the empire principals well-nigh created the impression that they were held only to fill up the time and divert the attention, while behind the scene, as it were, everything was being prepared for the impending bloody spectacle. Although in the em-

peror's surrounding thoughts of peace were still alive, being especially represented by Granvela until the very last, and although the Roman king did not desire the war, yet Charles V pursued his aim with extreme caution but great persistency. While he left even the already appointed colonels and captains in the dark as to time and place of action in the threatened war until the last moment, he secured for himself the papal assistance, the neutrality of Bavaria and, what he valued particularly, the military coöperation of Protestant princes. The advice of his father confessor to open to the one or the other evangelical prospects for the territory of his neighbor had perfectly justified itself. The dissension among the Protestants, the emperor believed, would prevent a prompt and united resistance, in case he should succeed in taking them by surprise through his mobilizations, which were carried out under some other pretext. Afterward it only needed a single success, a severe exemplary punishment, to bring all the rest to obedience.

Thus he wrote to his son on February 16, 1546, and with all candor admitted in the letter what he wished to keep secret before the rest of the world, that he intended to draw the sword for the preservation of his sacred Catholic faith and for the good of Christendom, by virtue of his imperial office. Besides ending the religious strife he could also terminate the insubordination and evil hitherto

practiced in the empire. He thought the moment had arrived to triumph over all religious and rebellious political desires of the Germans, and to realize his idea of an orthodox and autocratic imperialism.

After Charles had reached an understanding with his brother, the decisive steps followed one after the other. The emperor overlooked for the time the open advocacy by the papal legates in the Trient council, in defiance of his wishes, of a formulation of the Catholic creed doctrine, which was harsh and repugnant to the Protestants. On June 9, the cardinal of Trient left Regensburg in order to bring the alliance document signed by the emperor to Rome, where it received the papal signature. Paul III granted a support of 200,000 ducats and 12,500 men to the emperor, against the Protestants and Schmalkalden men and every other kind of German heretic, who were to be led back to the old true faith and obedience to the Roman chair. In addition, he pledged a half of the annual revenue of the Spanish church and of the sale of Spanish monastic possessions up to the net amount of 500,000 ducats.

In the meantime an agreement had been made in Regensburg between the two Hapsburgers and William of Bavaria—Duke Louis having died. The Wittelsbacher, whose son Albrecht shortly afterward celebrated his wedding with the elder daughter

of the Roman king, did not succeed in his wish to enter the war as an equally privileged ally, but he went forward in answer to the promise of subsidies, guns, ammunition, etc., and the prospect of the electoral dignity of the palatinate line, in case its descendants should forcibly resist the emperor. Only with the most careful provisions did Charles and Ferdinand countenance the alliance with the old adversary, Leonhard von Eck receiving an imperial present of 2,000 crowns.

Full of joyful confidence, the emperor wrote to his sister Maria that he intended at first to pounce upon electoral Saxony and Hesse, and to use the Brunswick affair "as a pretext and cloak for the war." He expressed the hope that some of the Protestant princes would join him and also submit themselves regarding the religious question to the decision of the council. Once Maximilian had known how to attach the young generation of the empire princes to his colors, but now many a princely son of the Reformation period, no more stirred by the fire of their initial enthusiasm and grown up in the decades of the confessional strife, looked covetously to the rising star of the emperor, to whom the future seemed to belong.

Those young gentlemen had seen how dynastic and personal desires had been satisfied under the sign of the gospel, and how land and people, money and possessions were gained. Should they now be

dragged down with the doomed party, when fortune was taking a new turn? Moritz of Saxony reminds us, not of the kings and heroes of the Old Testament, but of the princes and *condottieri* of the Italian Renaissance, the brilliant type of a religiously disenchanted and morally deteriorated generation.

This ally was certainly the finest prize of the emperor and John Frederick, by stealing a march upon his cousin in their rivalry for Magdeburg, drove the Albertinian into the camp of the enemy. What Moritz did not accomplish with the Magdeburg archbishop, the protectorate over this arch chapter, together with Halberstadt, afforded in the agreement which he made at Regensburg with Charles V and Ferdinand. Electorate and territory were promised to the ambitious prince as a likely reward of the struggle, but for the time only his neutrality, and no open participation was desired. Although he sought to preserve his Protestant view in matters of religion, he had to pledge himself in writing to submit to the decision of the general council in the same measure as the other German princes. However, the emperor gave the verbal assurance that Moritz should not be jeopardized if the council left some articles in abeyance. In a like manner Margrave Hans von Kuestrin calmed his evangelical conscience in order to enter into the service of the head of the empire as cavalry colonel. Besides him

among the Protestant princes, his nephew Erec II of Brunswick and the son of the ambitious Kasimir of Brandenburg, Margrave Albrecht, accepted imperial appointments.

The proceedings of the Schmalkalden men against Henry of Brunswick had not only created bad blood in the Guelphic House, but also with the Hohenzollerns. And besides these dynastic disruptions the imperial policy did not leave out of sight the advantage which presented itself in the discord among the nobility over the continual expansion of power of the principality.

Above all the landgrave was looked upon as a determined opponent of those minor potentates, with whom offended class consciousness and material interests wrought together to make them accessible to the temptations of imperial delegates. "It was," remarked Lenz, "unforgotten in these circles what Franz von Sickingen had dared and by whom he was overthrown." From Franconia up to the Harz mountains the barons, lords and knights gave attentive ear to the delegates of Charles V, who promised them promotion and preservation of their liberty and prerogatives. In Lower Germany the squires had, as the landgrave wrote on one occasion, an abundance of horses and men, "who will ride for him who is first in giving them money, as they don't know how to keep the horses otherwise." The former captains of horse of the deposed Bruns-

wicker crowded eagerly to the colors of the emperor, in order to fight once more their old opponents.

The Schmalkalden men had long known of the work and mobilization against them. For months the landgrave tried to rouse his lethargic companions, especially electoral Saxony; in vain did he repudiate the worthless subterfuge that God would do all things well, with the serious reply that one should not tempt God. While in June the emperor was making out appointments for German foot-soldier colonels, John Frederick protested against the Hessian war prophecies. He and other co-religionists shrinking from fight thought they could breathe again when, in the days of the peace conclusion between England and France, they heard of a mighty advance by the Turks against Hungary.

Only when the emperor laughed outright at a report of these Protestant principals did John Frederick admit that against which he had pretended to be blind. On the following day the cardinal of Augsburg, Otto Truchsess, explained to an evangelical lord that the coming war was not to be waged for the sake of religion, but on account of the disobedience of the landgrave who had not appeared before the diet. Vainly the Protestants now strove to induce their Catholic fellow principals to unite in an inquiry of the emperor as to the purpose of the mobilization; there was nothing left for them to do

except to undertake this step on their own accord. The reply, given through Naves, said the emperor desired to restore unity, peace and law in the empire, and he had to proceed against the recalcitrant elements according to the prerogative and authority of his office.

Immediately after this the emperor turned to the four large South German empire cities with the pacifying assurance that the one and only question was to bring to obedience certain princely disturbers of the peace who, under the pretext of religion, had robbed other principals and impugned his imperial sovereignty. Similar declarations went to Württemberg and to the Swiss confederates. Electoral Saxony and Hesse were to be isolated, as had been done a few years before with Jülich.

At last, after long and patient waiting, Charles V had drawn the sword.

What had always perturbed the Protestants as immediately impending but still uncertain, had become a reality. With such great decisions the moment of their occurrence is as incalculable as that of death with man and is, therefore, always surprising. The imperial forecast had been made so carefully that the conclusion seemed to approach certainty. And yet it was wrong. The mask which Charles intended to wear in relation to the Protestants was torn off by no less a person than his ally in Rome. Upon the German heretics, however, the



tremendous danger did not exert a directly paralyzing effect, but it sobered and nerved them for the struggle. "There is no other way out," wrote an evangelical Augsburger, "but to shrink ignominiously from God and all honorableness, or fight."

## IV

### RELIGIOUS WAR AND RELIGIOUS PEACE

#### THE SCHMALKALDEN WAR

**I**T was the fate of our nation,—a fate whose traces are well-nigh ineradicable,—that the greatest movement to which she has ever given birth had to be dwarfed and hindered by the conflict between religious and political interests.

For a time the emancipation of Germany from the ecclesiastical rule of Rome showed distinctly its genuine national origin; the subsequent course of the Reformation, on the other hand, shattered an aim which was no less longed for,—the creation of a national state. How much the international character of the imperial reign militated against this desire, was experienced by the Germans in the sixteenth century, not for the first time, but perhaps more poignantly than at any other period of their history.

The same separate powers, however, that had formerly antagonized every strict monarchical organization of the empire as allies of the papacy, now rose against their emperor, claiming to be the

only protectors of the hardly won and gravely menaced ecclesiastical independence. It had come to this, that the liberation of the minds from the Roman bonds could not be separated from the cause of princely liberty, and that the future of German Protestantism could only be bought with a renunciation of a reformation of the empire.

A clear recognition of this sad predicament cannot fairly be supposed with the contemporaries, although we have met more than once with a strong feeling on the Protestant side for the majesty of the imperial name, and a sort of guilty conscience over one's own insubordination. It would be quite futile to discuss whether the conversion of Germany into a more or less centralized monarchy, under the Hapsburg scepter, would have corresponded to the old popular ideal of a national and at the same time social reformatory empire.

In all probability it was not so, but it can be safely asserted that Charles V was never the man to make Germany's interests his own. On the contrary, the empire fared better whenever this foreigner was prevented from devoting his full attention to it. He always carried his alien interests into German conditions; the Holy Empire might be valuable to him as an indispensable bulwark against the power of the Turk, and as an inexhaustible field for his war levies, but never did he feel the need of making Germany the center and standard of his world-embrac-

ing policy. The Netherlands could boast that he sometimes felt as a descendant of her Burgundian rulers, if not as a real son. In his determination for the German war he feared that a possible victory of the Reformation in Cologne would cause a loosening of the Catholic faith on the lower Rhine, and at the same time weaken his own rule in the Netherlands,—a possibility which he would not allow to last “for all the money in the world.”

Under such foreign control Germany had at the best experienced only a new flurry of the imperialistic system of Spain's empire rule. The marching in of Charles's Spanish and Italian troops must have appeared to the Germans of both creeds as a foreign invasion. Consequently there was a certain justification on the Schmalkalden side when they did not speak of a fight for the cause of God alone, but also for Germany. Now one suddenly awakened to the fact that the emperor, as well as the pope, was really a foreigner. Thus it was said, in a song of defiance of those days:

“ No foreigner shall rule us,  
And no Spaniard either.”

The first consideration was always what Charles V would have liked to deny; the conflict from the beginning was supposed to be a “war of God,” a “war of creed.” And not alone on the Protestant

side. We have learned the real opinion of the emperor himself. However, at the Roman court no one was content with confidential letters in which there was talk of the punishment of the heretics and the salvation of the Catholic creed.

Paul III had, on the 4th of July, solemnly presented his grandchildren, Alessandro and Ottavio, with the cross and standard for the German campaign; and some days later he directly announced an indulgence (absolution) "for the common peace and the extermination of the heresies." It was not possible to expose the boasting game of the emperor more ruthlessly. From the very beginning, those Farnesians begrudged their powerful ally nothing more than an easy and complete victory over the Protestants. And the first time after the declaration of war—for such we may regard the imperial answer of June—it looked as if the emperor would have to regret the precipitated disclosure of his intentions.

Here and there, however, one had begun to waver over the seeming separation of the religious from the political question, and the threatening news of the mobilizations. Of the great empire cities Augsburg, the town of the Fugger and Welser, talked in the beginning of peace, and even the landgrave felt the danger so vividly for a few days that he thought of choosing once more the way of discussion, and appealed to the mediation of his son-in-law Moritz.

Ulrich of Württemberg admonished both sides to seek an amiable solution.

But these signs of weakness soon passed, and the hope of the emperor for a revolt of the highlanders against their allies was not realized. The Augsburgers and the landgrave plunged with eager haste into the preparations for the struggle, and in their patriotic ardor the Germans forgot their natural love of peace and inaction. Of the Schmalkaldeners the only one who had gone over to the imperial side was Margrave Hans, in spite of the pathetic dissuasions of his pious mother, and among the South German Protestants only the Palatinate, Prince-elect Frederick and Otto Henry, and the Nürnbergers assumed an ambiguous attitude. For the rest, both the Schmalkalden unity and the Protestant zeal, especially of the towns, had passed for the time beyond expectation. "Here in the highland," wrote the Augsburg physician Gereon Sailer to the landgrave, "we are united and honest. Truly it cannot be otherwise; we have to fight, as the saying goes, 'pro aris et focus,' for the sake of our God and our Fatherland; He will not leave us." And the landgrave assured his confidant Butzer that he was going to defend himself bravely, but in the case of failure, however, to "take the Heavenly for the earthly."

Since the beginning of the Reformation public opinion in Germany had not expressed itself so

loudly and emphatically as it now did under the impending great decision. But while in those days the spokesmen of the nation on the whole made general use of the prose form and especially of the dialogue, the tremendous excitement of the years of war was expressed mostly in the defiant or warning, derisive or plaintive tones of the song, and the historical or instructive poem.

Among the poets were clergymen like Justus Jonas, and the Reutlinger reformer Schradin, honest people like Hans Sachs, and above all, the foot soldier or horseman, who pounced upon his opponent with genuine, soldierlike recklessness, whether it was in the name of God or of the emperor, for the "divine right," or for the divinely ordained authority. No wonder that on the Protestant side one referred to the antichrist and devil in the camp of the adversary; what had been previously the slogan of the excited masses was sounding now in the ranks of the evangelical mercenaries.

"Die pfaffen last uns schlachten,  
die solches richten an.—  
Wol her, ein fetter curthusan,  
kein spiess sol hie ein knebel han,  
also muss man sie lehren."

In opposition to this, a "true imperial song" raised the cynical and un-German jubilant cry: "Kyrie, the Spaniards are in the land." If here

the emperor was branded as a foreigner (*Wael-scher*), Charles of Ghent, as butcher of Flanders, and his German adherents as dogs, carrion birds, and viper brood, on the other side the imperial people taunted with the Hessian kitten, which was going to challenge the eagle, and with the pepper bags of the empire cities.

More than the models of the Old Testament, the examples of the national history were brought to light by the Protestants, the Germanic people upon whom Rome could not force its yoke, the German emperors who had so much to suffer from the "archscoundrel Pope Hildebrand."

Ariovistus, Arminius, Frederick Barbarossa, and Georg Frundsberg appeared one after another, in a protracted poem, as the advocates of the German cause; Barbarossa explained to the poet that it was permissible to resist the emperor, who had become a parson's servant of the foreign pope, since in this case he was no more an emperor, and in the opinion of the jurists one need not keep faith with a party who had betrayed that faith;

"so er euch nimpt ewer freiheit,  
verleurt er auch sein oberkeit."

The threatened German freedom was placed equally beside the threatened gospel; nowhere was the double nature, religious and political, of the struggle obscured, whereas the imperialists pru-



dently put the emphasis upon the rebellion against the head of the empire. Indeed such a powerful alliance of North and South German elements against the crown had, as Lenz correctly remembered, never been created since the great civil wars of the Middle Ages. The enmity against the foreign rule, which had hardly found a place in the hearts of the princely voters of 1519, had now come to life throughout all strata of the nation:

“Der kaiser der wil zwingen  
 die freien Deutschen gut  
 unter seine joche bringen,  
 wie er den seinen thut.—  
 Er ist meineidig worden  
 an gott und deutschem land  
 er wil die Deutschen morden,  
 ist im ein ewig schand.”

His worthy companion was the Roman king who, for the sake of the pope, exposed Austria to the Turks; therefore—out with both of them!

“Mit ihn weit auss den landen,  
 nement von ihn die kron.”

We have a comment of Melanchthon from the beginning of the war,—the outward appearance, the superiority in troops especially presaged a victory for the Protestants, but the stars in their courses fought for the emperor. It was certainly not the merit of Charles V that his too early declaration

of war did not have more serious consequences for him. For when he had neither succeeded in the isolation scheme between the two Schmalkalden heads, nor in the breaking up of the federation itself, he saw himself almost defenselessly exposed to the rapidly summoned fighting forces of the Protestants. His troops were still in Italy, the Netherlands, and Hungary, or were beginning to gather in a few South German recruiting places. With the utmost effort he could perhaps raise 12,000 men before the arrival of the Italians, while the opponents had over 50,000 troops at their disposal. "The war history," said Lenz, "may have few examples where all suppositions of success were so much in preponderance on one side as in these weeks with the Schmalkaldeners; but the favorableness of their political position yet almost surpassed the military one."

Apart from the fact that in Germany the majority of neutrals were either open or clandestine Protestants, and that Bavaria was an absolutely unreliable ally of the emperor, France and England had concluded peace; in Hungary the ambitious ecclesiastical diplomat Martinuzzi, the so-called "Brother Georg," agitated in favor of the Turks, while not only in Bohemia and Moravia, but even in the Netherlands a fermentation prevailed which was very menacing for the rule of Hapsburg; in central Italy the republicans of Siena and Lucca became

restless, and in Genoa a revolution, encouraged by France, was assuming form. "If the emperor," so wrote a distinguished Netherlander in August, 1546, "comes to grief, which Heaven forbend, then in my estimation all his countries are as good as lost."

Rarely have the lucky chances been thrown away by such culpable neglect as attached from the very beginning to the policy and conduct of the war of the Schmalkaldeners. One can really feel with the emperor the relish with which he recorded the blunders of his opponents in his memoirs. According to his opinion they should have marched at once upon Regensburg where he, with a couple of hundred horsemen and a few squads of foot soldiers, could hardly have sustained himself among a jealous Protestant citizenship.

The leaders of the highland federation troops, however, who were on their feet first,—Schaertlin von Buttenbach and Schankwitz,—directed their attention to the gathering places of the imperial forces in Upper Suabia, and at the same time upon the possibility of blocking the nearest Alpine passes against the advancing Italians. Consequently they marched to the south, in order to occupy at first the town of Füssen (July 10), while the imperialists escaped across the near Bavarian border to capture subsequently, through a clever surprise, the "Ehrenberger Klause" as the key to the Inn valley. Whether the colonels really thought of following up this

lucky advance to Innsbruck and even across the Brenner pass, may be an open question. At any rate, through the confederate war council in Ulm and the anxieties of the masters of the various contingents, their hands were tied in such a manner that they obeyed at once the order to return.

On the 20th of July Schaertlin took the town of Donauwörth, which intended to remain neutral, and in that direction also marched the North German army, which on the same day had united under the command of John Frederick and Philip at Meiningen. A serious blunder had been made in the initial war plan of the princes through an army corps, —originally gathered in North Germany for the electoral Palatinate, which was to have threatened the Netherlands and covered the rear of the Schmalkaldeners, allowing itself to be persuaded by Brunswick and imperial delegates to separate. A great deal worse, however, was the antagonism showing from the first between the two princely field marshals of the Schmalkaldeners, for in vain had the landgrave hoped that John Frederick would leave the military leadership to him alone, and content himself with the "chancellor affairs." If it had caused much trouble to get the prince-elect past the rich Franconian chapters, through the occupation of which he thought to open the war, the idea of advancing the highland troops and the northern army against Regensburg in two separate units, and

of effecting the union only before the walls of the diet city, did not seem to have occurred to the Schmalkaldeners. In vain a messenger of the French ambassador urged the princes in the field to an immediate march upon Regensburg; on the 3rd and 4th of August they united with the highlanders at Donauwörth.

With the remarkable calm natural to him, the emperor had in the meantime conducted the diet to an end and, in spite of all warnings, festivity followed festivity, for which the marriage of Wilhelm of Jülich and Albrecht of Bavaria with the daughters of the Roman king was the occasion. Not until the 3rd of August did Charles leave Regensburg, in order to attach to himself at Landshut the Italian auxiliary troops and reinforcements of German and Spanish troops. He then returned once more to Regensburg, and thence advanced up the river Donau to meet the approaching enemy. He had now about 40,000 men in all, but the Schamalkaldeners had missed the opportunity to catch him before the arrival of the reinforcements. Every one of their steps was hampered by the "polycephalous" nature of the council, and above all by the obstinacy of John Frederick. Failing in his proposal to make war upon Bavaria, he angrily threatened to resign.

When at last a move was made against Regensburg, it was too late. The emperor took up a firm

position in an intrenched camp before Ingolstadt and awaited reënforcement by the troops advancing from the Netherlands under Count Maximilian von Büren, expecting also a probable attack by the Protestants. Besides the military aspect, Charles did not lose sight of the political one. He did not accept the Saxonian-Hessian letter of challenge, but in return the imperial declaration of the ban upon the two princely rebels against the imperial crown was forced upon the messenger. This document, dated back to the 20th of July, purposely concealed the religious motives of the emperor, so that he could reproach the offenders with trying to cloak their high treason under the name of religion. It was easy enough for the outlawed men to repudiate such a perversion of facts, and to remind the emperor, who based his stand, willing or unwilling, on the Brunswick affair and other matters far remote, that he had treated those former complaints as settled during his intercourse with them. It happened against the will of the landgrave and in accordance with the express demand of electoral Saxony that, besides this, Charles was declared to have forfeited his imperial dignity and title, as a violator of the law of the empire and the election capitulary. In a far more resolute way than Philip, the military leader saw himself face to face with the political crisis; he imagined nothing less than that for which Zwingli tried in his time to interest the landgrave,—

the complete removal of the Hapsburg imperialism, which had been perverted into a scheme of the devil.

The electoral Saxon jurists and theologians differed radically upon this subject. The horrible accusation was made against the emperor that he not only aimed to turn the empire into a hereditary monarchy and eternal servitude, but he had formed a plan to exterminate all Protestants in Germany, except children not above the age of two years, and in this terrible purpose he was to have the assistance of the pope and the Turks. It appeared as a ban declaration of Divine Majesty "versus Emperor Charles and Pope Paulus the Third, the devil's Governor at Rome." Whoever abetted the emperor, it said, would be like him a servant of the devil. While the landgrave would have preferred to keep open the possibility of negotiating with the opponent, the obdurate Wettin intended, after he had drawn the sword, to throw away the sheath.

However, in such hands the sword lost its edge. Charles and his fieldmarshal Alba were anxious to avoid a battle and to tire out their opponents by strenuous marches and indecisive skirmishes. In spite of this the decision could have been forced, in the opinion of the landgrave as well as Schaertlin, when the armies opposed one another before Ingolstadt. The imperialists were based upon the town itself, and the Schmalkaldeners to the west and northwest of his positions formed a large semicircle.

On the last day of August the great artillery fight opened. Philip of Hesse remarked that if an attack had been made upon the hostile intrenchments, "the emperor would, as all the world says, have been beaten." The omission of the attack upon the well "dug in" enemy may, or may not, have been a tactical fault; at any rate, the retreat of the Schmalkaldeners after a fortnight's futile bombardment to and fro, created the public impression of a grave failure, and this impression was strengthened by what followed. The important Neuburg was left without help and exposed to the enemy; the nearest and most threatening danger,—the union of the Netherland army, about 20,000 strong, with the emperor,—was not prevented, although the Schmalkaldeners had been for two weeks in a favorable position to turn their whole fighting forces against either the emperor or Büren.

Bavaria, which observed a highly ambiguous attitude, was only waiting to see to which side the fortunes of war would incline. Beyond a doubt mistakes were also made and opportunities missed on the imperial side,—a fact which has been proved by the investigators of Druffel. The fatal error of the Schmalkaldeners was in allowing themselves to be forced into the defensive and permitting the war to be carried into Suabian territory. In the face of the haughty and insulting second letter of challenge, which electoral Saxony and Hesse issued against the



emperor when still before Ingolstadt, and the reproach that he did not possess enough noble princely German blood to execute the ban against them, their retreat was the most cowardly contradiction. "They challenged," said a contemporary, "the emperor to leave Ingolstadt and they ran away themselves."

The blind groping way in which the war was dragged along, as it seemed with no set aim on either side caused much dissatisfaction among both factions. Slowly the two opponents moved up the Danube, each in the dark as to the other's intention. In the beginning of October an opportunity offered for the emperor to strike at Nördlingen, and in the middle of the month the Protestants had the chance to deliver a blow, yet neither used it with energy. Still it cannot be denied that the Schmalkaldeners were retreating continually step by step, while the emperor gained one position after another,—Neuburg, Donauwörth, Dillingen and Lauingen.

There was mutual speculation over the disbandment of the respective armies. The Protestants hoped that the Italians and Spaniards would not be able to stand the severe autumn weather in Germany. It was a war "which was a tedium to everybody." According to a not improbable story, the emperor was prevented from carrying out a resolution to send the troops home instead of into winter quarters only through the decisive veto of his father confessor Soto, that war-enthusiastic monk. The suc-

cess of the endurance test was then of course placed to the credit of the imperial leader,—this modern Fabius Cunctator,—and of his persistency which could not be shaken by anything.

Two factors specially affected the result of the first six months of the war, to the disadvantage of the Schmalkaldeners,—the lack of all foreign help, and the intervention of Duke Moritz of Saxony in the struggle. It was indeed surprising, as the Italian Jove declared, that King Francis was not roused out of his calm by the roar of guns before Ingolstadt. It is true he had a hand in the movements of Italian discontent, and French and Hapsburg representatives at the Porte, after a brief official harmony, were working against one another as before. But Francis at that time had become a broken man from debauchery and was no more a match for the emperor who, although ailing himself, put the shameful dissipations of the French king to shame by his serious self-control.

With a greater interest than the father, the dauphin seemed to take up the wishes of the Protestants for the energetic intervention of France; moreover, the duchess of Etampes, the still powerful mistress, promised her influence with the king in that direction. The great plan of an anti-imperial league, which was laid before the Schmalkaldeners in the autumn of 1546, provided a simultaneous offensive war against Germany, Italy, the Nether-

lands, and the Hapsburg hereditary domains; England, the Swiss and Denmark were to lend their assistance; after the victory another emperor was to be elected and, what was obviously predominant in the minds of the French, not only Milan, but the empire deputy in the Italian countries and in the empire territories on the left bank of the Rhine, were to be given to the king of France.

It is beyond all doubt that the possibility of such a world war had been discussed between England and France, and that young Christoph of Württemberg strove to tempt the ambitious dauphin with the prospect of the imperial crown that was to be won. The Schmalkaldeners accomplished nothing but empty phrases, both from Francis I and Henry VIII; the English king thought it advisable to inform Charles V of these negotiations, and Francis, while he was intriguing against the old enemy in Constantinople and Venice, in the Schmalkalden camp and at the papal court, directly offered the emperor once more his assistance against the Protestants, for the prize of that family connection which he had not yet succeeded in getting out of his mind. It turned out as Charles told an ambassador of the king; they had both measured their strength sufficiently; as for the rest, the emperor repudiated the threats of France, which grew more and more distinct, with the remark that it was quite within his

power to make peace with the Protestants as soon as he liked.

The cautious Venetians did not dare to reject openly an agent of the Schmalkaldeners, but they denied themselves the French offers of an alliance. More disappointing to the Protestants than all this must have been their vain hope of the Danish king, who was related in creed and who forgot his old alliance with them in order, as he had promised the emperor, not to promote the cause of the enemy. The Schmalkaldeners clung to the prospect for a time, hoping that as the French had promised, something would be done in the spring, and that at least the Turks would give them some freedom through a fresh advance, as in the past. But while the dragging of the war and the absence of foreign financial help meant considerable harm, the catastrophe suddenly descended in Saxony and gave a new turn to the whole struggle.

Moritz fancied he had temporized and kept abreast of the Schmalkaldeners long enough. It was by no means a matter of indifference to him that the public opinion of Protestant Germany had begun to look upon him as a turncoat and clandestine papist; above all, it was important for him to force the Roman king with whom he was to operate in common, through a delay of his resolution, to a more favorable settlement of the spoils. Only after Ferdinand, at a personal meeting in Prague, had

waived his initial demand of an equal division of electoral Saxony and, in addition, had granted a provisional protection of the gospel in the conquered territory, was the double attack made upon Bohemia and the duke, who sent his cousin the letter of challenge. On the same day the emperor effected the transfer of the Saxon electorate to the Albertinian, whose revolt, however, he believed was always possible. Almost the whole of the electorate territory was occupied with little trouble by the Bohemian and ducal troops; only Wittenberg and Gotha held out, while outside, on the plains, everybody trembled before the fierce cruelty of the hussars, the light lance horsemen from Hungary and Poland.

It is surprising that in spite of all this, John Frederick allowed himself to be held for several weeks on the Suabian scene of war, although nobody thought of any serious action in that quarter, but on the contrary, disease and the lack of money visibly depleted the ranks. Quickly enough had the fighting spirit vanished in the empire cities; while from the north no money arrived, now all the large South German places refused to draw any further upon their capital and credit.

The results hitherto had not been in proportion to the sacrifices; Strasburg alone had supplied 220,000 guilders to the federal treasure for the Danube campaign. The old habitual particularism claimed its right again; Augsburg recalled its cap-

tain Schaertlin from the army. The unduly popular "heroes" of the Protestants again exerted the most captious criticism of the war conduct of the landgrave. Philip put the chief blame for the failure upon the towns, "who would not suffer any shortcomings in their commercial bargains and outward possessions." He himself made two fruitless attempts in the camp of Giengen to induce the emperor to hold a peaceable discussion through the mediation of Margrave Hans, as he also corresponded in spite of the war with his son-in-law Moritz, and proposed a meeting to the count of Büren, with the presence of Granvela, after the Schmalkalden army had cleared the field in Suabia.

The retreat began on the 21st of November; it did not come to any energetic pursuit on the imperial side, but the Protestants had given way first, and the plan of winter quarters in the highlands was not realized. It can be understood that John Frederick who, on his way, levied considerable contributions from the Catholic town of Gmünden, the abbot of Fulda, the archbishop of Mainz, and the Protestant Frankfort, had an urgent desire to reconquer his country and punish his cousin.

But what did the landgrave intend doing when he, as people taunted, returned to his two women? Timid minds credited him with desperate resolves,—an appeal to the revolution, to the peasants; but a skeptical observer remarked that "he had many bees

under his bonnet; I dare hardly write that he is crazy." At all events, he did not possess the devotion in his own country which would have been indispensable for a life and death struggle against the emperor. On the contrary, many of the Hessian and the neighboring nobility sought to exploit the opportunity for the destruction of the hated prince. His son-in-law, whom he desired to see personally, put such clauses in the safe escort for which he was asked that Philip desisted. Already preparations had been effected on the imperial side for making a prisoner of him while on this journey. Inactive and hopeless he sat at home, while the emperor, who had got rid of his opponents, marched as if in triumph through Suabia and Franconia and received the homage of the totally discouraged towns and princes.

Within a few weeks smaller places, like Bopfingen, Nördlingen, Dinkelsbühl, Rothenburg and others surrendered. Charles left the Nördlingen delegates on their knees for fully a quarter of an hour before he deigned to receive them, in grace or disgrace. At any rate it was a consolation that, for the time being, their religious services were vouchsafed to them, although Nördlingen had to embody in the general church prayer the request for a Christian reformation through the emperor. On the 22nd of December the representatives of the powerful town of Ulm had to subject them-

selves to the same humiliation; the Upper Suabian towns followed, with the exception of Constance, then the Frankforters and the Augsburgers, whom Schaertlin tried in vain to rouse to a brave defense and, in the case of need, to a glorious death. Strasburg was reckoned to be one of the strongest fortresses in Europe; "it will hold out, like no other," writes Sleidan, "if there is any reliance at all in earthly power."

But though many spoke in favor not only of defense but of an alliance with France and the Swiss, they were finally glad to grasp the proffered hand of the emperor, in order to be dealt with leniently, perhaps by prostrating themselves and paying a moderate money fine. Quite different contributions were imposed upon the other towns: Augsburg had to pay the emperor 150,000 guilders, Ulm 100,000, Frankfort 80,000, Hall 60,000, the little Isny 12,000, quite apart from other indemnifications which benefited the Roman king, the bishop of Augsburg and Duke Henry of Brunswick.

Naturally the imperial ministers were not left empty-handed; Granvela, for instance, received 1,000 gold florins from the Frankforters in a gold cup. Ulrich of Württemberg was given the hardest punishment, although he still counted himself lucky in that King Ferdinand's newly awakened desire for the possession of his dukedom,—this "heart of Germany,"—was not gratified. None the less, he had to



be answerable to his lord of tenure and to pay 300,000 guilders' war contribution. As the gouty gentleman was not able to bend his knees, the emperor allowed him to deliver his apology in a sitting posture, attended by two kneeling counselors. That Charles made the sick old prince wait for a whole hour, during which he was taunted and sneered at by the insolent Italians in his surrounding, and that he offered the humiliated man his hand in a contemptuous manner over his shoulder, showed clearly enough that ignoble spirit of exploitation of victory which had once brought Francis I to despair, and which was still to create bad blood more than once in Germany. The prince-elect of the Palatinate, who had placed a few horsemen at the disposal of the Schmalkaldeners only under stress, was compelled, in spite of his ailing condition and great age, to make his excuses to the frowning emperor standing erect and bareheaded. Three times he bowed low and the tears filled his eyes, but not until the following day did Charles show him again a friendly face.

If the highest principals in the empire were treated thus harshly, the towns could not be surprised that, in the circles of their old opponents, there were loud demands that guardians and administrators should be appointed in the future for the "immured peasants," in order to knock all revolutionary inclinations out of them. It really required courage

in those days to maintain the evangelical ground, as was shown by many of the town preachers when they refused the prayer for the emperor.

Time and again Charles gave the assurance that the war was not waged for the sake of religion, and therefore he would not enter into any agreements on that point, but his whole past clearly revealed the insincerity of this declaration, even if the knowledge of his alliance with the pope did not expose him in every shape and form. At this very time he thought of being able to proceed in the Cologne affair without any further consideration. It helped the old prince-elect naught that he, obedient to the imperial command, had anxiously avoided and forbidden every support to the Schmalkaldeners; at the instigation of the emperor the papal decree of removal issued against him was executed, and Adolf of Schaumburg-Lippe was appointed archbishop. When the hitherto faithful worldly principals yielded to the threats of the imperial commissioners, Hermann also agreed to a renunciation of his dignity. Previous to this the Catholic bishop Julius Pflug had, under the guard of Protestant troops, made his entry into the town of Naumburg, without the intention of granting the town the protection of its religion that had been promised it by its guardian Moritz. It was desperate advice, with which one had to be content and which was given by the Strasburg town council, that in case the em-



**Pope Leo IX (from 1049 to 1055) and his cousin, Cardinal Giulio de' Medici, later Pope Clement VII. (to the left), and Cardinal Pellegrino de' Rossi.**



peror really wanted to "drive out" the religion, it was none the less free to everybody to act in this respect as God conferred his grace upon him.

We must not overlook here the important part which the capital and commercial interests of the Upper German citizens played in this grave crisis of Germany, as was the case at the royal election of 1519. For, quite apart from the direct financial sacrifices which the war demanded from the towns, the emperor possessed an effective weapon against them. The commercial blockade and confiscation of merchandise which suddenly affected the traffic with Spain and the other Hapsburg countries, was a hard trial for the religious enthusiasm of the Protestant empire cities. The distrained goods of the Strasburgers alone were estimated to be worth 500,000 guilders. And with all this the old Church and the ecclesiastical sentiment in the upper stratum of the population had very influential representatives, such as the Fuggers, the Baumgärtners, and the Welsers. With full justification Nitzsch emphasized that "a continuation of the resistance against the emperor threatened the whole Spanish-Indian commerce of these Upper German houses with annihilation."

From the beginning the Protestants regarded the merchants with mistrust, because of their own confession. In Strasburg they were openly accused of treason by the excited multitude, and threatened

with violence. And in a certain sense these voices were right; without the most serious damaging of capitalistic and mercantile interests, the Protestant conduct of the war perhaps would have been more energetic and the resistance more lasting. "When a few months later," said Baumgarten, "the emperor imposed the heavy contributions upon the principals, the hundreds of thousands came to light which, when it depended upon salvation, had not been in evidence at all." The whole embitterment of the Protestants was expressed in those satirical verses in which the "rotten lists" were held before the Ulmers and the other highlanders:

"Das ihr bey ewrm Mammon,  
bey ewerm hochsten got  
moecht pleiben grobe Schwaben,  
o wee der faulen rott."

The glances of the Lutherans were now turned to the Saxon countries, so far as they had not given up every hope. For the ponderous John Frederick seemed to have been transformed, since the question not only concerned the great interests of Protestantism, but his princely heirloom and existence. Here his deepest sentiment played a part; in the hated cousin everything was personified which was likely to exasperate him,—the old rivalry of the Albertinians, the faithless world wisdom of the "Meissners and Gleissners," and the diabolical be-

trayal of the gospel. Received in his own country with great enthusiasm, he opened the winter campaign with the declaration to the principals of the opponent that he intended "to measure him with the same measure as he had done before."

The easily captured ecclesiastical seats Halle and Merseburg were treated mercilessly; and the ducal country also was made to feel the hand of the victor so heavily that, during the siege of Leipzig, the previously strong anti-imperial sentiment of the preachers and the citizens, which was also a grave matter for Moritz, turned again wholly in favor of the sovereign. It was quite characteristic of what value a real politician like Moritz placed upon the true evangelical sentiment of his own subjects, and upon the sharp criticism of his alliance with the emperor. Various songs from the ranks of his adherents defended the policy of the prince as a by no means non-Protestant one, in which perhaps the teaching of the apostle Paul of the divinely ordained authority had been used, and the reproach was made against prince-elect John Frederick that Luther had dissuaded him from drawing the sword against the emperor, his master. Moreover, it was lucky for Moritz that John Frederick wasted his time and strength before the walls of Leipzig, for his subjects proved themselves, as he wrote to Ferdinand, "to be so blind, that they believe the words of the enemy more than me and all others," and his urgent

requests for help sounded upon deaf ears at the imperial court and with the neighboring chiefs.

King Ferdinand showed no readiness to make any sacrifices for the territorial interests of the duke, and when finally he had cause to fear that he would drive the uncertain ally to an agreement with the prince-elect, mediated by the landgrave if he delayed much longer, his Bohemians refused their military services. He appeared in Saxony almost like an outcast, deeply grieved over the loss of his consort, with small fighting forces, mostly contributed by the Catholic nobility, while the utraquists remembered their anti-Hapsburg and anti-Roman traditions, concluded formal unions against the king, and got into communication with the prince-elect.

What had threatened in the beginning of the Reformation,—a connection of the newly revived Hussitic element with the German movement,—seemed to be now impending; the Protestant pamphlets which had been scattered through the country were answered by Czech fighting songs in which the emperor was abused as a plucked, hungry eagle, and the king, on account of the hereditary claims of his consort, as a female eagle in the den of the Bohemian lion. John Frederick had given up the siege of Leipzig on the 27th of January; from the walls of the town the guns were booming, and the scoffing verses pursued him: "Regret you do this shame in vain, now you go home again."



Almost simultaneously Margrave Albrecht came with military assistance, in the name of the emperor, and a further arrival of imperial people was announced. But shortly afterward the enterprise of his opponents against Halle offered to the prince-elect the opportunity for a successful coup. The margrave, who took up his quarters on the way in the badly defended little town of Rochlitz, the seat of the zealous Protestant sister of the landgrave, had a merry time at the little court until suddenly, on the morning of March 2, he was surprised by the enemy and made a prisoner. Frederick, however, instead of exploiting his victory and carrying the war to Franconia, relapsed at once into his habitual inactivity; the necessity of a courageous offensive seemed, as Voigt judged correctly, to have been as little apparent to him as "the recognition that the opponent of the House of Hapsburg, the champion of the gospel, also had to calculate his war plan and the scene of action in another way than the enemy of the cousin." And yet all depended at this time upon a serious adaptation to the prevailing situation. The emperor was not dead, nor in a dying condition, as rumor had it for some time; he was in vigorous advance, and the decision was imminent.

Charles had for weeks announced his entrance into Saxony, but only the news of the Rochlitz defeat forced him to a decision. The burden of a decaying physique weighed heavily upon the aging

monarch, whose resistant power seemed to decrease almost visibly to his surrounding people. Racked by the gout and a bladder trouble, unable to walk without the help of others, traveling in a sedan chair,—thus he moved slowly into the field, by way of Nördlingen and Nörnberg up to Eger. The people believed that the Spaniards carried only his embalmed corpse with them. In Eger he attended mass at Easter, led by his brother, the latter's son Maximilian, and the Protestant German princes, like Moritz and August of Saxony. That the son of electoral Brandenburg, Margrave Hans Georg, also arrived with several hundred horsemen in Eger, had less reference to the alliance with King Ferdinand and Moritz which Joachim had concluded not long before, than to the emperor whose favor the Hohenzollern intended to use against the aspiring Albertinians. For with all the Protestant participators in the Saxonian campaign the desire for the chapters Magdeburg and Halberstadt played a decisive political part. In the same way that this rivalry accentuated the contrast between the Wettinian cousins and even influenced their conduct of war, the Hohenzollerns strove to preserve so valuable a possession for their dynasty, and they really accomplished it, after Margrave John Albrecht had renounced his archbishopric under the pressure of the electoral Saxonian arms.

The young margrave, who kept up an attachment

to the half Protestant paternal church, promised to be obedient to the apostolic chair and to the dogmas of the Roman Church, and not to introduce any innovations until after the decision of the council. With staunch persistency the emperor clung to his last aim in the vicissitudes of the struggle,—that was, to make the whole of Germany Catholic again. For his intention to politically reorganize the empire, this restoration of a union in creed was just as indispensable as for his religious principles. As early as January he reflected, as can be deduced from a letter to his brother, whether it would not be advisable to abandon all further pretense in the religious question, since the latter had for a long time been regarded by the opponents as the real cause of the war, and if not, a decisive interposition of his authority, coupled with energetic punishment of the preachers, could also compel the already subjugated principals to this last sacrifice. He decided upon the other way, which was to destroy the rebels utterly at first, and after that to prepare for the new organization of the German conditions.

Quickly—beyond expectation—the fate of the military and politically incapable prince-elect was sealed. He had by no means rejected the advice of the landgrave to throw himself into a great fortress, such for instance as Magdeburg or Brunswick, before the arrival of the emperor, but he had chosen Magdeburg, which shortly afterward defied a pro-

tracted siege, as the goal of his unavoidable retreat. Instead of marching north at once he pressed in an easterly direction, by way of Meissen, in which Dresden was attacked. He had detached a part of his fighting forces to the Erzgebirge, with the idea of a union with the Bohemians. The enemy concerning whose strength and movements the prince electoral headquarters was in the dark, had begun his advance to the north, led by Moritz and Alba with the Spaniards. The emperor followed with the main body resolved, as Moritz wrote, "to seek the enemy, wherever he may be."

In Meissen there was no belief that the emperor would arrive, and it was rumored that somebody would impersonate him at the instigation of Moritz. Only when the emperor took up his camp a few miles distant did John Frederick cross the river Elbe at midnight, in order to march downstream on the right bank. While resting at Mühlberg and against the advice of the duke of Alba, he hurriedly departed before dawn in a dense fog, to reach the river. Of the 30,000 men, who were mostly Spanish, German and Italian troops, only the horsemen, including some hussars, were supposed to engage in the battle.

The prince-elect did not permit himself to be disturbed during his Sunday sermon and meal by the first news of the arrival of hostile squadrons on the other side of the stream, but he lost his head

completely when the fog dispersed about midday and there was left no more doubt that he faced the emperor with his far superior force. Instead of holding the right bank at any cost, and defending the boat bridge placed there, a retreat was begun in all haste. The few men with their guns ordered to the river were routed after a sharp fight, and while the imperials started to rebuild the bridge with their own and the conquered Saxon barges, the son of a citizen from Mühlberg who had been accidentally picked up showed them a good ford, over which the whole of the imperial cavalry passed, with Charles V himself and his retinue in the rear. Duke Moritz had sent word after his fleeing cousin that he should surrender and rely upon his mediation, but the offer had been rejected.

Moritz and Alba now placed themselves at the head of the pursuit, for more and more did the retreat of the prince-elect turn into a rout.

In front of a swampy forest called the Lochauer heath, the battle once more came to a standstill, but the prince electoral horsemen could not be held back any longer. They galloped off after the first volley without heeding further the infantry and their leader. While Moritz and his brother August had joined in the wild chase after the horsemen and more than once risked their lives, the stout John Frederick had stayed at the rear of his people, and the enemy had caught up with him, since he was

practically deserted. He was fencing with a hussar when a nobleman approached, accompanied by several Italian horsemen, and called to him in German to surrender. He did so, and Duke Ernest of Brunswick followed his example, having remained with him to the last. Another nobleman than their captor conducted the prisoners to the duke of Alba.

The emperor halted far in the rear of the battle. He could not be dissuaded from donning his full armor after the crossing of the Elbe; Titian afterward painted him, splendidly equipped, spear in hand, as he galloped over the battlefield. Yet he did not, like the Wettinians, participate in the actual fighting. Probably there was no moment in his life when he felt more a victor than that in which he saw Duke Alba riding toward him with his illustrious prisoner, John Frederick, on a heavy Frisian stallion, in black armor, and his face, exposed by the lifted helmet, covered with blood. Charles refused the attempt of the prince-elect to dismount and offered his hand, as well as his polite address and request for a princely prison. "John Frederick would be treated according to his merit," the emperor remarked as he turned away. The prince-elect covered his head again and said: "Do with me as you like, I am in your power."

Charles made no attempt to conceal his dislike nor did the otherwise awkward prince-elect forget

what he owed to his own dignity even when vanquished. He belonged to those passive natures whose best forces are only stirred into action when suffering. His attitude made a deep impression upon the Spaniards and Italians, much as they were always inclined to scoff at the German "beasts." To an Italian Humanist who participated in the war and wrote a description of it, this true son of the Lutheran Reformation appeared almost like a stoic of ancient times.

Thus, without a real battle, the defeat of German Protestantism was sealed. Nothing could reveal more distinctly the real causes of this defeat than the thanksgiving service which was held in Berlin on the occasion of the imperial victory. The prince-electoral preacher Agrikola, Luther's old antagonist, compared the crossing of the Elbe by the "pious" emperor with the miraculous passage of the Red Sea by the children of Israel. That the Bohemian principals in Prague congratulated the emperor and had a *Te Deum* held showed the unreliability of an alliance upon which John Frederick had placed too much value.

It cannot be said that in electoral Saxony itself a complete discouragement prevailed at once, for there was hope still of the North German towns, of France and the Turks, while the Wittenbergers seemed to be obeying the plea of their electoral prince, "to hold the town as their cemetery." Some

dared even to think of an advance into the Netherlands, "the heart and the treasury of the enemy."

Meanwhile, the emperor pronounced the death sentence upon the captured author of the ban in the Wittenberg camp. Probably from the beginning he had no serious intention of executing it. John Frederick, though he received the news of his sentence intrepidly, became more yielding under the strong pressure to the harsh terms which the capitulation imposed upon him. It was of no avail that the prince-elect of Brandenburg, with his consort Sibylla, two sons of the Roman king, and a number of other princes, fell prostrate before the emperor after the surrender of the town: it was an unalterable fact that John Frederick had to renounce the electoral dignity and the electoral lands, surrender his fortresses to the emperor, and remain under supervision during his pleasure at the court of Charles V or of the Infante Philip. The prisoner had repudiated the order to submit, under the decision of the council, to the confession of 1530 and the final decree of the imperial diet of 1544.

The future prince-elect, moreover, had to experience the disadvantages of his unequal alliance with the Hapsburgs; he received by no means all that he had expected and demanded, but in order to secure the young Ernestinians an annual income of 50,000 guilders had to cede part of the Thuringian country to them, and to King Ferdinand the



Bohemian tenures of the Ernestinian House. Of Magdeburg and Halberstadt there was for the time no question. Should the emperor, after he had just rendered one of the most prominent empire princes harmless, be so careless as to pave the way for an independent position of the Albertinian? In fact, he adhered to the often proved principle of the "divide et impera." In order to hold the aspiring Moritz in continual dependence and uncertainty, he could not wish any better means than a certain continuation of the rivalry between the two Saxonian lines. The person of John Frederick therefore gained a value to him, which he sometimes showed by a friendly and even respectful treatment of his prisoner. The Wittenbergers were astonished when their quondam sovereign was allowed to show himself at Whitsun within their walls, seated under a canopy carried by Spanish noblemen. Granvela's son, the bishop of Arras, could not sufficiently praise to the chancellor of the young Ernestinians the daily efforts of Alba and himself with the emperor in their favor. "One must," he remarked, "forgive bad deeds, because what has happened had been decreed by fate." The real responsibility for the fact that liberation did not follow was charged by some to Moritz. That the attempts to establish a tolerable relation between the two dynastic lines at the imperial court found no support was evident. "A block was placed between the two men," it was

said in a Saxon diet, "so that one could not come to any agreement."

The repugnance of the old gentleman and his people toward the kin of the bloodhound and scamp fitted excellently the intentions of this Hapsburg policy, which was endeavoring to disrupt the authority of the principals in the empire by internal strife and to make them amenable to a monarchical régime.

After the Mühlberg catastrophe, however, there was one Protestant fighting force which dared to hold the field. The troops of the towns of Lower Saxony,—Magdeburg, Bremen, Hamburg, Brunswick, and others, under the command of the counts Christoph of Oldenburg and Albrecht of Mansfeld—united with the rest of the electoral Saxonian army which had operated on the Bohemian frontier. They succeeded in compelling the imperial commanders Erec of Brunswick and Wrisberg, who beleaguered Bremen, not only to retreat, but they inflicted upon the young duke at Drackenburg such a defeat that his too late arriving ally, Wrisberg, had to content himself with taking the war chest of the enemy as booty and fleeing. The "skippers and farmers" of the towns thoroughly revenged themselves upon the imperials for their nickname. Still Charles was spared the trouble of wasting his time in making war upon the "firm and poor" North German towns, since the latter

preferred not to wait for the declaration of the ban, for which princely executors would have been easily found. Only Magdeburg was resolved to defend itself,—a town which, according to the judgment of Ferdinand, had always been “more rebellious, and stronger, and more important than a thousand others.”

The emperor refused to countenance a siege that would probably become a protracted affair, especially now that the only unsubdued prince, the landgrave, without a stroke of the sword gave up his cause as a lost one. Vainly looking for foreign help, in the midst of discontented subjects and malevolent neighbors, decried by the South German Protestants as the real originator of all these disastrous failures, he had seen one month after another pass without a change in his position or any progress in his endeavors to get favorable terms from the emperor. It was an amazing transformation for the former warlike prince to accept the previously repudiated view “that God probably does not want his word to be kept by the sword and by force, but by preaching, confession, suffering, death and cross.”

And yet it was not Christian devoutness, but only a too sanguine forecast, which prompted the landgrave to yield to submission and apology. The best terms the son-in-law and prince-elect Joachim could secure from the emperor were that the landgrave

should give up his guns, dismantle his fortresses with the exception of one, and surrender himself to the favor or disfavor of the emperor; the latter told the two mediators, however, that he did not intend to punish the landgrave bodily or with imprisonment for life, but Philip was not to know anything of this leniency. Thus Charles expressly reserved to himself the right to detain his opponent, and the proceedings of the act of submission themselves could not leave any doubt that he was resolved to use that right. It was not his fault if Philip came to Halle to make his apology believing it was to fulfill a mere formality; the responsibility for this, however, had to be borne by the two mediating princes-elect, who gave the landgrave the assurance that it would not come to an arrest, for which they even pledged their own persons. The story of the keen observer Sastrow is well known,—that the emperor, when Philip could not conceal his joyful mood while he was lying prostrate, had threateningly exclaimed to him: "Well, I will teach you to laugh." The two mediators knew that Charles would not offer his hand to the humiliated man. This common token of reconciliation was conspicuous by its absence, while the imperial answer after nullification of the ban only saved the landgrave from the death sentence, confiscation, or life imprisonment. Since the princes had previously dined with the younger Granvela, so they were now

(and in this there was characteristic Spanish perfidy) invited to supper by the duke of Alba, who had been commissioned with the apprehension of Philip. Is it possible that Moritz and Joachim still really hoped that the emperor would liberate the man whom he regarded as his bitter personal enemy?

With every sign of consternation and indignation they protested against Alba's proceedings, but their plea of a misunderstanding could not possibly be sustained in view of the distinct wording of the agreements made by them with the emperor and there was nothing for them to do except to lend the prisoner their escort for a few days.

As his most precious trophies the victorious emperor conducted the two heads of the overthrown German Protestantism with him to the diet. He enjoyed making the two conquered opponents feel the bitterness of their humiliation as often as an opportunity offered itself. He replied to the low bows of John Frederick with a scornful smile, and the defiant despair of the Hessian only exasperated him to aggravate the degrading measures of safety, which remind us of the treatment of Louis XVI and his family in the temple.

Perhaps he had heard of the threatening remark which was ascribed to the landgrave: "if ever he got His Imperial Majesty in his power, he would crucify him, and hang a cardinal on either side."

At any rate the emperor saw in the restless and (in his opinion) highly unreliable prince the most dangerous factor, which must be made harmless at a thorough reorganization of German conditions such as he was about to undertake. A satirical poem expressed in blunt words the change during those days:

“Kaiser Carl von Gendt  
 Hat den schmalkaldischen Pundt zertrent.—  
 Wirrttenberger gib Wein,  
 Landgraff schenk ein,  
 Kaiser Carl trinck aus,  
 Reich bezals, dem schmalczhafen ist der poden aus.”

Now or never Charles V must undertake to force his will upon Germany and Europe, and to carry out in earnest his inmost plans. The general situation had changed much to his advantage within a year. While he was busy in clearing the way to remove heresy and the privileges of the principals simultaneously, changes of government took place in rapid succession in France and England.

On January 28, 1547, Henry VIII died and on March 31, Francis followed him. There was a rumor that King Henry II intended to save the expenses of a coronation in order to gain money for war preparations, but for the time the disinclination against a passage of arms with the victor of Mühlberg prevailed at the French court, and the old partisan of Charles, Montmorency, regained the

influence which he had lost under Francis I, but the opposition to this accented anew the strife with England. Although Henry II did not fail to promise the German Protestants his help in the traditional fashion, the interest and the fighting forces of France were chiefly engaged by the events in England. French troops fought side by side with the Scotch against her, and it was planned at the same time, in 1546, to snatch the ceded town of Boulogne. England herself, apart from these warlike conflicts, not only had to face a religious reorganization, but a grave social crisis which, recalling the German revolution of 1525, bore a more distinctively agrarian character.

Edward Seymour, duke of Somerset, who during the minority of his nephew Edward VI conducted the régime as lord protector, was in sympathy with evangelism and as an enemy of the Scotch and the French was also suspected of absolutist aspirations and certain democratic sympathies. How could England in such a position and under such a government think of intervention in the great conflicts of the continent? To the east the Hapsburgers were protected by the peace which the Turkish government in strained relations with Persia concluded on June 19 with Ferdinand, although exacting an annual tribute of the king.

The ruler of Transylvania, Martinuzzi, began again to look for advantages on the Austrian side.

The anti-imperial conspiracies and projects in Italy had failed, the Genoese revolution was deprived at the beginning of its leader Fiesco by a fatal chance, and a revolt of the Neapolitans against the introduction of the Spanish Inquisition (May, 1547) had been quelled with little effort. Yet the most stubborn resistance ever encountered by Charles was to come from Italy. Nobody in Europe had interfered more promptly and resolutely against a complete crushing of German Protestantism in Europe than the pope.

We have learned long since of this strangely restrained position of the Italian papacy and the far reaching consequences. Time and again these "governors of Christ," if they did not want to sink to the level of vassals of a presumptuous imperialism, saw themselves dependent upon an alliance, not pronouncedly but nevertheless truly, with elements whose political support must have been welcome to the papacy, which was limited to the ecclesiastical states, although they had inscribed on their banners the fight as against Rome. Paul III had indulged in this traditional policy, perhaps not exclusively as a Farnesian, but as the wearer of the threefold crown. For everywhere the inopportune Hapsburger was in his path, no less in the council than in the devious course of his dynastic desires. In every direction he collided with the sovereign ruler, who wished to dispose freely of Italy, secularize in Spain,



command in Trient, and in Germany drag the great religious quarrel before his forum.

Religious and political interests were inseparably connected with one another; the dissatisfaction of the pope and his legates over the influence which the emperor strove to secure for himself in the Trient assembly, coincided with the discontent of the House of Farnese. These contrasts threatened to become acute even before the conclusion of the imperial-papal alliance. At the "General Council" which opened in Trient on December 13, 1545, with an attendance of only thirty-four prelates, the Spanish bishops and the imperial delegate appeared from the beginning to be unalterably opposed to the reforms, although a number of Italians assumed a "highly Lutheran" attitude. The request of the emperor to defer the fixing of the dogmas was not complied with, but the papal party had to renounce a full adjournment of the reformatory works.

The resolutions which were announced in the fourth session brought the irreparable break with the Protestants already combated by the emperor, through their unconditional adherence to the authority of the Vulgate and the tradition. Against the will of the emperor there followed, in the fifth session, the publication of the dogma of hereditary sin, after which the disputants turned to the central point of the controversy,—the vindication doctrine.

If one ventured to appeal occasionally, on the side

of the Spanish bishops, to the protection of the emperor against Rome, the papists at once threatened an adjournment and transfer of the council. In opposition to this, Charles caused the legate Cervino to be told that he would punish him for his obduracy and would see to it that he should never be safe before him. While the troops of Paul III were in camp with the emperor, the son of the pope, Pier Luigi, whose dignity as a duke Charles refused to recognize, saw in the person of the new imperial governor in Milan, Ferrante Gonzago, a pronounced enemy, placed by his side. Vainly had it been hoped in Rome that the important post would be given to the young Ottavio Farnese. It was not surprising, then, that Pier Luigi resumed his former French relations, and that he besides France had a hand in the conspiracy of Fiesco.

A renewal of the anti-imperial coalition of 1526 seemed to be close at hand, but Florence and Milan were in the power of the opponent. In spite of this the pope resolved, in the midst of the Protestant war, to leave the emperor whose successes and claims had gradually filled him with alarm. For the result of the Danube campaign, favorably as it shaped itself for Charles, rendered a further effort of the military, and therefore of the financial powers unavoidable.

Charles, displeased with the haggling policy of the pope, whose subsidies flowed very slowly, demanded

not only the previously arranged high taxation of the Spanish church, but an extension of the measure to all his empires and states, which represented a tremendous secularization. Instead of granting this Paul III recalled his troops from Germany in January, 1547. He may have justified this step to himself by the fact that the emperor had hitherto granted religious tolerance to the vanquished Protestants, instead of forcing them to submit to the council, in which the legate who had been threatened by the emperor purposely offered defiance to the Spaniards by the publication of the doctrine of vindication.

The bishops who were absent from Trient,—above all the Germans were meant,—were to be proceeded against. More and more the ecclesiastical assembly assumed a hostile attitude against the Protestants and also against the emperor. The proud monarch's paroxysms of anger, to which the nuncio had to listen, were terrible; the excuses concerning the troops were nonsense; the congratulations of the pope upon his successes were lies; the aim, on the contrary, had been from the beginning to draw him into protracted embarrassments; the pope evidently suffered from the French disease, in spite of his extreme age. In his negotiations with the Protestants the emperor had omitted the pope for the reason "that his name was so much hated, and not alone in Germany, but also in many other

parts of the domain of Christendom, on account of his wicked deeds, so that his mention could not involve any advantage, but only great harm." Moreover when, after the death of Henry VIII, the imposition was made from Rome that he should turn his forces against schismatic England, he declared he would not draw the sword against the king of England nor anybody else for the sake of the pope; in future he intended to honor the Holy St. Peter, but not the pope Paul, and so far as the German war was concerned, he reckoned upon the nuncio and the legate to enter the front ranks in battle, in the absence of papal soldiers,—then it would be seen what they could accomplish with their blessing.

In opposition to this the pope expressed to the French delegate his satisfaction with John Frederick's successes in Saxony, and assured the French that money could not be better applied than for the support of those who resisted the common enemy. On the 11th of March the chief blow descended upon Trient; a few cases of death served as a pretext to transfer the council from the infected town to Bologna. The Spaniards remained behind in defiance of the majority resolution; the schism was imminent. "The transferring of the council," according to Janssen, "became a disaster for the Church."

As in the quarrel of the emperor with Clement VII, there were powerful voices which urgently

advised Charles V to take the reformation of the Church, which had been neglected by the pope, into his own hands. For neither Charles nor the Protestants would have left the decision of the greatest question of the time to a council in Bologna. Already the heretically tinged republican Burlamacchi, who in 1546 fell into the hands of the emperor, after an unsuccessful attempt to liberate his native town Lucca from the Toscanian rule, had given Charles the advice to march to Rome with German and Italian fighting forces and rid the Church from the pernicious burden of its worldly possessions. And when in February, 1547, King Ferdinand proposed to his brother to lay before the Roman court and the council a reformation scheme jointly arranged by German and non-German Catholic theologians, Cosimo de Medici found himself almost on an identical footing with his deadly enemy Burlamacchi. In a letter to Granvela he recommended, not forcibly at first if possible but through the council, to exercise such a pressure upon the pope that the longed for reformation of the Church, that is, the abolition of the papal autocracy and priest tyranny, would be reached in a peaceable way, and then the German heresy would cease of its own accord. This would bring His Majesty double as much fame as all the rest of his successes together. The pope alone would perhaps be offended, but if he offered resistance it would be the duty of the

emperor to "punish him in such a manner, that while His Majesty and his sons were alive, the popes would refrain from causing this upheaval in the world every other minute."

Paul III had prevented his opponent from securing a peaceable reform in the council. Consequently the duty of Charles was now to deal simultaneously with Germany and Rome.

## V

### IMPERIAL REFORMATION

A FEW decades previous an Italian Humanist had compared the empire to the shadow of a tall tree, or to the ray of sunlight which penetrates through the window. One should try to hold an ounce of this imponderable light in his hand. This sarcasm, formerly only too well justified, was inapplicable in the year 1547. A power which had been unheard of since the times of Charles the Great, and which in the nineteenth century was wielded for a short while by the mighty Corsican, was at the disposal of the victorious Spaniard. For his position in Germany appeared like a triumph of the Romanic element in those days. After he had conquered for a long time the precedence in all the domains of historical life, the nation, whose old claim to the highest dignity of Christendom was regarded by a profoundly changed world as an anachronism, was now to be divested of its arrogated sovereignty, and snatched by foreign hands from the clutches of an anarchy which she herself was not able to master or control.

The contempt for all that was German spoke

eloquently enough; a Venetian delegate remarked openly that it was revolting that the emperor, without calling any other Christian princes, was elected only by six German gentlemen, of whom the three ecclesiastics had the appearance of ordinary chaplains, and the three worldly ones were drunk every day. And yet the wealth of these far extending German lands in money and soldiers was not to be denied; the possibility of disposing of such means more liberally than ever before seemed now to be given to the emperor. Everywhere spread the conviction that he would in some way or other alter the constitution of the empire and make Germany monarchical,—“patrimonial.”

The succession since Frederick III in the Holy Empire could practically be accepted as good as hereditary. Now the prophecy that all earthly empires would be subject to Austria seemed to come true. A German learned man did not shirk the trouble of compiling numerous predictions of a great and Holy Emperor, from the times of the Old Testament to the sixteenth century. The German people, however, had ceased to see in the inaccessible foreign ruler the features of the once longed for imperial liberator. Charles V himself, as the world rightly assumed, fostered from the beginning of the war the firm resolve to remain emperor in Germany, “either dead or alive.” He prepared to settle there the stewardship of his life.



We have a picture of Charles V in those days which, coming from the master hand of Titian, brings us close to the dreaded man. There are the deathlike complexion, the penetrating eye, and the partly gray beard of the sovereign whom the troubles of a laborious life and physical sufferings, rather than the burden of many years, had made old before his time. In spite of his weakly constitution he had developed himself, through his will power, into a cavalier and warrior, and he knew how to overcome an inborn terror which made him tremble at the sight of mice and spiders. When he received, before Ingolstadt, the report of the advance of the Protestants, he shivered with nervous excitement; shortly afterward, when he had donned his armor and mounted his horse, he exposed himself with recklessness to the fire of the enemy. To such physical self-control was added the long, strenuous activity in the cabinet and his body, whose delicate constitution was not equal to these hardships, was further imposed upon by a boundless capacity for enjoyment. His achievements in eating and drinking were renowned even in those days of tremendous indulgence in table luxuries, and also the fair sex could not complain of neglect by him.

But what distinguished Charles from the real Epicurean was the quietude and the never violated decorum which marked his participation in the joys of life as much as it did his public appearances.

He never forgot the consideration due his majesty in such a reckless manner as did Francis I, or the high born drinkers of German nationality. One can scarcely say that there was ever a jolly time at his court. Without uttering a word, at the utmost perhaps forcing the semblance of a smile at the quips of his Spanish court jester, he made his choice among the twenty-four dishes of his dinner table, and emptied his stately drinking glass. "Five times as long as any one of us," declared an English eyewitness, "does he keep his head in the glass, and he never drank less than a good quart of Rhine wine at one draft."

For the advice of his physicians, who were always present, he cared little. By the side of the loud hilarity of his almost over-vivacious brother and amid his surroundings, this mute revelry seemed doubly strange. "He lives," said a French report, "like through a miracle, and against the rules of nature and physics."

But Charles had to pay heavily for his excesses in work and pleasure; the gout and other afflictions were his steady companions and his pronounced perception of duty was coupled with a no less strong self-will. Never for a moment did the consciousness of his power depart from him. We know the dignified, always half-contemptuous manner in which he sometimes condescended to indulge in a carefully measured facetious speech, for the account

is from the notes of a Spanish nobleman whose original impudence had been more than once pardoned by the emperor.

Only his own Spaniards remained always really sympathetic to him, and he occasionally treated Germans and Italians with unconcealed contempt. He was said never to have laughed more heartily than about a malicious joke which his court jester once indulged in at the expense of the Italian soldiers. One could explain his predilection for the young prince of Sulmona only by the theory that he was a natural son of the emperor.

But with all this Charles was by no means indifferent to the brilliant side of Italian culture. In 1530 he visited the churches and monasteries in Bologna, not perhaps for the sake of devoutness alone, but as a connoisseur and collector of art treasures. It is well known that he appointed as palsgrave and knight the greatest Venetian master, who was allowed to paint him often, being the Apelles of his time, and he not only kept many other artists busy, but honored them conspicuously.

It characterized the emperor as a son of the Renaissance that he took a painter with him on his Tunisian campaign, and that after the termination of the Schmalkalden War the aged Titian had to cross the snow-covered Alps in order to create in Augsburg the life-size picture of the victor.

But this imperial patronage was not devoted

exclusively to æsthetic enjoyment, but to the perpetuation of his fame as well. One feels tempted by Charles's astronomical and mechanical hobbies to think of the master of statesmanship, who looks upon the leadership of men and the exploitation of their forces and weaknesses as a grave mathematical problem.

The one absorbing passion of this reticent nature was politics. Even his not very sanctimonious religiousness was so fraught with political elements that the interests of the Catholic creed and of his monarchy were, in his eyes, in such beautiful congruity that, in the incessant conflicts of ecclesiastical and worldly matters which those times had produced, we never gain the impression that Charles V had been disturbed by religious scruples in the choice of his aims and means. For this reason there is a kernel of truth in the judgment of a French diplomat, "that religion, justice and honor only count with him inasmuch as they can be made subservient to his advantage and no further."

The best proof that political matters could excite him most deeply was the boundless violence by which the otherwise cautious and taciturn prince allowed himself to be carried away whenever opponents or allies crossed his plans. Then he became eloquent of a sudden, and resorted to biting sarcasm or to open insult. As a rule, however, one only beheld the well controlled gravity of the imperial

diplomat, who had learned to attend to his most difficult tasks himself. Still it is true that in the forties Nikolas Perrenot, the elder Granvela, enjoyed the reputation of being almost omnipotent with the emperor.

This clever man from Burgundy, who with unfavorable surroundings had worked his way into the confidence of the mightiest monarch, was flattered by princes and ambassadors, whose homage and presents he accepted as a tribute due his position without neglecting the interests of his master. The Schmalkalden War had become a gold mine to him. Smilingly he pointed to his wagons loaded with *peccata Germaniæ*, and to his beasts of burden.

Besides the stately father, the gifted sons began to play their parts. Anton, the bishop of Arras, seemed particularly destined to succeed to his parent's position. While Granvela could pride himself upon having gained the emperor's consent to many things and having occasionally excused his master's ire and lack of affability by his engaging manner, the decision of great questions was by no means in his hands. Down to the very last he was opposed to the German war; his diplomatic actions in matters of belief were perhaps not always fully in accord with Charles's personal views and intentions. As a suggestive feature, this minister was in the habit of writing down each morning his inexhaustible wealth of propositions and sending them

to the emperor by a servant who could not read. This did not prove that the emperor depended on him, but, as Ranke supposed, it was the ruler's habit to reach a decision "undisturbed by any stranger's presence, all alone, in the quiet of his cabinet." The sovereign was aware of the fact that such decisions could not be easily shaken; on one occasion he told Contarini, "At times I also insist on poor opinions."

The Germans considered this imperial government peculiar and foreign; even those who followed the emperor's flag felt they had been discriminated against in favor of foreigners. One of the margrave's friends made the following entry in his diary:—"The foreign adventurers are acting disgracefully, but whatever these people do is called well done."

People were horrified by the frightful licentiousness of the Spanish and Italian troops, who did not seem to see any difference between friends' and enemies' country, and by their bestiality toward women and girls exceeded the worst hideousness of the German soldiers.

Accompanied by these wild hordes Charles V moved slowly to the Reichstag, which was opened at Augsburg on the first of September, 1547. The city and surroundings were full of warriors; at Augsburg a serious riot occurred among the foot soldiers (*Landsknecht*), who had not been paid.

Many soldiers were executed on the scaffold which the emperor had erected; among them was an evangelical German colonel who had enlisted for the French army and, through the connivance of an imperial officer, was turned over to the Spaniards. Prior to this congress King Ferdinand called to Prague his Bohemian counselors, whose desire for rebellion he had nipped in the bud. With the assistance of Elector Moritz the "bloody" meeting of the frightened gentlemen and city dwellers was preceded by executions, and at the same time the Bohemian brothers were cruelly persecuted as an undoubted opposition element.

Under the stress of a general terror these Hapsburg brothers tried to make all Central Europe do their bidding. On the 10th of September, the son of the pope, Pier Luigi, was assassinated in the citadel of Piacenza by noble conspirators who had the support of the imperial governor (*Statthalter*) at Milan. He occupied the city in the name of the emperor, who knew of the matter and would have preferred to spare Pier Luigi's life, but neither called Gonzaga to account nor returned his booty. Nobody felt safe in the presence of such a power that did not disdain expedients of that kind,—least of all the German princes, under whose eyes the governor maltreated their captured equals. The Pomeranian ambassadors gave assurances that their masters were guiltless regarding the fateful letter

of regret of the Schmalkalden leaders, but the emperor replied he would prove to the satisfaction of all counselors that he had sufficient noble princely German blood, and also the power, to punish everyone according to his will. Moritz of Saxony repeated to the duke of Alba the effective flattery that congress would be of short duration this time, and that it would not pass its hours in deliberations as heretofore, but in taking orders.

This remark was justified by the emperor's changed demeanor during his intercourse with the princes assembled at Augsburg. It was noticed that, instead of meeting them at the head of the stairs as he had done previously, he now received them in his chambers and did not accompany them back to the door. The electors of Cologne and Saxony had just been elevated to that dignity by the emperor's victory; only through imperial favor was the elector of the Palatinate able to maintain his position, which was energetically claimed by Bavaria. The duke of Württemberg was now in danger of losing the land which Charles had left him, through a lawsuit brought by Ferdinand. The Hohenzollerns were obliged to execute the previously pronounced ban against their cousin in Prussia. Ranke said: "There is not a large house in the empire that did not depend on the emperor's good-will in one matter or the other."

Nevertheless this great ruler, in the zenith of his



glory, had to experience the power of passive resistance which is based on historical conditions. Analogous to the former Suabian Union, Charles desired to create an empire league including all the states and maintaining a standing army which, by a stricter system of voting in congress, would render harmless or perhaps unnecessary the clumsy meetings of the empire. Long before, Maximilian's reform of the imperial system had failed through the king's resistance, and also through a lack of interest on the part of the states, and now Charles could not overcome the stubborn adherence to the conventional which had become second nature with the members of the holy kingdom,—all the more so since this time there was, with reason, fear of a considerable increase in the empire's strength. Charles succeeded, however, in carrying through a number of his wishes by separate resolutions. The selection of the entire new personnel for the supreme court was left to him; the statutes of that court were to be carefully revised, and its maintenance was assumed by the different states.

After some resistance the representatives granted the imperial demand "to have some cash on hand in the empire." This meant the creation of a war treasury which the emperor and representatives would be permitted to employ for the purpose of maintaining peace and justice. Finally, by a treaty of the 26th of June, 1548, the future relations be-

tween the Netherlands and the German empire were settled in such a way that, as a Burgundy district, the country would be obligated to participate in the payment of taxes and other expenses granted by congress, but would not be subjected to the jurisdiction of the supreme court. This loose connection did not justify the empire's dangerous obligation to defend the Netherlands for all future time against any attack. At Augsburg Charles had just decided to leave these territories to his son Philip, not to his daughter, who was to marry the young archduke Maximilian.

The time was approaching when it would be necessary to have an explanation between Charles and Ferdinand over the question of succession, but no definite agreement was reached at that time. A successor in the empire from outside of the House of Hapsburg seemed out of the question. As Ferdinand had done in Bohemia, so his brother in Germany tried first of all to make the democratic element of the states—the cities—forever harmless. In congress they were excluded from deliberations about the supreme court; when Turkey had to be assisted, the higher courts placed the heaviest burdens on the cities without paying any attention to their complaints. The old idea of a closer connection between the crown and the citizens could never find a place in the heart of a ruler who, from the very outset, was obliged to fight against repub-

lican opposition in cities in Spain and Italy, as well as in the Netherlands and the empire. Charles was convinced, particularly after his experiences during the last war, that a threat of intended violence would suffice to crush the spirit of religious independence in these thoroughly humiliated German cities. From representatives of the states, who hesitated before making their justifiable complaints of the Spanish soldiers, and accepted his unfavorable reply with humble gratitude, he expected finally to obtain anything he desired in regard to the church question, especially since his settlement of this question really meant to a certain extent an approach to the old demands of the Lutheran people.

The religious conversations under imperial leadership and the concessions made in 1544 exceeded the limits of participation which, according to hierarchical views, the worldly authorities could be permitted to take in deciding religious differences. The specter of imperial reformation, or imperial schism, repeatedly loomed to view in the minds of frightened office holders, although Charles never intended to go so far as was occasionally whispered around him.

On the other hand, it was remembered that at one time Clement VII and his theological counselors expressed a liking for the Augsburg Confession, and that at the Regensburg colloquy a cardinal of the Roman church met his Protestant opponents on the

hotly contested ground of the doctrine of mercy. Such Roman inclinations toward a compromise could no longer be expected, but the pope by his treatment of the council had given the emperor more than sufficient reason for intervention.

The circumstance that Charles tried at the same time to frighten and to win the head of the Church seemed very peculiar. Pier Luigi's murder, and the loss of Parma and Piacenza, showed Rome what might be expected from the angry emperor; it was not to be wondered at that uneasy minds already saw Charles at the head of Lutheran armies marching toward the Eternal City.. Instead of doing so he was trying at Augsburg to bring all the German states to the point where they would on principle recognize the council as the highest court of justice in religious differences; he succeeded by promising "a free council that would guide itself strictly by the regulations of the Church," and a preliminary compromise until final decision.

In October, 1547, a commission of Catholic theologians received the order to draft such a proposition, while the pope was requested to send a plenipotentiary. Although the emperor had carried his point in spite of the conflicting opinions expressed by the state, his demand of the pope to transfer the council back to Trient, where all Germany was ready to submit to it naturally, was refused after being referred to the assembly at

Bologna for consideration. It was claimed that it would be unwise to risk the salvation of all Christendom in an effort to reclaim Germany. On the 16th of January, 1548, the fathers at Bologna received the emperor's solemn protest, which Mendoza the envoy shortly afterward repeated before the pope and the cardinals. The emperor declared that the assembly at Bologna did not possess the character or authority of a council and that, on the strength of his office, he would protect the Church against the evil conjured up by the pope and the assembly.

Prior to taking this step Charles resumed his work at Augsburg on the preliminary agreement concerning religion, this time by consulting with the representatives of states, although reserving his own right of final decision. After a commission, which he appointed by request of the states, produced only contradictory propositions of both parties (the Catholics even demanded originally full restitution of church property), instead of an agreement, the emperor decided to take the step which his brother had long before advised. The much discussed interim was his work, at which he only permitted the states and the nuncio coming from Rome to look, after it was completed.

Personally he was only concerned with the production of the "imperial interim religion," inasmuch as he had appointed the theological commission,

which attended to the work and surrounded it with great secrecy. Besides the well known Julius Pflug, the suffragan bishop of Mainz, and the imperial counselor Michael Helding (Sidonius), were consulted. They used as a basis a formula for a compromise submitted by the last two named, although it originated principally from Pflug. Their Protestant assistant was the conceited imperial preacher Agrikola, who solemnly promised after Luther's death that he would gladly sacrifice his life for the purity of the doctrine, but a year later delivered the joy sermon in honor of the victory near Mühlberg. Butzer, whose participation was also desired, came to Augsburg, but neither by kindness nor by threats could he be prevailed upon to sign the interim. In fact, it required all the conceit and blindness of Agrikola to term the book, which was completed about the middle of March, 1548, the beginning of the evangelization of all Europe. He boasted not only of having managed the whole affair, but of reforming the pope and making the emperor a Lutheran. As a matter of fact, the assistance of this questionable representative of reformation did not prevent a "straitjacket of German Protestantism," as Beutel expressed it, from being created during the interim.

The mental father of the work was Pflug, not Agrikola, and furthermore, besides the three theologians mentioned, several Spaniards including

Charles's confessor Soto actively assisted, and numerous changes were afterward made in accordance with the desires of the Catholic representatives of state. Contrary to Ranke's previously expressed opinion it is not believed that Charles V originally intended to force the interim as a permanent rule on both parties—those of the old belief as well as the "separated" states. The imperial "explanation of what should be done for religion in the holy kingdom until the common council reached a decision" was intended only for the evangelical people, and while the Catholics were expected by their consent to make this temporary order a law, they were not obliged to observe it in their own territories. For a time the case was not perfectly clear, particularly to the Protestants, and this lack of clearness may have pleased the emperor. Although asserted, it was never proved that he formally promised some evangelical princes to make the interim generally valid. It was evidently far from his thoughts to force upon the states still belonging to the old Church, or even recommend to them, the two most important concessions of the book, which were utraquistic communion and the marriage of priests, although soon after the congress of 1530 these concessions were declared admissible even in Rome.

Besides these two points the interim really offered the Protestants only a few and very doubtful

similarities in their doctrine and mode of expression. This was less in the doctrine of justification than in the article concerning the mass and a few other observances, while the purgatory was passed over in silence. On the whole, the contents of the book showed a Catholic tendency; above all, the Protestants were asked not only to recognize the bishops' jurisdiction but to resume the entire burden of the ceremonies which had been done away with, such as the seven sacraments, the daily masses, the fasts, the veneration of the saints, and the benedictions.

This was papism personified, which the storms of reformation had swept out of the churches and the people's hearts. In popular opinion those outside differences were more important than dogmatic cunning; Protestant theologians would have been obliged to deceive either the world or themselves had they claimed to see in these regulations anything but an evident turning to full ecclesiastical reaction.

Charles V was justified in rejecting as "contrary to reason" the demand of the Catholic princes under the leadership of Bavaria, that Protestants should expressly renounce the Augsburg Confession. In a personal address he made clear to the ecclesiastical representatives that more had been gained from the opponents than ever before and still further gain was in prospect.



On the 15th of May, the interim was submitted to the assembly of the empire and accepted by the elector of Mainz in the name of all, without any opposition. Immediately afterward Elector Moritz declared that he would first have to consult his counselors and theologians; Margrave Hans of Küstrin firmly refused to accept the interim; Palsgrave Wolfgang of Zweibrücken declared a quick passage of the measure impossible out of consideration for his subjects, and the captured John Frederick, resisting all allurements and threats, remained firm in declaring that he was willing to suffer what God might decree, for the cause upon which salvation of the soul depended.

The emperor probably began to understand that in spite of the brilliant successes of his arms the invisible enemy was not yet overcome. On the 26th of June one of his counselors wrote: "Public opinion in congress, from which people's minds may be judged, indicates that nobody likes to accept the interim, but under such conditions much is promised without a thought of keeping the promise later. The emperor is fighting for religion against its head, the pope, and against members of the church in Germany, which means against the masses of Protestants and the ecclesiastical princes." The last named were as much dissatisfied over the reform demanded by the emperor as they were with

the refusal of restitution of the secularized church property.

In later years Vice-chancellor Seld expressed the opinion that there was no intention of passing the interim by force and that such means would have been perfectly useless. These were threats particularly against the cities, which were reminded on every occasion of their inferior position in the empire. An imperial counselor told the Frankfort ambassador that it would be necessary to learn the old customs again, and added: "People will be sent to teach you; you shall even learn Spanish."

At Augsburg and Ulm Charles overthrew the constitutions, which he considered too democratic, and placed the government in the hands of the honorables; this was regarded as a serious warning. By working against the "awkward and useless" guilds, hardship was at the same time inflicted upon the evangelical element, while on the other hand during the conquest of Constance the lower classes contributed to the catastrophe from sheer dislike of the strongly reformed character of the regiment. The city was fortified on account of the interim and had successfully repulsed a surprise attack by the Spaniards, but the emperor's threatening attitude led the citizens to the desperate decision of losing liberty and the Protestant religion by placing themselves under the protecting power of the Roman king.

This step was highly favorable to Austria and King Ferdinand would have liked to try the same mode of procedure on Strasburg, but the formidable city was again gently treated by the emperor, as on previous occasions, owing to the dangerous proximity of France and the confederates (*Eidgenossen*). While permitting a few churches to exist, he made it more difficult in every possible way for Catholics to exercise their religion. Even in the cities which had expressly submitted to imperial orders, concessions were by no means equivalent to real execution. At any rate, prominent evangelical churchmen felt the ground growing hot under their feet; several of them left, such as Alber from Reutlingen, Wolfgang Musculus from Augsburg, Blaurer from Constance, Brenz from Hall, (whose adventurous flight gave rise to a curious legend), and Osiander of Nürnberg. Even at Strasburg there was no longer any room for men like Butzer and Fagius when they were asked by the counselors to pledge themselves to silence concerning the interim. Both found an honorable asylum in England, where just then evangelization was making rapid progress under the leadership of the active primate Cranmer.

Great strides, however, were not always made by the tendency indicated. At Ulm people were arrested by imperial order and prevented from further resistance. Among them was Matthias

Frecht, the zealous persecutor of Sebastian Franck. The uselessness of such enforced submission was evident when those exiled appeared partly in the splendor of martyrdom. Their firmness of character was revealed in a still brighter light through the regrettable weakness shown in those days of tribulation by the one-time champions of reformation at Wittenberg.

It cannot be denied that the new ruler Moritz and his theologians were in a precarious position. On the morning of the battle at Mühlberg, Moritz attended mass with the Hapsburg brothers and, while he did not shrink from worshipping occasionally in Catholic churches and even taking part in processions, he disliked the demand to participate in an ecclesiastical reaction, which was likely to estrange completely the hearts of his subjects. One of his confidants wrote to him: "The miners in the ore mountains are praying with uplifted hands that God may hold you at your word and assist you." It was not easy to maintain the emperor's good-will and the confidence of Saxon Protestants at the same time, although Moritz and many of his "Carlowitz" counselors had scarcely any conscientious scruples. Once the young prince appealed directly to the cardinal of Trient for the purpose of obtaining from the Roman chair the necessary privileges for undisputed possession of the secularized convent properties. On the 28th of April, 1548,

Melanchthon wrote to the elector's influential counselor, Christoph von Carlowitz, the notorious letter in which, while not fully hiding his opposition to the interim, he attacked the memory of his great friend in an endeavor to show his own submission the more ostentatiously. He said in part: "I suffered formerly a very abominable servitude, as Luther frequently paid more attention to the dictates of his quarrelsome nature than to his dignity or the common interests." Melanchthon also stated that he had no connection whatever with the organizers of the new evangelical church, which he considered a mere makeshift, and that he still remembered how extremely congenial the Catholic ceremonies were to him during his boyhood days. Carlowitz immediately published the letter, which was accepted as valid testimony of the reformer's intimate opinion, although it was a mixture of truth and falsehood. The emperor's suspicious grudge against Melanchthon was hard to overcome, all the more so since the first public criticism of the interim came from the pen that had written the famous letter. It was printed contrary to the will of the author, who was not ashamed to tear up a copy of it with his own hands.

In a really confidential communication he sighed incessantly over this period of affliction and said repeatedly, "I felt plainly that death would be easier to me than my consent to the Augsburg

sphinx." Nevertheless, he reluctantly assisted Moritz in carrying through, after lengthy deliberation at a country diet in December, 1548, the derided Leipzig interim which, in view of the emperor's intention, was regarded as a payment on account. Besides a prominent presentation of the doctrine of justification, it contained marked concessions regarding the adiaphory, which was the external form of church life known as indifferent. It was desired to reintroduce, "from love and to prevent all differences," not only the already forgotten choir vestment but the entire apparatus of Catholic worship. Against this "ecclesiastical disgrace of Mamelukes" Matthias Vlacich (Flacius) protested with all the fire of a southerner. He was a young professor of Wittenberg, who left his office and family in order to remain true to his convictions.

The theological opportunists' reference to Luther, who had hesitatingly and gradually discontinued many of the old customs, was flimsy. Ranke said: "There is an immeasurable difference between permitting the accustomed to continue temporarily and reintroducing that which had already been abolished." The actions of Melancthon, Bugenhagen and Cruciger were not only rough rebuffs to the public opinion of Protestant Germany, but varied greatly and unfavorably from the determination with which,—besides the exiled clergymen

called *exules Christi*,—a number of North German cities took up the fight against the new compulsion of conscience. At Hamburg, Bremen, Brunswick, and above all, Magdeburg, the “devilish” interim was pronounced unacceptable. Such actions were more honest and manly than the half introduction and actual weakening used as a compromise in the electorates of Saxony and Brandenburg. Even Elector Joachim,—whom his father Albrecht called “the thick interim,”—by agreement with Moritz published falsely a modification, as the real decree emanating from the emperor, while in reality it referred back to conditions as they existed in 1540. In an underhanded way, Melanchthon advised a friend to have his deacon execute the “foolish ceremonies” which were offensive to him. Both roads, however,—the open and the covered one,—really led to the same point; in evangelical Germany the imperial reformation found nowhere a fertile soil in which to take root.

For the last time must be mentioned the effective participation of the German people as expressed in numberless pamphlets and songs, which in its stormy vividness recalled the years between 1520 and 1530. Even Melanchthon, who was not at all democratic, confessed that during such a period the voice of the people must not be disregarded. It would have been impossible anyway, since from everywhere and from

all classes came complaints mingled with shouts of derision and threats.

With grim pleasure these critics, who were mostly nameless, picked to pieces and soiled the hardly completed work of the victorious emperor, exposing it to condemnation and ridicule. Agrikola, the Protestant collaborator and champion, bore perhaps the lion's share in an attack which in his case degenerated into an assault. In a small Thuringian city he nearly fell victim to a mob which furiously pelted him with stones. Prior to the publication of the interim, Margrave Johann called his attention to a prophecy for 1548. The Berlin archives still contain, written with his own hand, a "small catechism issued by Agricola Islebius for the comfort of the Roman Church and for the real growth and improvement of his newly born child called Interim." Mr. "Grickel" (Agrikola) may have found some comfort in the fact that in many utterances of evangelical dissatisfaction the emperor scarcely fared any better; a long poem spoke of "a man called Carlus the fifth who finally, after a pregnancy of twenty years, gave birth to a cruel animal." With graphic force such lines described the horrible form of this antichristian monster as a dragon with three heads, the tail of a snake, the sting of a scorpion, the claw of an eagle, and the foot of a toad. The inscription was, "In Latin this worm is called interim."



A book was also published under the title of "The beautiful, hypocritical, smooth-coated kitten called Interim." The words and illustrations in such publications showed a decided deterioration from the really popular strength and roughness of previous decades to the sober play of fancy and intentional preference for the ugly and common, which perhaps might have appeared without the religious strife, but which gained particular inspiration from that source.

A Wittenberg student, Dedekind, started a notorious publication at this time (1549), bearing the title of *Grobianus* (ruffian), the disgusting contents of which were regarded by contemporaries as the essence of wit and humor. Flacius, the most prominent champion of the Protestant opposition said: "No dirt smells in our noses as bad as the papacy, which is the very worst dirt of the devil; it stinks before God and his holy angels."

For the moment this superabundance of invectives was not as might be thought an indication of internal weakness; in these savage words was expressed all the sense of independence that was still left in the sorely harried nation. While prominent people gave in, the lesser ones found courage for protest and desperate resistance.

The same as was done prior to the Peasants' War, popular prophets tramped through the country

and harangued against the interim; a weaver from Frankfort predicted at Küstrin that the emperor would shed much blood on its account, but that God in the end would put a ring through his nose. There was an old Lutheran song "Preserve us, Lord, by thy Word," in the text of which the word "Turks" was replaced by "Spaniards," and traitorous Protestants, as the devil's henchmen, were sent to the devil's pool. Here are a few sample verses:

"Oh, God in heaven, give us aid  
Against the emperor's tyranny;  
His raging here makes men afraid;  
He thinks he is God, oh irony,  
And gladly would chase God away;  
Oh, punish him and end his sway."

In one pamphlet attacking the emperor the following passage occurred: "His worthy followers are Moritz, the incendiary with his godless jurists, the bad child from Mecklenburg (young Duke Georg), the false Christians, hypocrites and knaves Witzel, Grickel (Agrikola), Sidonius, Philips (Melanchthon) and Pomeranius (Bugenhagen), which godless sophists God without a doubt will punish soon."

These words show the mood of the people of Magdeburg. That city had been under the ban since July, 1547, when, "as in God's and Christ's chancery," an indefatigable literary feud against

the interim was opened by the theological *intransigentes*, led by the gray-haired ex-bishop of Naumburg—Amsdorf—and the youthful enthusiast Flacius. The bitterness of the words written by this small number of exiles from the last fortress of reformation seems as natural under such conditions as the spirit of Huss which filled the hearts of the abandoned and threatened citizens and soldiers of the brave city, and enticed them to wild acts of cruelty toward the convent of Hammersleben near by. As Ziska and his troops did on a previous occasion, these people considered themselves the “tools of God’s wrath,” to exterminate idols and idolatry. There were also clear, ringing sounds that were bound to go right to the heart of every real German; in deep distress and during the battle for the holiest of all possessions were heard jesting songs of Magdeburg’s besieged people about the noble virgin and her treasures, for which the emperor, the Judas Moritz, the Spaniards, and the servile monks, had such a hankering. Here are some of the words:

“At Magdeburg on the bridge  
Three little dogs are seen;  
They howl at every wedge,  
No Spaniard they let in.  
At Magdeburg on the public square  
There is a barrel of wine;  
Should the emperor to drink it care.  
He must be a soldier fine.

At Magdeburg in the old city  
 There are many rifles too;  
 They always mourn with pity  
 Because his visit does not come true."

In a strange manner, genuine national traits were mixed with the fanatical ones of the Old Testament in a poem entitled: "Complaint and prayer of a small Saxon maiden." They remind us of the war of liberation against Napoleon.

"Not a man, not one, in this German land  
 To protect us against such disgrace;  
 Not an ornament on my neck or hand  
 Till free Germany shows her face;  
 Not to a man or youth on earth  
 Shall I speak here with love or mirth."

At the end of the poem the virgin besought God to send, after the two old German war heroes Armin and Emperor Otto, a third one, saying: "Oh, Lord, I mean a Jehovah; that is, the mighty Israelite avenger who was anointed by the follower of Prophet Elisha for the purpose of defeating the house of Ahab and destroying his own royal master, besides his relatives and all the servants of Baal."

King Ferdinand wrote to his brother that the execution of the interim was hindered above all by the lack of an effective power of attorney, making it possible for German bishops to permit the ultra-quistic communion, and to admit married clergymen in the heretic territories falling again under

their jurisdiction, besides securing the continued possession of church property for Protestant princes.

All the authority of Charles V did not suffice to make the gray-haired pope a submissive assistant of imperial reformation. The emperor inflicted terrible punishment on the refractory house of Farnese; the sham council at Bologna had no hope of success, and there was no prospect of obtaining assistance from France so long as Henry II had his hands tied by his participation in the fight between England and Scotland. Nevertheless Paul III did everything in his power to renew the anti-imperial coalition, while hoping that by an ambiguous, dilatory policy respecting the interim and council he could force the emperor to comply with his wishes regarding the dynasty. He told the cardinals that, as a man, he could pardon his son's assassination but not the robbing of the church, for which he would have revenge even if he had to suffer a martyr's death in consequence. Afterward he said to the French ambassador, "I shall open the emperor's vein without letting him see his blood."

The pope's warlike intentions were partly prevented by the Anglo-Scottish complications and partly by French suspicion, although the head of the Church did not hesitate to recommend to France on one day an alliance with the Turks, and on the

next day a strong support of German Protestants. Finally he felt obliged to bring some pressure to bear on the emperor by apparently meeting him half way, but in reality resisting him in regard to the burning questions of the Church.

The powers of attorney for German bishops were delayed as long as possible and were not as unrestricted or as broad as desired; they were published later; and in August, 1549, Cardinal Otto Truchsess of Augsburg announced the papal recognition of the interim. A month later Paul dissolved the assembly at Bologna, but at the same time strove to handicap the council of Trient by ordering a reformation commission to meet in Rome and summoning four of the Trient fathers to it.

Brosch referred to the papal and imperial policies of those days as "an abyss of the deepest cunning, unrestrained greed and sickly selfishness." This fight between emperor and pope was more exclusively than ever for purely personal interests pertaining to the dynasty or, in other words, to Parma and Piacenza. Paul III stated confidentially that he purposely issued the powers of attorney for Germany in a restricted sense because he desired to retain some means of pressure upon the emperor; he did not wish to see the religious matter and the Piacenza case treated separately. On the other hand, Charles V was determined to perfect his rule in Italy and not to let it decay in various places.

He retained the stolen Piacenza and demanded for this city as well as for Parma,—of which Paul's grandson, Ottavio, was the lessee by authority of the Church,—to have the authority transferred to the duke of Milan.

Much more freely than in Germany, could Spanish policies in Italy prosecute their aims. Spain's most rigid representative, Gonzaga, an Italian renegade, would have liked best to employ force against the church state; he considered the submission of Genoa and Siena, besides the annexation of some Venetian places. Siena was occupied by Spanish soldiers and had to accept an aristocratic reconstruction of the constitution, similar to the change made a short time before at Augsburg. There was already some talk of creating a kingdom of Upper Italy for the Infante Philip, who had been placed in charge of Milan. It was even expected that the House of Hapsburg would immediately seize the papal chair, since Emperor Maximilian on one occasion showed a desire to do so. Rumors sometimes attributed to the king of Rome, sometimes to Charles V, an inclination to acquire a third crown upon the death of the old pope, which could not be far off.

On more than one occasion, Paul III predicted that he would outlive the sickly emperor, but shortly before his death, he saw his hated rival gain an advantage through the fact that the great war be-

tween Spain and France created dissension in the House of Farnese. The pope's grandson, Ottavio, who had charge of Parma, was a son-in-law of the emperor, while Horacio, also a grandson of the pope, was engaged to an illegitimate daughter of Henry II. The French people insisted upon having Parma transferred to their protégé. The emperor refused absolutely to relinquish Piacenza and Paul III, therefore, took Parma from Ottavio, who seemed inclined to turn the city over to the Spaniards for a consideration. Without his grandfather's knowledge, Ottavio left Rome with the intention of regaining Parma for himself, but the papal commander of the city resisted strongly, although a brief, signed by the dying pope, ordered the city to be surrendered. His restless ambition had finally brought the head of the family to a point where his grandsons, although he desired to see them grow more and more powerful, insisted upon having their own way. Once the pope declared that assassins were seeking his life. On the 9th of November, 1549, at the age of 83 years, he died of a sickness directly due to excitement caused by such a fear.

It is impossible to determine whether the last overtures made to France by Paul III were sincere or not; at any rate, his grandson, Cardinal Farnese, in spite of all assurances to the contrary at the conclave seemed to have shown an anti-imperial tend-



ency from the start. For the last time, there was a prospect of the Catholic reform of which Contarini was the most prominent representative assuming the lead of the Church. Reginald Pole, cardinal of England, who was a distant relative of the king but had been condemned to death by Henry VIII as a dangerous opponent of the royal church policy, was considered as good as elected and seemed to have the emperor's backing. Pole, however, was openly accused of heresy by Caraffa, a fanatic, and was also opposed by the "old, wealthy and dissolute" cardinals. He rejected the proposal of being elected by "adoration,"—without counting the votes,—and thus missed his great opportunity. After a stubborn struggle of more than fifty ballots, on the 7th of February, 1550, Farnese and the Frenchmen elevated Del Monte, formerly president of the Trient council, to the chair of St. Peter.

Prior to his election, the new pope, Julius III, had under oath incurred obligations toward France. Nevertheless, force of circumstances compelled this unimportant wearer of the tiara, who like Farnese looked diligently after his family's interests, to secure first of all the emperor's good-will. He could do this only by showing himself more submissive than his predecessor, in matters pertaining to the council. On the 14th of November, 1550, he issued a bull convening the Trient assembly for the first of May, 1551.

Even then there was no sincere, unrestrained understanding between the two heads of Christianity; Charles V, in a secret protest, reserved to himself the right to proceed openly later on against any disadvantages which might accrue from the bull, while Julius III hoped that he might get rid of the council because the Protestants, for whose sake the emperor had demanded it, would under no circumstances condescend to recognize the validity of conclusions arrived at in Trient. For the time, however, the weak pope, after having submitted once, fell completely under the domination of the Hapsburg politics; the estrangement between him and King Henry II, to whom, next to God, he owed his elevation, according to his own statement, was completed by a close connection between the House of Farnese and France. The new pope returned Parma to Ottavio, who recognized the impossibility of compelling the emperor to relinquish his claim on the city, and determined, with French aid, to resist at the same time his spiritual landlord and his imperial father-in-law. During the summer of 1551, Julius was obliged to begin hostilities against his unruly vassal; thus his position in the opening war between France and Spain was declared.

The renewal of this war was the necessary result of changed world conditions. England and France finally concluded a peace on the 24th of March, 1550. Henry II, as king of France and as a French-

man, could not remain inactive while the House of Hapsburg strengthened its supremacy as it was then doing. Gradually Charles V revealed his secret thoughts, though not publicly; but the world learned enough to understand that the old fears of an Austrian universal monarchy were justified. It was known that the emperor meant to have the last word concerning great church questions, and it was impossible to hide his energetic efforts for an assured future of the Hapsburg world power. With the Catholic Church the holy Roman kingdom also came under Spanish rule. For continuing and fortifying his life's work in the same spirit, the imperial father believed his own son to be the sole man to rely upon.

As had been the case with the interim, King Ferdinand was the first one to agitate the question of succession, although he called the idea a "foolish fancy." While Charles seemed to have thought of changing the empire into an hereditary monarchy, his brother proposed to him in November, 1546, to obligate the electors, only for the next two or three elections, to an exclusive consideration of the House of Hapsburg.

Through the royal election of 1531, Ferdinand's succession to the throne was for the present assured, but in view of the slight difference in the ages of the brothers the throne might repeatedly become vacant after a short interval. Charles then decided

that the succession in the empire, after his brother, should not go to that brother's eldest son, Maximilian, but to the Infante Philip. While rumors were in circulation concerning the matter, it was not talked of again by the brothers until congress convened at Augsburg, when it was agreed to let the case rest until the Infante arrived in Germany. Connected with this trip of the emperor's son were the suppositions that either Charles would make him king of Rome while Ferdinand was still living, or that perhaps he would induce his brother to renounce his own succession in favor of the prince. The Roman king became more uneasy when Philip arrived from Spain and was honored as the future sovereign in the Netherlands, and also in several German cities. An agent of the elector of Saxony reported that living pictures were already shown representing the transfer of the empire to the prince.

This journey was only made possible by Ferdinand's eldest son, Maximilian, who relieved his relative and rival in the administration of the Spanish kingdom. The two cousins were substantially of the same age; Philip having been born on the 21st of May, 1527, and Maximilian on the 31st of July in the same year.

The son of the Roman king, a boy of stately build, was brought up in Bohemia and Germany; his mother tongue was German, as was his fondness for drink of which his father accused him. Al-

though he frequently caused difficulties through his love affairs, his passionate fondness for music and his religious indifference, one could easily observe that the young gentleman, who had already taken part in two military expeditions and had given the first speech before the imperial diet, possessed the ability of winning human hearts. The emperor had good cause to keep away his nephew, who had married the Spanish Infanta Maria, in order to make a clear road for his son and to remove the opportunity of an immediate treaty which might prove harmful to the Spaniard. The tender, effeminate prince, whose unsatisfactory demeanor during the tournament contrasted markedly with the knightly valor of Maximilian, was a Spaniard through and through, and his efforts to display friendship for German nature were distinctly artificial. He often became intoxicated so as to be on good terms with the carousing electors; he sought occasions to show himself favorable to the Germans; thus, for instance, he freed the preachers of Ulm from prison and intervened in behalf of the Protestant princes of Württemberg, of Otto Henry, and the landgrave. All this, however, failed to remove the unfavorable impression of Spanish formality, into which the unyouthful youth, who lacked natural freshness, often fell. It was taken amiss that he was pleased to be accompanied by German princes without even looking at them, while

the emperor always paid careful attention to every form of courtesy. On the other hand, how did Maximilian succeed in gaining friends and admirers in Spain? Charles and Philip were so much the more desirous of settling the matter at a diet at Augsburg in 1550, while that dangerous member of the family was still absent.

Yet here, the interests of the younger Hapsburg dynasty coincided quite manifestly with those of Germany and above all with the attitude of the German princes. We are aware of Ferdinand's truly Hapsburg ambition; in the Schmalkalden War he had not obtained the electorate of Saxony nor had Württemberg been returned to him; and now the prospect of leaving the imperial dynasty to the Spaniards inflamed his anger. He felt offended in his rank and his honor, and during the diet which was opened in July, 1550, he expressed his exasperation so strongly that Charles was almost ready to "perish" because of his indignation, as he said himself.

Ferdinand did not fight alone. As the emperor had called upon his sister Maria for help and she had acquiesced and tried to persuade the Roman king, so Ferdinand brought it about that Maximilian meanwhile elected his successor in Bohemia (1549), left Spain and could participate in the decision. The young king mediated with France very courteously at Augsburg and diligently avoided

his father, even not appearing when Philip was invested with the Netherlands.

Charles's effort to change the attitude of his brother by postponing the sending of aid to the Hungarians, against the Turks, only increased the mutual enmity which they no longer attempted to conceal before the world. After a conversation regarding succession to the throne, as the French envoy related, the emperor was attacked by fever caused by anger. Queen Maria was also much excited when leaving Ferdinand's room, where he, together with his brother Maximilian, hid for a whole day.

One must remember that during these months Charles V was ill and he had lost his ablest counselor, the elder Granvela, in August, 1550. Many thought the emperor would not live until spring, and yet he was successful over his disobedient relations, although such success was only feigned.

On March 9, 1551, a treaty was concluded between Ferdinand and the Infante, according to which the former promised to work in behalf of the election of Philip as his successor. This election was to follow Ferdinand's imperial coronation and the electors if possible, were to be impressed that the Roman royal dignity should be transferred to Maximilian after Ferdinand's death and Philip's imperial coronation. They thought of dividing the empire between the two Hapsburg dynasties,—a

step that would have been highly favorable for Spain, since both Charles and Ferdinand, as well as Philip and Maximilian, were of the same age. Naturally Philip had to promise to take part in the government of the empire, as much as Ferdinand would permit him, and to observe similar restrictions as the future general-vicar of Italy during the presence of Emperor Ferdinand. Yet the promise of Philip to assist his uncle against all enemies, especially the German rebels, and in the settlement of religious feuds, foretold a continuous Spanish intervention. Maximilian declared that he had neither undertaken nor would undertake steps in behalf of his own succession, and that he would rather work for the election of the Infante.

Yet this declaration was as untrue as the whole treaty and we may add, as the obedient position of the imperial classes toward the emperor. One often heard that the empire belonged to the emperor, who had honestly paid for it. "They think," said a letter from the diet, with regard to the Spanish, "they possess the empire and will never surrender it; thus one might fool the Germans like bulls."

It was said that Granvela's last advice was to the effect that Germany should remain divided. But this assurance of victory of the Spaniards, and the threatening danger of a new, thoroughly Spanish empire, caused general discontent which greatly increased the passive resistance of the imperial mem-



bers against their supreme lord. Of all the electors only those of Mainz and Trier attended the imperial meeting, and Moritz of Saxony and Joachim of Brandenburg refused to appear, notwithstanding the urgent demands of the emperor. These facts distinguished this new diet of Augsburg from its predecessor. It was evident from the statements of the assembled princes and envoys that it would be impossible to carry out the interim,—the favorite plan of Charles V. On February 13, 1551, the emperor succeeded in persuading the Protestant classes also, to send representatives to the council; a protest of the electorate of Saxony remained futile, and Moritz was ready to carry out the imperial execution against Magdeburg. Still the attitude of the Protestants toward a council which they never could regard as free and Christian, and as an impartial forum in behalf of the religious struggles, was not changed by the promise to send representatives. Melancthon said it was merely a question of avoiding the appearance of disobedience to the emperor in his present distress. The decisive point whether the council should be regarded as a continuation of the previous meeting, and whether the edicts already issued should be discussed, was carefully avoided. The French envoy saw in this a decrease rather than an increase of the imperial dignity, and advised the king to postpone the sending of representatives to Trentino, since it would

only encourage the emperor to disregard the demands of the Germans. And this increasing pressure of the imperial government, the shamelessness of the Spanish courtiers, the presence of Spanish troops contrary to the law and which the various classes demanded to be withdrawn, the rude manner in which the emperor refused that request,—all this created a bitter, resentful feeling among the classes. “In short,” said the envoys of the electorate of Brandenburg, “the Germans are treated as though they were slaves already.” How the news of the imperial plan of succession and of the resistance of the German Hapsburg stirred up the hearts of the people! “Never,” said the archbishop of Mainz and Trier to the papal envoy, “would they approve of Philip’s election.” They requested papal assistance against eventual severe measures of the emperor, and were opposed to any change of the existing imperial conditions. Trier added that such innovations could not and should not happen, to establish firmly the Spanish rule in the empire. When, in the spring of 1551, the Infante left Augsburg, posters were found which read that the emperor would collect the tears shed at the departure and pay for them with Indian gold.

During the diet the assembled princes were said to have taken an oath at a drinking party never to elect the Spaniard, and to consider whoever would do so a traitor. The efforts of Charles V met

everywhere with resistance instead of approval. All electors were not to be moved and King Ferdinand, who was deprived of the hope of obtaining Württemberg because of that treaty, was not inclined to win over Saxony and Brandenburg to a plan which he himself detested. Joachim, who had entered into an agreement with Moritz, advised the Roman king to drop the matter altogether, since he would create hatred for himself and his posterity among the German classes. The four Rhenish electors agreed to call a meeting at Oberwesel; even the old partisan of the Hapsburgs, Frederick of the Palatinate, was not approachable by the voice of the imperial court.

The boasts of the Spanish that the electors could be won by means of a friendly countenance and several banquets proved a delusion. We also observe that all upper classes of the empire did not lose their self-consciousness, notwithstanding their many previously experienced humiliations. The lively duchess of Rochlitz wrote to Moritz of Saxony, as early as 1546, "The House of Austria has big eyes and a big mouth; whatever it sees, it wants to possess and to devour it."

In the course of German history there is more than one instance where particularism, frequently and justly lamented, greatly benefited the whole, that is, the nation. Such a moment had arrived when the power of a foreign ruler threatened to

destroy not only the results of religious upheavals, but the acquisitions of a political decentralization. As in the beginning of the Reformation the princes became the only champions of the national idea. It suffices to recall the unbounded sufferings of the Netherlands, and the intolerable servitude of Italy. The German princes who had prevented the succession of the Infante in the empire acted virtually in behalf of the Fatherland, not from patriotism, but because their interests coincided with those of the entire nation.

We cannot believe that a statesman like Charles V would give up his favorite idea because of the resistance of his relations and the difficulties on the side of the electors. To make this genius of expectations and calculations abandon his plan, means were needed which he himself regarded as of the utmost importance,—namely, cunning and force. In a wicked manner and with unclean hands the last insurrection in Germany during those critical decades, the revolt of the princes, had prevented the creation of a strong imperial power and secured the old freedom of the various imperial classes, as well as the continuation of German Protestantism. Charles V and his statesmen nevertheless found many docile disciples among the rebellious Germans. Thus it was brought about that the foundations of modern Germany, the territorial state and the German Protestant spirit, were saved

by an originally purely dynastic and not a national policy. At the same time we must not forget that, long before the Reformation and Charles V, the Holy Roman Empire had outlived itself. Whatever was vital within it strongly opposed the anachronism of this imperial reformation.

## VI

### THE REVOLUTION OF THE PRINCES AND ITS RESULT

**T**HE influence exerted on the history of the German people by the contrast between the German South and North was immense. It has ever been active, so that the bold attempt could be made to hold together the North German Protestants of the sixteenth century, with their invincible Germanic forefathers. The attempt was even made to find, in the frontiers within which the Reformation could maintain itself for some time, an approximation to those ancient boundaries between a free Germany and what had become Roman provinces.

We must not underestimate the importance of the fact that since the dying out of the Saxon emperors, the German North had become gradually alienated from the empire, and had frequently assumed a hostile or indifferent attitude toward the crown. Let us recall the times of the prime of the cities in the late Middle Ages,—how the two great republics of the South German cities and the Hanseatic League were hostile to each other. Now the

Reformation in its beginnings had revived the feeling of a national unity which flourished in the South more strongly than in the North. Luther was a native of Middle Germany, and the ordinary man whose language he consulted during his translation of the Bible spoke no Low German. But, as early as in the Treaty of Schmalkalden, the North German princes brought about the decision, and after the catastrophe it was sufficiently evident where the most tenacious resistance resided. Magdeburg assumed the rôle which originally the far stronger Strasburg was believed to hold. The ancient Saxon defiance was once more met among the Low German population. None the less, the valor of several cities would have succumbed had not the princely element whose future was no longer threatened by democratic powers, but by the empire, entered into the struggle.

It was only natural that the North German princes should raise the banner of insurrection, since it was they who were greatly aided by Protestant sympathies. It was also natural that the Catholic imperial classes should gather about Charles V with less resolution, for the emperor was the common foe of all lovers of princely freedom.

From every movement of those stormy years the liberty, the self-government of the princes, had drawn advantage from the upheaval of the Church as well as from the social revolution. The cities

could maintain their position at the diets only with great difficulty. Now the superiority of the emperor once more menaced the inherited and growing independence of the greater and smaller lords, while they, together with their counselors, became gradually accustomed to regard their government as an *Imperium*.

We have already hinted at that peculiar movement which is known as the "Reception of Roman Right," reaching down to the seventeenth century from the fifteenth. While the German spirit strove to throw off the lordship of the Roman Church and to create a truly national religion, the native attitude regarding law was abolished or forgotten because of the victorious advance of Roman jurisprudence. After the establishment of the imperial court and the introduction of appellatory rights into civil trials, the Romanization of the highest courts took place slowly but irresistibly in the various territories and the offices began to be filled with trained jurists. In the place of the old supreme courts of the cities were the law faculties of the universities. By and by territorial policy and the government were unable to dispense with the "doctores" of the civil professional officers trained in the law schools, whose dependent position toward the emperor was greatly at variance with that of their noble predecessors. Everywhere was a striving after greater comprehension, regularity and subordination.



What the empire could never accomplish, individual members now sought to realize,—that was the establishment of an independent commonwealth.

Since the territorial right rose above the local, and the economic cares of the government above the self-government of the classes and associations, the princely "overlordship" would know nothing of exceptions regarding subjects within a "closed and bounded province." Even those vassals of foreign feudal lords who owned estates in the territory were claimed as subjects. What Schmoller once said with regard to the economic policy of this lordship was also true with respect to the idea of state: "It is always a matter of the same conception; whatever the province possesses, is thought of as a whole which in the first place should benefit the country." The advantages which the clergy of the country, or the territorial regulation of ecclesiastical conditions, derived from such development were hinted at more than once.

The new Protestant institutions, which were first established in the electorate of Saxony in 1539 under the name of consistories, bore a distinct imperial character, since they had to control both ecclesiastical and civil matters. Jurisprudence sought to preserve a large part of the old opinions regarding the canonic law, despite the supreme episcopate of the lord of the country, as for instance, the frequent protests against the secularizations.

The new ecclesiastical system had to obey the state, and tolerate the "divine service" of a princely dominion. Upon the whole, this new absolutism of little states derived from the legal theory all it needed for its purposes, although it was pleased with the augustness of the prince above the law, the *potestas legibus soluta*, it permitted itself to be led astray by an anachronistic imperial law which ascribed to the emperor the unlimited power of the Roman imperators, and to the ruler of the province the position of a *magistratus*. The imperial princes had long grown used to negotiating independently with the representatives of foreign powers, and to equipping armies. It would have been a disastrous blunder to regard these German dukes and margraves as being equal to the bearers of the same titles in Spain and France. The cruelties of the victorious emperor and the character of his foreign environment were aimed at this idea. For its own sake and not for that of its subjects, to say nothing of the German people, the half-sovereign aristocracy of the empire unsheathed the sword.

The sincerity of their position was irreconcilably offended by Charles V. Although he may have thought it a necessity of political wisdom not to free his two princely prisoners, notwithstanding the prayers and the attempts to negotiate in their behalf, he displayed through the maltreatment of the landgrave, in accordance with settled plans, the

irreconcilable and unknighly stain in his nature with an indiscretion that was neither decent nor wise.

More than once the emperor had shown that no means was too wicked so long as he could satisfy his desire for vengeance; the Spanish rebels knew of this trait, as did the rebelling warriors at Augsburg whose leader he had once pardoned, then incited to offend his majesty, and finally put to death. His treatment of John Frederick of Saxony showed considerate pity and shameless cruelty. The whole faith in God and the high consciousness of this prince were needed to preserve a manly equanimity during the long year's test,—an equanimity which equally impressed both friend and enemy. He rejected a proposition of his devoted adherents to free himself by means of pretended magic means, saying he would have nothing in common with such devilish frauds, since his salvation depended only upon the Lord.

On the whole we cannot compare the situation of John Frederick, who was permitted to have his favorite Lucas Cranach with him in prison and pose before Titian, with the sufferings of his princely sharer in misfortune. Philip of Saxony was surrounded, annoyed, and offended day and night by his garlic-tainted Spanish tormentors. If he looked through the window, two soldiers were immediately at his side; even his sleep was con-

tinually interrupted by the changing sentinels, who tramped into the chamber with drums and pipes, and snapped up the curtains to satisfy themselves of his presence.

In vain did the landgrave seek to move the emperor by his willingness to accept the interim. He promised, should he be freed for several months, to attend all religious services and to set an effective example to his preachers and subjects; but his captors preferred to compel him to attend the Sunday service as a prisoner.

After his hope of obtaining aid from the Infante proved futile, and after he heard that he would be freed only on his deathbed, he began to think seriously of trying to escape. The attempt made at Mecheln failed and the emperor asked President Vigilius to threaten the prince, whose first confession seemed unsatisfactory, that the truth would be obtained by means of "seriousness and severity." Vigilius was told not to speak of torture, but to make the prisoner believe it was intended to subject him to it. Vigilius did his utmost and had the satisfaction of seeing the landgrave shed tears. We must believe the statement of the despairing prince that he often thought of committing suicide. His sons feared lest their father should succumb to the permanent imprisonment.

Such a procedure, not undertaken by an inhuman ochlocracy but by a victorious monarch, created the

belief that the emperor aimed not only at the punishment of the landgrave but at all the other German princes. Even in Catholic regions many believed the landgrave had been overpowered through deception. Public sentiment was markedly impressed by the personality of the captured elector, who—so it was said—had been betrayed by his environment and taken prisoner after a valiant fight, and who had remained a “martyr of Jesus Christ.”

Like Luther at the time of the diet of Worms, the suffering John Frederick was regarded as a hero of a “passion.” His picture was believed to show in the clouds, and it was prophesied that he would become emperor at last. The princes must have been impressed most profoundly by the example of the maltreated landgrave and the failure of their intervention in his behalf. That the princely allies of the emperor were fully as unsafe against the cruelty of the emperor as were the defeated ones, was clearly shown by the lesson which Erich of Brunswick received at Brussels when about to go to Spain by way of France. He was seized and forced to promise that he would carry out his journey in accordance with an arranged plan, whereupon he preferred to return to his own country. Most of all Charles disliked those lords who could never be cajoled, who always needed money, but were eager to enter into political military relations with the alien countries, especially with France.

The conviction of Colonel Vogelsberger was quite in accord with the imperial conception of such a situation, but it created bad feeling among the imperial princes. Margrave Albrecht of Brandenburg, who gladly accepted the interim and recommended himself to the pope as a good Catholic Christian, equipped an army for foreign service, contrary to the imperial laws, and thereby forfeited the royal friendship. The offended young gentleman began to ask himself how he could "compare ungratefulness with ingratitude."

Charles thought he could rule the new princely generation differently from their predecessors, who were accustomed to a certain modesty and independence. But he forgot how the dreadful religious party strifes and the misleading model of his own policy had utterly destroyed the offended conscientiousness of the German aristocracy. For the first time after a number of centuries, it felt "the sunlight and the fine dust of a mighty, centralized, restlessly agitating, imperial court," as Nitzsch said. Indeed, in many respects we may recall the times of the great Hohenstaufen Frederick II. As in those years, so in the sixteenth century Italian statesmanship and conception of state exercised a confusing and seductive influence upon the highest classes of the German nation.

The endangered princes had to appeal to that alien power which regarded the protection of Ger-

man particularism as one of the indispensable elements of its policy. Thus, at the beginning of 1548, we find ambassadors of Duke Otto of Brunswick-Harberg, a son of the pro-French Henry of Lüneburg, at the court of Henry II. The king, at that time in feud with England, gave an evasive answer by recommending the conclusion of a North-German-Polish alliance. Immediately afterward there were negotiations between the young landgrave of Hesse, Margrave Hans of Küstrin, Duke Albrecht of Prussia, and the young king Sigismund August of Poland. Elector Moritz was also initiated without enjoying much confidence. The very soul of the northern treaty—Denmark was also asked to join—was Margrave Hans, who was endangered after rejecting the interim and had expected King Ferdinand to raise claims upon the dominion of Grossen and Kottbus. He was told that his own brother Joachim was willing to carry out the scheme against him. The Prussian duke was not yet absolved from the imperial ban, and the possibility of executing it made even Poland suspicious of the emperor. Moreover, the Reformation, borne by the liberty-loving members of the *Schlachta*, was progressing very rapidly.

There was no need of agents; as in the case of the exiled patriots of Florence and other Italian cities, German refugees lived in French exile, filled with a burning desire for vengeance. Among them

was Schärtlin, exiled from Basel, who more than once escaped hired murderers. In the Hanseatic cities and in England, George of Heydeck and Count Volrad of Mansfeld were active, the latter having tasted the bitterness of imperial cruelty when waiting for hours before Granvela's door, at the diet of Augsburg. There were also a number of North German cities, like Hamburg, Bremen, Lüneburg and Brunswick, which were hostile to Lord Henry and seemed willing to "shed their blood against the emperor" by the side of Magdeburg. Besides, there were the tenacious enemies of the interim and the sons of the captured elector. The oldest of them, John Frederick, was filled with wild imaginings which remind us of the times of Sickingen. He declared that in the course of the imminent war all bishops, "and priests and monks and all bands belonging thereto, should be slain, a source of all wickedness" should be destroyed, and only the preachers should be spared. The defensive alliance which was formed in February, 1550, by Hans of Küstrin, John Albrecht of Mecklenburg, and Albrecht of Prussia, at the latter's marriage in Königsberg, was not so pitiless. Yet of what avail were the several hundred knights who had been promised the aid of Denmark, the Hanseatic cities, and different princes and lords, but had never received the same? On the other hand, it was rumored that the emperor would soon appear and



give a lesson to the Lutheran knaves. "The thunderstorm," Margrave Hans wrote to the Pomeranian chancellor, "will reach all of us and spare none."

The margrave did his utmost to keep two elements away from the alliance whose friendship or enmity was of vital importance. These were Moritz of Saxony and the young Albrecht of Brandenburg. Even an earnest Protestant like Hans of Küstrin could not help disliking the religious and moral equanimity of such princely allies, who had come in close touch with each other during the diet of Augsburg because of their common admiration of a beautiful woman of that city. "They acted," said Sastraw, "that even the devil might laugh," and much was said about it in the city. No wonder, when several years later even the electors believed the story that during a party the devil seated himself disguised as a maiden near the elector; for Albrecht had publicly boasted that he would not serve the Lord, but the devil.

After the old ties to the Church had been broken, the life of such wild natures was overcome by a cynicism which deferred to nothing except its own profits. Simply because nobody could learn their real intentions, those two harum-scarum but warlike lords became more powerful than the rest. Albrecht was "sometimes loyal to the emperor, at other times against him," and Moritz seemed to justify

once more his Judas cry when, in the autumn of 1550, he undertook to impose the imperial ban upon Magdeburg. He was induced to undertake this step by military expeditions in northern Germany, that were suddenly shifted to Magdeburg. Duke Georg of Mecklenburg, who was as indiscreet and bold as Moritz, had wielded his sword early in spring, first against his brother, and then entered into the war with the city of Brunswick, which had been started by its lord and old enemy, "Heinz" of Wolfenbüttel; but he was checked by command of the emperor. With several thousand men the warlike duke of Mecklenburg marched in September against the archbishopric of Magdeburg, by way of Halberstadt, and succeeded in defeating the rebels of the city near Hillersleben. Soon Moritz hastened to secure the victorious soldiers and to deprive the young duke Georg of his favorite rôle. He did not attend the diet, nor lay down arms, and was regardless whether the emperor learned of his negotiations with France or not.

This ambitious man was fully aware that he could not possibly attain any higher power so long as the emperor maintained his position. We recall the hopes and disappointments which connected him with the Schmalkalden War. As soon as he was deserted by Magdeburg and Halberstadt, his brother August was obliged to renounce the administration of the bishopric of Merseburg. He never ceased



**Granvela. Antone Peirenot de, Cardinal (1545-1622).  
After an engraving by Hans Collaert (1545-1622).**



to fear that John Frederick might be set free, and worried because Landgrave Philip was not likely to be liberated. All that he heard from the imperial court regarding the overthrow of the Saxon cause, and the dealing with secularized ecclesiastical estates, caused sufficient tribulation. He knew why the Infante Philip had been summoned, as many already said: "It would be more profitable if Germany had one lord instead of so many tyrants who could do almost nothing save torturing the people, and whom almost nothing concerned." And how could the differences between the religious reactionary plans of the emperor and the pronounced hatred of the interim by almost all Protestants be solved?

In the great distrust which Moritz met among most of his own subjects lay the chief peril for him. He thought it politic to come in contact with all. After he had settled with his brother in March, 1550, he negotiated with Margrave Albrecht and Elector Joachim, who believed he could obtain the archbishopric of Magdeburg for his son Frederick. Although the grossest indecency prevailed at these princely meetings, the members knew how to carry on their political affairs and to conceal their mad carouses. The young margrave Albrecht, as a favorite of his Prussian cousin, it was arranged should find out everything regarding the Königsberg alliance of princes.

Moritz determined to free his father-in-law and

attempted to appeal to King Henry II by means of Hessian agents, in order to anticipate the people of Königsberg, and sought to establish more intimate relations with the young descendants of Ernest. The rumors of the negotiations regarding a French treaty with the German princes greatly concerned him. Was it now possible for him to isolate himself by becoming a partisan of the emperor, and secure the liberation of John Frederick with the assistance of the French?

Throughout his enterprises this young master of political trickery observed the captured elector closely. The fact that France, as well as the people of Königsberg, would have nothing in common with Moritz, warned him to be careful. Suddenly there came, like the trumpet of redemption, the advance of the Mecklenburger against the excommunicated Magdeburg. Ere the people of Küstrin and the army of several other North German princes and cities could take part, Moritz had appeared, soon followed by Elector Joachim and Margrave Albrecht.

Futile negotiations with the rebels began, although the Saxon classes refused to aid their ruler. At the diet of Augsburg in December, a large sum of money was granted for military purposes, and Elector Moritz was elected supreme military leader of the imperial campaign. Meanwhile a decisive change took place in the Albertine policy. He him-

self had joined the North German Alliance, and thus prevented an open battle of the Protestant princes. Instead of the current idea of protecting the gospel, he had assumed the bold purpose of an offensive.

While Moritz attempted to march against the troops of the allies, who were stationed in the bishoprics of Bremen and Verdun, he said to the Hessian mediators with whom he spoke of the French alliance that he wished to be and to remain something; aye, ere he would be willing to yield, he would do miracles and not permit himself to be devoured by the emperor and Queen Maria. The written ultimatum that he sent to the Hessians on the 17th of December was equally clear: "I find in this great enterprise nothing of greater harm than distrust. If the latter is not done away with, then good-night for Germany! My adherent and myself must have a lord who could protect us."

This letter was dispatched to all parts of the alliance and to a number of leaders. With the chiefs of that "Christian Band" in the regions near the Weser, Hans of Heindeck and Volrad of Mansfeld, they partly negotiated and partly fought, until in January, 1551, many of the army under Herdeck openly joined the elector and followed him to Magdeburg. There the besieged citizens had made a successful attack on December 19. Georg of Mecklenburg was wounded and taken prisoner, and

with the ringing of all the bells and the roaring of cannons the victory was celebrated.

But Moritz and his reënforcements soon returned. His ultimatum was well understood by the members of the alliance. John Albrecht of Mecklenburg really began to place confidence in the return of the elector, and Hans of Küstrin gave up his resistance after an imperial envoy had revealed the seriousness of the matter. Obedience in both ecclesiastical and worldly affairs was expressly demanded, whereupon the margrave replied that it would mean interfering with the privileges of the Lord, for his conscience was not under control of the emperor's jurisdiction. They recalled how several years before the younger Granvela had told the Pomeranian chancellor that the emperor did not permit a discussion of the interim, and no jot of it should be changed; it was a matter of yea or nay, peace or war.

The lord of Küstrin started for Dresden in February, to negotiate with Moritz; his rôle as a leader of the anti-imperial alliance was brought to an end, and the statement of the Albertine that he was no Mameluke so far as religion was concerned perhaps did not remove all doubts, but there was no other outlet, especially since John Albrecht had not been treated politely at the Danish court. Margrave Hans omitted nothing to warn the new ally who was still imperial leader against Magdeburg, the priests of Baal, and the worldly children. These



priests, genuine children of the devil, would love to see "all of us stand up on our heads, and themselves bathe in our Christian blood till their ears, as in a breezy wild bath."

Moritz, however, was not to blame if the approval of the other allied princes was brought about very slowly, and if an understanding with his Ernestine cousin, which he considered of great importance, did not take place. The captured elector wrote confidentially to a friend that he would not like to be freed by Moritz, even if the latter should desire it. None the less, two important decisions were adopted at Torgau, where Moritz, Hans, John Albrecht, and the young landgrave William met. The young Ernestines were to be treated as enemies if they refused to join the alliance or to promise to maintain neutrality.

Thus Moritz had obtained safety, which he needed most of all. The excommunicated knight and leader of the warriors, Frederick of Reiffenberg, was dispatched to France, to obtain from the king a monthly subsidy of at least 100,000 crowns. Henry II was promised aid from the princes, and election as Roman king. The main cause of the whole enterprise was said to be the undertaking of the emperor "to force the entire German nation into an eternal beastly servitude out of its ancient freedom." All depended upon the success of these French negotiations; they tried further to get into

touch with England, Sweden and Poland, but this was of minor importance.

None the less, one thing was certain; the princely revolution had found its leader. Being unconcerned with the half-Protestant, half-princely scruples of Margrave Heinz, Moritz went his own way, determined to change the defensive into an offensive policy. Though the lord of Küstrin and his peers despised the wild margrave Albrecht as being godless and vendible, Moritz did all he could to win over the friend. He was active in behalf of his marriage with Princess Lucretia of Terrara, the later duchess of Urbino and friend of Tasso. Albrecht would have been willing to entreat the pope to allow him to marry, and Moritz, too, did not hesitate to assure the pope secretly of his loyalty. It need not be said that he continued to declare obedience to the emperor, and that his faithful adherence to the Hapsburgs was often taken amiss. At the imperial court they were far from believing all he said, but they relied upon his fear of Johann Frederick, and did not think it possible that he would desert them.

In carefulness and taciturnity the young statesman was far inferior to the oldest diplomats of the Spanish and Italian school. He preferred to negotiate orally without the counselors being fully aware of his ability to control himself. Even Carlowitz, one of his most intimate comrades, was

not permitted to see his master's cards, although he had been sent to Trentino to greet the returning king (December, 1550). Moritz regarded the schism within the Hapsburg family as an extraordinary grace of fate. Maximilian wrote to him that he did not dare express his attitude on paper, but there was no doubt that the elector's refusal to comply with the imperial project was quite in accord with the desire of Ferdinand and his son. At the court of Charles V, the young Hapsburg was denounced as a friend of France. In many respects his desires met with the approval of the Wettinian whom he had once called his best and most beloved friend on earth. At the negotiations with Margrave Hans at Dresden, Moritz had insisted that the king of Bohemia should under no circumstances be attacked.

All the same, French aid remained the firmest foundation of the policy which sought help everywhere. Moritz had said at Dresden that they could assist the emperor and his brother against the Turks and the pope, if France should refuse to do so. Yet he was fully aware of the difficulties of such a policy. A failure of the negotiations, he wrote to the lord of Küstrin after the arrival of the French envoy, would forever deprive the German princes of assistance.

The collaboration of various powers which had been roused by the Hapsburgs to resist all attacks

repeated itself with a certain monotony. Of course all the hostile elements had not united. England, the pope, and the German Protestants, were frequently arrayed on the side of the emperor, yet those who still possessed political vitality could not cease protesting against his dismal "Plus, Ultra."

The world knew better than the emperor himself that his ability was not equal to that of the majority of his enemies. After several failures against the Mohammedan power, it surely was audacious in him to resume his struggles against Islam when the war with France seemed to renew itself. A sea rover in North Africa named Dragut had offered sufficient ground for punishment by his piratical raids upon the Spanish and Italian coasts, but when,—in September, 1550,—Spaniards and Italians, together with the Johannites, captured the city of Media in Tunis, peace with the Porte, upon which according to Ranke "depended the entire policy of the emperor," was shaken forever.

In the following summer the Turkish fleet advanced against the main harbors of the Johannites; Malta resisted, but Tripoli was lost to Christianity. This loss seemed equalized through the cession of Transylvania to King Ferdinand. Martinuzzi, who saw his leading position endangered because of the widow of Zápolya, as well as through the distrust of the Turks, sought safety by entering into a close alliance with Austria. His belief that he

had to deal with a man notorious for his treachery, even in those evil times, was strengthened when after a Turkish invasion into Banat the "monk" again negotiated with the enemy. Elected cardinal, the aged adventurer was assassinated by Italian officers and with the express approval of King Ferdinand.

After that event Austrian rule in Transylvania weakened and went backward. At the same time the imperial troops in northern Italy fought the French, the pope having opened hostilities against the defiant Farnese as early as May, 1551. The Turkish expedition into the Mediterranean sailed with the consent of France. Julius III, "to whom the whole world appealed to make peace," was threatened by a French national council because of his adherence to the emperor, and King Henry publicly spoke of him as the Roman parson. True, in England the powerful Somerset was overthrown in behalf of Charles V, but the earl of Warwick, who took his office as duke of Northumberland, did not check the rapidly progressing evangelization of the Church. But the political situation was far more unfavorable for the emperor than it had been for years, while highly favorable for a French-Protestant alliance.

The negotiations of the German princes with France progressed very slowly, even after John de Fresse, bishop of Bayonne, had come to Hesse in

August, 1551, as royal ambassador. Henry II placed little confidence in the whole matter. To one of his ministers he had written more pointedly concerning the inner feuds and hesitation of the Germans. Sebastian Schärtlin warned against demanding too much money from the king. Moritz, however, rightly considered the *nervum belli* of utmost importance; he would not—so he said—plunge into a bath where he could neither swim nor walk; the emperor was a cunning individual who could not be overcome within four or five months.

In addition to this, there was the personal contrast between the electors and Margrave Hans. At the meeting at Lochau where, besides the two John Albrechts of Mecklenburg, August of Saxony, and representatives of the landgrave, negotiated with the bishop of Bayonne, hostilities broke out between Moritz and the lord of Küstrin.

All had been arranged when one evening, at a wine party, the two rivals attacked each other. The margrave departed; what he had feared from Moritz,—namely, the betrayal of the princely cause,—he had done himself by negotiating with the emperor after war broke out. Meanwhile the conditions of a French alliance were outlined at Lochau. They demanded an offensive and referred only to political causes and aims, excepting the religious question, as one which the lord must solve, because

King Henry would avoid seeming to aid the Protestant faith.

The princes had to declare that they would make war against no one on account of religion. The price of the French assistance did not consist of the promise of the princes to obey the demands of France during the coming imperial election, but rather of the cession of the cities Cambrai, Metz, Toul, and Verdun, which belonged to the empire, though foreign languages were spoken there.

More disgraceful than this illegal separation from imperial territory was the humble flattery with which the Christian king treated the Germans in the matter, "not only like a friend, but like a faithful father," to which must be added the desire of an eternal "protectorate" by France. A well known incident of very recent history has been compared with the above cession of territory,—namely, that of Savoy and Nice, in which the greatest statesman of modern Italy was forced to obtain the indispensable assistance of France for his important enterprise. But in the fact that Cavour had brought with full conscience so painful a sacrifice in behalf of national purposes, lay the far reaching difference; for even if the policy of those German princes was actually destined to benefit the nation, it did not originate from purely religious viewpoints, but from overwhelmingly dynastic ones.

We must not forget that the state idea of which they had been deprived was regarded even by its chosen bearer, the emperor, as being inferior to Spanish and dynastic interests. If Charles V, who had taken part in the Holstein and Prussian affairs against the interests of Germany, and who had separated Milan and the Netherlands from the empire, dared to speak of his case in behalf of the weal and the honor of that very empire, it was as treacherous as all the patriotic phrases of a man like Moritz of Saxony.

The true necessity of the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation corresponded neither with the Hapsburg ideas of a world power, nor with the petty egotism of the high German aristocracy, which was above the emperor only in opposition to the unmistakable foreign rule.

The princely revolution had also played with ideas which, since the stormy twenties, had been considered of small significance. First, they revived their old wish of secularization on a large scale; at Dresden it had been stated by Moritz and the lord of Küstrin that "parsons and monks might be expelled from Germany." But we have already learned that they were not content with the parsons, for the princely enmity against the cities was revived at the same time. "It is necessary," said the confidential document of an elector, "to attack emperor and king as enemies of the empire, and



above all not to spare their closest environment, the higher and lower clergymen, merchants and their kindred." He even demanded "special mandates to conquer the priestly estates."

Notwithstanding the humble dependence of many princes on the capital of the city, the bourgeois were still regarded as the source of all independence and all "Swiss" inclinations. If we refer the War of Schmalkalden and the Peasants' War to the incitement of the imperial cities which were hostile to the nobility, Magdeburg's rebellious defiance gave an excellent instance of the truth of such conceptions. Moritz was too much of a realistic politician to bind himself to a certain programme. On November 9, 1551, he entered Magdeburg, after the city had publicly declared its willingness to yield to emperor and state, while it had secretly recognized the elector as its hereditary lord, and he had agreed to protect their Protestant faith. It is understood that he had held the troops together without permitting himself to be deprived of the chance to change his colors at the last moment. By promising to visit the emperor in the near future, while at the same time the French negotiations might be broken off, he greatly frightened his allies. They implored him to stand firm, "for the sake of all Germans, nay, we well might say for that of Christ." Even with regard to the question of a council he had yielded to the emperor, and dispatched to Tren-

tino his ambassadors, who did not include theologians nor Melanchthon, whom all anxiously expected.

Elector Joachim had preceded him in October, 1551, since he would obtain the archbishopric of Magdeburg at any price for his son; there followed representatives of the young duke Christopher of Württemberg, who had taken possession of the throne after his father's death (November 6, 1550), and also the historian Sleidanus as plenipotentiary envoy of Strasburg. Württemberg and Strasburg had agreed regarding a new confession formulated by Brenz, but the attempt to win over the other Protestants failed because of the resistance of the Saxon elector, who asked Melanchthon to work out a separate confession and who wished to delay the matter by demanding a recommendatory letter, such as the Hussites had once obtained from the council of Basel. Finally he sent a few worldly counselors to Trentino, but Melanchthon, who had been asked to join them, was obliged to remain at Nürnberg till the end of the war.

Whatever was going on between the assembled Protestant envoys and the clergymen of the council was in vain, although the representatives of the emperor, and even theologians, sought to clear the road for the Protestants, thereby rousing the amazement of the council and of the Roman see. All these vigorous efforts appeared like a tempest

in a glass of water after the die of Moritz had been cast by a French Protestant alliance.

That alliance was concluded on the 15th of January, in the castle at Chambord. Margrave Albrecht, although personally not a member of the confederacy of princes, had negotiated with the French court. John Albrecht of Mechlenburg greeted the treaty as "a special gift of the Almighty, who wisheth to punish great haughtiness." Moritz hastened to Hesse, secretly traveling chiefly by night, and there, on the 15th of February, in the city of Friedenwalde, further arrangements were made with the bishop of Bayonne and the Hessians regarding subsidies. France promised 240,000 crowns for the first three months, and 70,000 for each of the following ones. Week after week passed without the emperor attempting anything whatever, and the allies were able to complete their equipment and assume the offensive at their convenience.

All this was due to the inexplicable blindness and inaction of Charles V in the face of all warnings and exhortations. Before the middle of March, King Henry II invaded Lorraine with 35,000 men, after having previously visited St. Denis and other patrons and having expressly repeated and enforced the dreadful edicts against French heretics. He posed in a pamphlet as the "avenger of German freedom," pretending to demand nothing but grati-

tude of the saved Germans, and eternal glory, for that magnanimous "divine" intention. While he took possession of the three Lotharingian cities, Moritz, Landgrave William and, as an independent member of the enterprise, Albrecht of Brandenburg, gathered an army of some 30,000 in Franconia, and at the opening of April they appeared before Augsburg. Moritz, William, and John Albrécht of Mecklenburg solemnly declared in their proclamation that they did not contemplate solving the religious question by means of the sword, in accordance with the French proposals, but they would only protect themselves against the imperial "unbearable, beastly, hereditary servitude." The maltreatment of the landgrave was regarded as an "infamy and injustice," and they also spoke of the introduction of foreign troops into the empire, contrary to the emperor's oath, the financial extortion of the nation, and the exclusion of loyal foreign envoys from the imperial diets. The pamphlet of the margrave went even farther; he did not forget to mention the ignoble foreigner (Granvela), and the book filled with lies, written by the "Spanish archknave" Avila, dealing with the War of Schmalkalden. Finally attention was called to the necessity which might arise, "that the excessive power of the clergy, forbidden by divine and ecclesiastical laws, should be weakened and destroyed."

Once more burst forth the German revolution

against the non-German monarch, in its most hideous features. Never before had Charles V been so greatly endangered. The desire of his pupil Moritz to destroy utterly his reputation in the empire seemed destined to a speedy fulfillment.

As an old and ill man the emperor entered into the gravest crisis of his life. He was only a "little heap of medicine," as the English diplomat Ascham expressed it. In this most difficult situation that fragile body was held erect by an unconquerable will and an unshakable sense of duty. More impenetrable than ever was the mighty sovereign. "Whenever I saw him," said Ascham, "I was reminded of the words of Salomo: 'The heaven is high and the earth is deep, yet the heart of a king is inscrutable.' There is nothing within him that talks, save his tongue." To this seeming character corresponded a mood which at times came close to apathy. The younger Granvela once complained that his master felt such indignation over the political situation that he refused to grant interviews, on the ground that he knew beforehand what the ambassadors would say, and that all those people, Englishmen, Venetians, and German princes, would do nothing for him.

Charles no longer reposed confidence in his closest relations, on account of the negotiations over the succession to the throne. Only upon his sister Maria did he believe he could rely; wherever it was

necessary to fight with brains instead of the sword, "she was the real captain," he once wrote to her. None the less, the queen had to be very cautious in her correspondence with her brother, lest she would offend him. She could speak with perfect freedom only to Granvela, who on his part told her of his sufferings. "The Lord knows," he once lamented, "if I had not cared only and solely about the emperor, I should not stand the existing state of affairs for all the treasures of the world, although I am highly honored, yet undeservedly."

On the most decisive points Granvela and the queen failed to agree. That prudent Hapsburg woman had perceived the full peril with admirable sagacity, and had shown the right means of defence. She did not approve of the emperor's intention to spend the winter at Innsbruck instead of at Speyer, where he could keep in touch with the Rhine and the Netherlands. She advised him to reconcile himself with Ferdinand and Maximilian, and to "dissimulate" in matters concerning the succession. After a victory over France, whereby the Infante would have to gain a reputation for himself, the emperor would be able to decide regarding the empire and a council. Above all, she never tired calling her brother's and Granvela's attention to that imminent and grave danger which she was sure lay in the unsatisfied ambition of the young Saxon elector. She regarded the latter as

thoroughly unreliable, and his signs of yielding by word and deed as cunning deception. Only by means of a strong army could such a man be converted. The French efforts for obtaining German troops should be anticipated, Magdeburg should be forgiven, German princes like Württemberg should be induced to join the imperial party, and the financial power of Spain should be strained to the utmost.

Maria was not the only one who thought thus about Moritz. King Ferdinand was of the same opinion; he regarded the liberation of the landgrave as indispensable, if a great German war were to be avoided. The papal legate at Trentino was well aware of the imminent insurrection of the German princes and their French relations. The imperial commissary of Magdeburg, Lazarus of Schwendi, highly distrusted the imperial military leader, whom he saw surrounded by public rebels; he said if Moritz feared a journey to the imperial court, it was only a token of his accusing conscience.

Charles V was indeed not in want of exhortations of the gravest nature, and of tidings about the movements of the enemy. But he rejected all on account of Granvela, who would not believe such madness on the part of the young elector. "People already begin to stone me, because I will not fear," wrote Granvela in January, 1552. Moritz was hated by almost the whole of Germany, and was

without the means for so great an enterprise, since the Protestant classes were no longer so rich as before the Schmalkalden War.

The king wondered where Moritz, who alone might be dangerous, could obtain the indispensable money. The emperor was by no means willing to yield regarding the landgrave, although he was asked to free him by the three worldly electors, a number of other imperial princes, the king of Denmark, King Ferdinand, Poland, and Bavaria.

Toward the end of February the emperor wrote to his brother that if Moritz thought to free his father-in-law by force he would immediately behead the landgrave, and thus dispose of the troublesome question. He always said they must wait for the arrival of the elector.

The journey, which Moritz postponed from one month to another, continually met with difficulties. It was a sufficient offense when the elector, warned by many, openly declared that he would not go into the trap as the landgrave and the assassinated monk in Transylvania had done. Granvela condemned such unworthy distrust; how could one doubt the innate goodness and mercy of the emperor?

One important reason of his love for peace Charles V could have named,—his finances were, as usual, in bad shape. In a despairing mood he wrote to his sister on January 28, 1552: "I am in



every respect in such distress that if Germans led by folly would attack me, I could do nothing but throw the handle after the axe."

We behold the lord of one-half the universe in the depth of the utmost helplessness: "This war about Parma," he exclaimed, "may go to hell, for it leads to ruin; the whole money from India has been consumed, and I know not wherewith I should pay for my mourning garbs." He thought it wise to display no fear and to confine himself to "what can be done with paper." To the end he rejected the belief that Moritz should be taken seriously,—for did not the elector send a counselor to Innsbruck? And this counselor it was who intensified the emperor's recently acquired distrust of his nephew and his brother, by spreading the false rumor that Moritz would meet King Maximilian at Wasserburg. After his son was taken ill in that city, Ferdinand immediately thought of poison; he believed they desired to do away with the rival of the Spanish Infante.

Although Ferdinand and Maximilian advised their friend Moritz to give up his undertaking against the emperor, the Austrian did nothing to assist Charles with means other than paper. Ferdinand thought of Hungary, where his rule was menaced by the Turks more seriously than ever, and disregarding the requests of his brother he withdrew his troops from Tyrol, while Charles's

own daughter, the wife of Maximilian, demanded her dowry from her father.

Nothing vexed the emperor more than the ambiguous position of the younger Hapsburg line. None the less he could do nothing except entreat his brother to negotiate with Moritz. It was one of the shrewdest tricks of the elector that he seemed to approve of that negotiation immediately before the beginning of the expedition, and that he promised the Roman king, in case of a peaceful settlement, a great general war against Turkey. A meeting was called at Linz, to be held April 4. Charles V had become even willing to free the landgrave.

But it was too late. On April 4 Moritz captured Augsburg instead of going to Lunz. After the expulsion of the Protestant preachers by the emperor (August, 1551), the city resembled a morgue. One can easily understand why the citizens were unwilling to sacrifice their lives and their property for the emperor after the arrival of the allies, especially since the princes had promised to reestablish the old constitution. The interim was overthrown and a part of the exiled preachers returned. But wherein they succeeded at Augsburg, they failed in the other large imperial cities of the south.

The suppression of the republican elements by the princes was not avenged. Nürnberg knew the wickedness of Margrave Albrecht too well to make common cause with the allied princes, or to permit

their army to cross its territory. All they obtained was a contribution of 100,000 florins, while Moritz and Landgrave William promised that the city would be spared. They met with unexpected resistance at Ulm where, forgetting the maltreatment by the emperor, this fortified city defied all menaces of the enemy, including a heavy cannonade, and horrible devastation by the wild Brandenburger.

Strasburg also rejected the cunning request of the French king to permit his soldiers to enter the city. "They did very wisely," said Schärtlin, "for no sooner had we entered the city than we should never have been able to leave alive."

The people of Augsburg may have been amazed when their former general, together with the French and allied princes, demanded an enormous indemnity. The valiant resistance of Ulm and Strasburg favorably contrasted with the torturing anxiety of the Rhenish electors and the spiritless neutrality of the dukes of Bavaria and Württemberg. The young duke Albrecht (successor of his father William since March 7, 1550), told his subjects to serve whomever they wished, and entertained intimate relations with Margrave Albrecht; the ancient desire of the Wittelsbachs to obtain the throne was revived after the death of Eck, the leading Bavarian statesman (died March, 1550), since it could take place "over night, that Austrian blood would no longer rule the empire."

For the moment at least religious contracts seemed to be displaced by political interests; even the ecclesiastical electors, the bishop of Würzburg and the duke of Jülich entered into an agreement with the Protestants of the Palatinate and Württemberg, according to which a general council should be held in Germany instead of the Trentino meeting, where all clergymen should be freed from their duties toward Rome, or a purely national council should be called. Even the emperor believed it profitable not only to remind the people of Ulm of their allegiance, but to soothe them on account of their religion, for there were only a few Protestant imperial cities which prevented a complete triumph by the allies.

The outwitted emperor sat at Innsbruck doing nothing. He seemed, according to a poem of those days, to have sunk into sleep and dreams. On April 6 he attempted to flee to the Rhine and the Netherlands by way of Württemberg, but he was forced to turn back, for the road to Lake Constance was occupied. Thus he faced the alternative, "either to suffer utmost disgrace or betake himself into great danger."

Ferdinand advised his brother to maintain himself in Tyrol and not to leave the imperial soil. The emperor asked his warriors who had marched against Hungary to return, but for a long time the members of the Innsbruck government endeavored

to obtain an interview with or counsel from the emperor in matters concerning the defense of the country. Granvela advised them to negotiate with the enemy.

Meanwhile, Moritz, whom King Ferdinand considered more fickle than April weather, had reached Linz. The negotiations,—in which participated the Roman king, his sons Maximilian and Ferdinand, the duke of Bavaria, imperial counselors and those of the electorate of Brandenburg,—led to no settlement of the most important questions, wherefore, a new meeting was called at Passau for May 26, in which a greater number of imperial princes were to take part. Moritz declared that he could conclude no armistice without the consent of his allies, and appointed the 11th of May as the first day of the negotiations, but as late as the 10th he wrote from his headquarters at Gundelfingen that the negotiations could not start before the 26th of that month. He won time to proceed against the emperor. At the meeting in Linz Moritz had learned that King Ferdinand, who desired peace and the German forces to use against the Turks, would not oppose his wishes.

I cannot agree with those who believe the king betrayed his imperial brother. Of course, Ferdinand had not forgotten the question of succession, and he had not decided to sacrifice his Hungarian interests to the stubbornness of the emperor re-

garding the demands of the belligerent princes. Though he had been one of the first to warn the emperor, he declared anew that courage and strong equipment were needed; for they had to deal with ambiguous people. He could justly complain of his sister Maria, because his voice hitherto had been disregarded at the imperial court. Nevertheless he hastened to Innsbruck from Linz and asked his brother to approve of the fatal delay of the armistice. So far as he himself was concerned, he tried to avoid any warlike entanglement with Moritz. This fact accounts for his asking the Tyrolean government to confine itself to the defense of the country. One must admit that this endeavor to disturb the imminent negotiations regarding peace remained not wholly free from ambiguity, but Granvela advised an appeal to the neutrality of Tyrol.

Charles V wrote that "his brother had nothing in common with this rebelling warfare, as far as he himself was concerned, to say nothing of his country and his people." Ferdinand emphasized more strongly his neutrality by saying in a letter to Moritz that it did not befit him as brother of the emperor to expel the latter from Innsbruck, whither he had come before the beginning of the war, thus placing confidence in him. At any rate, the southern drive of the allies was quite unexpected. Bavaria did not hesitate to promise them food sup-

plies, which the Tyrolean government had refused. On May 18 Moritz arrived at Füssen, and on the same day defeated the imperial troops at Reuttle. During the night, the soldiers under the leadership of George of Mecklenburg passed round the Ehrenburg Pass, which was defended by imperial and royal troops, and took possession of it the next morning. The victors thought it was "supernatural" and due to extraordinary grace "to lead the people like chamoises against the rear of the enemy, across such mighty rocks and cliffs."

On the evening of the same day the emperor and the Roman king fled to Brunneck, across the Brenner. It was fortunate for the monarch that—as was usually the case—the disorder among the warriors made it impossible for the victorious elector to make full use of the situation. Moritz, whom they called "yellow hat" and "traitor," saw himself endangered by the spears and swords of the rebels. Thus the emperor escaped capture.

Whether Moritz had seriously pursued his plan, or whether he had only delayed it, has not been ascertained. The one and the other could be ascribed to that master of dissimulation and calculation; he who belonged to those political gamblers whose secret thoughts are hidden behind a bewildering variation of mental combinations. The fact that he negotiated with the duke of Ferrara in the

spring of 1552 furnishes proof of his expectation of seizing the emperor on two sides.

Of course all the priests of the council, who were gathered at Trentino, hastened to leave Tyrol after learning of the invasion of the heretics; the ecclesiastical meeting, whose suspension had been announced previously, disappeared because of the menacing approach of Protestant arms just as miserably as the nimbus of the world-dominating empire. Those were the darkest days in the life of Charles V. Pictures of disgrace, death, and captivity loomed before the eyes of the man who was wont to see in his cause the cause of the Lord.

As soon as Moritz and his adherents, the landgrave and Duke Georg, appeared at Innsbruck, leaving all imperial and Spanish estates to their soldiers, Charles escaped to Villach. After the long expected catastrophe had descended the defeated monarch seemed suddenly to regain his old capacity. To all places he sent letters asking for the protection of the empire against the "French relations of conspirators," as he called his Protestant enemies.

While the Turks scored victory after victory, and while efforts were put forth at Passau for the reestablishment of peace, the emperor never ceased to think of how he could punish his adversaries and carry out his old plans. The best means of inflicting punishment was in the person of the aged elector John Frederick, who had been set free immedi-



ately before Charles's flight, on condition that he should remain loyal to the emperor. King Ferdinand shook hands with the prisoner at Innsbruck, as a sign of reconciliation; the emperor himself met the pardoned landgrave several days afterward. He gladly accepted the proposition to carry out the excommunication against Moritz. During his imprisonment he had doubted whether he had not shown himself too irreconcilable toward him, but the thought that his cousin was his real and only enemy gained the upper hand. He entreated his son to keep aloof from the man who had neither fidelity nor faith. At the imperial court, the imminent execution was discussed; John Frederick, who had again donned his electoral garb, wished to tolerate Protestant preaching, to reinstate the deposed archbishop of Cologne, and pardon all the rebels except Moritz, the brother of the landgrave, who was also to be "deprived of his wings" so far as it was possible. He asked several cities and princes for assistance, and did not omit to state emphatically how "tyrannically and madly" Moritz had treated his noblemen. The latter had refused to aid him against the city of Magdeburg, and the independence of the knights of Leipzig caused him to proceed against them. Consequently it was said in Saxony that "there was only a French government."

The same attitude had been made use of suc-

cessfully against the landgrave only a few years before; these princely states, although we note their inclination toward absolutism, still favored restoration and tolerated no strong discussion.

In vain did the French attempt utterly to destroy the emperor; Schärtlin, who made himself the most ardent spokesman of France, wrote "as a good German" to Moritz that the king would have nothing in common with any German, since the elector negotiated with the Hapsburger. The allies thought of a hereditary union among the worldly princes, with each other, and with France; in other words, they contemplated a permanent French protectorate, and John Albrecht of Mecklenburg would also win over England and Denmark.

The young landgrave William warned his brother-in-law against the knave of Passau. Moritz, however, went to Passau and took part in the negotiations regarding peace, without permitting himself to be misled by the severe letters of the Hessian, who, after all, treated him like a traitor.

We know of his fear before the "fat cousin," whom he sought to interest in behalf of his liberation, and to win over the Roman king by promising to aid him against the Turks. It is almost humorous to observe how he repudiated with high moral indignation the idea of a friendly treaty or an alliance with the archenemy of Christianity. For who was there that would permit himself to be swayed

by the Protestant and pro-German phrases which this Machiavelian occasionally misused? True, he was interested in what he could obtain only directly, and not in the grand imagination of a world monarchy, of which Charles V was dreaming, but solely in the "kingdom of Saxony," and in the desire to increase his territorial power as much as possible. Such were the demands which he maintained at Passau, with full reëstablishment of the "free empire of the German nation." By this he meant the electoral oligarchy as founded since the time of the Golden Bull, in accordance with the constitution; security against the monarchic desires of the Hapsburgs, which had appeared prominently of late years; against foreign counselors and troops; against imperial influences upon the diets; the imperial court and the free royal election; and finally, permission for the traditional alien service of the German soldiers, even against imperial hereditary lands.

Permanent peace should be concluded between the two faiths regardless of the assembly of Trentino, and should not be changed even in case of an eventual failure of a national council. We observe that nothing had remained of those desires for secularization and a French protectorate, although the bishop of Bayonne had come to Passau, very much against the will of the emperor, and instead of being arrested, was listened to. This truly diplo-

matic moderation of the elector, however, facilitated his negotiations with the mediating princes quite extraordinarily. Besides King Ferdinand, who had not brought his son Maximilian with him, there were present at Passau, Albrecht of Bavaria, the archbishop of Salzburg, the bishop of Eichstädt, envoys of the electors and of the dukes of Württemberg, Jülich, Brunswick, and Pomerania, of Margrave Hans, Landgrave William and the bishop of Würzburg. The disposition was more peaceful than ever before and the Catholics, who agreed with the Protestants as to worldly complaints, yielded also with regard to the religious question by acknowledging the unconditional validity of the treaty between the two faiths, and therewith the Protestant's claim to a legally secured existence.

Once more they wished to raise the question at the next diet whether the attempt should be made to settle the religious feuds at a general or a national council, and whether by a decision of the imperial classes or a colloquy. Still they desired to maintain peace, even if the last attempt should fail. The idea of parity which had originated in the inner feuds of the Swiss Confederacy seemed to dominate the greatest commonwealth of Middle Europe with irresistible power. An evangelization by force was not thought of by the leading Protestant statesmen, nor was it in fact within the realm of possibility. They did not as yet "have their emperor in iron,"

as Moritz said to Landgrave William, and had to be glad because they met with good will rather than with stubborn bigotry among the Catholic classes. The elector justly replied to the accusations of his brother-in-law that his much blamed procedure corresponded with the interests of German particularism. With regard to his treacherous attitude he proudly remarked, "Thanks to God, we possess more honesty and fidelity within us than the bold bishop (of Bayonne) and the silly, useless, and black clerk ever had possessed."

His allies, William, John Albrecht, the palsgrave, Otto Henry, who had joined them, and above all the wild margrave, were active in order that the labors regarding place should fail, as was also the emperor, who hastily carried on the equipment of his army, desiring to postpone the religious question to the next diet, and not to some previously established religious place. That meant, as he wrote to Ferdinand, impunity for the rebels and tolerance for the heretics.

But he was far from being willing to free the landgrave before a complete breaking up of the hostile forces, or to withdraw those political complaints. In vain his own counselors whom he had sent to Passau, and his brother Ferdinand, as well as the assembled classes warned him to be cautious regarding the impending danger of a desperate fight for which allies could be found nowhere. Neither

the pope's neutrality in the Italian war, the advances of the Turks, nor the hopeless accounts of Queen Maria, were sufficient to induce Charles to sacrifice what he regarded as his right and his duty. "If it were only a matter of suffering disgrace," he wrote to his brother Ferdinand, "I should easily overcome it for the sake of peace; I have always been willing to forgive personal offenses for the sake of the common weal. Yet the worst of all is the fact that in addition to disgrace which one could easily get over, a heavy burden rests on my conscience, which I am unable to endure."

All the efforts of Ferdinand, who hastened to Villach, were in vain against this iron will; the emperor insisted that the final solution of religious and political questions should be postponed till the next diet. And meanwhile Moritz, who had arrived at Passau in the beginning of July, had opportunity to learn of the inward and outward weakness of the confederacy of princes. It was a momentous question as to whether a fight of life or death might be undertaken against the emperor, there being only a few resolute elements, which were always opposed to each other, and no firm organization whatever for the fight that was probably to last long.

Aside from the distrust of Moritz by the allies there was the indomitable and incalculable Margrave Albrecht,—an "immense, foolish wild beast," King Ferdinand's counselor called him. At

any rate, the nature of this fierce adventurer contained more of a wild beast than of a national hero. The miserable, insignificant prince was a genuine forerunner of that princely proletariat which in the Thirty Years' War sought to obtain riches and glory. He felt himself removed from the pressing narrowness of his affairs when, with waving hair and flaming red beard, he plunged into the midst of his warriors like a "severe storm," everywhere leaving behind him destruction and misery.

He had given sufficient proof of his murderous and fearful talent before the city of Ulm, but his complete hideousness was displayed only after carrying the war into his Franconian home, where he burned and destroyed like a fiend. As a robber knight on the most merciless scale, he fell upon the archenemy of the margraves,—the city of Nürnberg. "If you have not Nürnberg," he wrote to Moritz, "you are unable to conquer any city. I could do to them more damage than for 200,000 florins in the country."

And this was no vain boasting; disregarding the promises which the allies had made to Nürnberg, and spurning their prayers, he pitched camp before the city, and turned the surrounding country into a desert and land of desolation. While before Ulm he was said to have destroyed 100 villages, two small cities, three monasteries, more than ninety castles, seventeen churches, 170 villages and farms, and a

large part of the city forest, which was burned. The German soldiers who served under this master were not entitled to look down upon the infamous Spaniards, whose ferocity was less than their own.

Instead of taming the cruelty of the soldiers, which was everywhere about the same, this shameless offspring of the Hohenzollerns found pleasure in allowing his adversaries to suffer to the utmost all the horrors of war. At the same time he intended to punish severely the aged parson of Bamberg. A military expedition of the margrave's cavalry forced the bishop to cede more than one-third of the bishopric and to pay 80,000 florins, while his Würzburg friend pledged to give 220,000 florins, and to liquidate debts of the margrave amounting to 320,000 florins.

The Nürnbergers induced the margrave to spare the city by giving an indemnity of 200,000 florins, while their own losses far surpassed that sum. Thus Albrecht acquired about 870,000 florins within less than two months. The meeting of Passau was now asked to sanction the treaties into which Bamberg and Würzburg had been forced, while the margrave marched along the Main to punish the elector of Mainz and other "miserable parsons" in a similar fashion. His most powerful assistant was Christopher of Oldenburg. "Seek money and spare none," said the marshal of the electorate of Brandenburg;



"the ecclesiastical residences are attacked mainly because of the good wines they contain."

The margrave, who had demanded full liberty after joining the alliance, became the disturbing element of the princely movement. Having marched toward the Rhine it became clear that he intended to carry on the war independently and on the side of France. He once more tried his fate with his previous allies, when Elector Moritz attempted to seize Frankfort. But in a decisive moment the attack of the princely revolutionists was rendered futile by the walls of the Protestant imperial city. The bombardment was strongly answered. On the 20th of July, the valiant young Duke Georg of Mecklenburg was killed near Sachsenhausen.

The situation of the allied princes was not favorable when, on the 24th of July, the envoys of the meeting at Passau appeared before Frankfort with the much modified treaty. Although King Ferdinand had declared at Passau that the essence of the treaty was not effected by imperial changes, both the landgrave and Moritz were amazed at the miserable outcome of a military enterprise which had begun under such favorable circumstances. Continuous religious peace failed and the future decision of important matters once more depended upon the emperor. The situation was the same as before the war, for there was no security and only a probability that the emperor, freed from his dif-

ficult position, would yield to the desires of the German classes and sacrifice his ecclesiastical and political principles, of whose steadfastness everybody was convinced. Not unfairly did a shrewd Italian clergyman reply to the laudations of the brilliancy of Moritz by saying he had once had the emperor in his power, and had done nothing. Certainly Moritz was not the victor when he brought his allies to Passau on the first of August to sign the treaty. The camp of the disobedient troops was set afire by Moritz, in order to compel them to give up the siege, and the majority of his troops withdrew upon learning that they would be sent to Hungary against the Turks.

The margrave gladly received the rebels; meanwhile he had pillaged the bishoprics of Worms and Speyer, and marched against Mainz and Trier after an unsuccessful siege of Frankfort. Everywhere he forced the cities to take an oath of allegiance before the king of France. He wished to prove to the latter that faith and fidelity still existed among the Germans, notwithstanding the desertion of the other allies. Henry II was not inclined to pay the sum for the sake of which the margrave had been willing to render service to the French.

The prince now stood quite helpless in Lorraine; German soil had become too dangerous, although he had threatened to destroy ten or twenty houses of his enemy for each destroyed building, village

or town, in his own country. His German conquests were all lost, for Charles V, who had pronounced invalid the treaties that had been forced upon Nürnberg and the bishops, was already on his march to the western frontier of the empire.

The situation in Germany had greatly changed within a few months. Contrary to the expectations of all, the expelled emperor returned undismayed, without having granted the most important demands of his opponents, and ruled in the Suabian cities as severely as after the defeat of the Schmalkaldens, while Elector Moritz was about to leave for Hungary. Only the margrave, who was hated by all, remained of the entire anti-imperial power of the princes, with Count Volrad of Mansfeld in the north.

Charles had hesitated for a long time whether he should ratify the "exorbitant" treaty which his opponents had accepted, or whether he should not avenge himself without delay. Moritz was angered on account of the renewal of the "old treacherous Spanish misunderstandings."

King Ferdinand, who saw all his Hungarian hopes at stake, protested against that perilous and dishonorable change of imperial statesmanship.

After the emperor arrived at Augsburg by way of Munich, riding between John Frederick and Alba, he was received "with tremor and fear." Protestant preaching was no longer suppressed, but

the rule of families had been established there and in many other Suabian cities. The cities of Ulm enthusiastically received their monarch. Strasburg, too, was given an opportunity of enjoying an imperial visit. Charles, however, avoided molesting the city by letting his troops march through it. The interim was no longer spoken of. But who could rely upon the future? Charles resumed his projects regarding a monarchical reform of the empire as if nothing unusual had occurred. The plan of an imperial treaty was revived, as well as the one to obtain the German throne for the Infante. Maximilian was disregarded, and the aid of Brandenburg, which desired to secure the bishoprics of Magdeburg and Halberstadt was sought.

Margrave Hans of Küstrin was willing to win over his brother Joachim, while Granvela and Queen Maria, who thought little of the prince, regarded the movement as wholly inopportune. The result was, as before, the dissatisfaction of the Austrians. They thought the "princely movements" were the work of the "black parson" (Granvela). At the same time, Ferdinand saw himself deprived more than before of the hope of obtaining Württemberg. Everything seemed to be tending toward a more intimate relation between the German Hapsburgs and the archenemy, Moritz of Saxony, who was so warmly recommended by King Ferdinand.

The whole world must have been astonished by

the treaty, and the peace which Charles V concluded with Albrecht in October and November, 1552, for he sacrificed the bishops he had promised to protect, and sanctioned the so-called treaties with the margrave, which only recently had been solemnly rejected. It was, according to Ranke, the most radical concession that the emperor had ever made in the time of distress. Chiefly upon the advice and mediation of the duke of Alba he accomplished a feat which could not fail to destroy all faith in the imperial word. The cupidity to make the best use of the military and political situation shattered every sense of conscience and duty. "Necessity knows no law," Charles wrote to his sister. He had not forgotten how imperial princes and clergymen had deserted him only a few months before.

Albrecht, rejected by France and no longer able to control his unpaid warriors, succeeded in defeating a French army on the way to his new master. He brought the French leader, the duke of Aumale, as a prisoner to Diedenhofen, where the emperor presented him with the red field ribbon. But throughout the empire, the disgraced double-headed eagle was flouted and sneered at by sarcastic verses.

This policy had lost all sense of morality on both sides; Charles V and Moritz of Saxony as opponents were on the same plane. The liberation of the captured Schmalkaldians, which took place in the autumn of 1552, bore the character of an exchange

in which each closely watched the other, for both were capable of doing anything and everything. The young elector was not pleased with the return of his Ernestine cousin. John Frederick was asked to give bail, but the aged lord, whom his loyal Saxons received enthusiastically, was permitted to reconstruct the old fortress Gotha, and the fact did not facilitate the hope for a perfect settlement of the "errors" among relations. For the main participant, however, the end of so troublous a period contained something reconcilable, while the landgrave was forced to spend the last anxious months of his expectation among the most painful impressions. The emperor was about to break his word, Landgrave William could not but express his anxiety concerning his father who, should he be set free, would return as a dying man, and "bluffed with a Venetian soup."

One of the biographers of Charles V regarded it as a great merit that the emperor had not made use of poison sent by Milan for his unfortunate prisoner. Yet since his unsuccessful attempt to escape, the windows of Philip's prison had been closed; they were opened only once, when the Spaniard who had brought a letter to the landgrave was being punished. Furthermore the colonel, who was entrusted with the person of the landgrave, not only compelled his soldier guard to disturb him every night, but found grim pleasure in threatening

the noble prisoner with death, fetters, and blows. Philip implored Queen Maria for protection against such maltreatment. He declared that he would "prefer to be in the highest or lowest tower, with iron fetters, rather than in such danger." An exceptional strength of character was needed to resist such painful experiences, for although there was nothing of his former greatness in the liberated landgrave, one cannot say that Philip returned as a broken man. On the contrary, a sort of clearness and mildness were displayed by the once stormy champion of German Protestantism. He even rewarded the colonel, his tormentor, as he had promised when he left his prison. An impartial judge of the failings and weaknesses of this much tried prince must concede his nobility of character when compared with that of a treacherous monarch who had been willing to lower himself to the office of a merciless jailer of a man like Philip, and to make common cause with a princely robber like Albrecht.

Charles had displayed one striking merit on his last expedition: the courage and self-command of the old, sickly man put to shame many a younger soldier. The princely revolution also revived and advanced the fight against Austria, aside from a few insignificant successes of France. While Julius III (April 29th) concluded an armistice with France, in order once more to devote himself to "banquets, gardens and plays" fully in accord

with his inclination, the sultan wrote to the German belligerent princes as being his true friends and allies. In Hungary the fortress Temesvar could not resist the superior Turkish forces, and the coasts of Naples were menaced by a common attack of the Mohammedan and French fleet.

Everywhere in Italy was to be observed a revival of the old anti-imperial tendencies; at Siena the Spanish garrison was driven away, amid the shouts, "France! Victory! Freedom!" and its detested castle was destroyed in the presence of the rejoicing citizens. Corsica, too, made preparations to wrench freedom and independence from Genoa and the emperor. King Ferdinand entreated his brother not to betake himself to Spain, warning him that Germany, Italy and Holland would be lost if he did so. Because of the safety of the empire and the Netherlands, whose southern frontier Henry II had devastated on his return from Lorraine, the emperor decided to proceed against his chief enemy, and upon the advice of Alba to besiege Metz.

It was an imposing army which surrounded the city from three sides; by and by the emperor himself appeared, greeted by thundering cannons. Only a short time before, the monarch suffered so intensely from gout that he could hardly wield his pen and had to be carried in a litter; now, in the bitterly cold weather, he sat on his horse's back for



hours, and while the bad climate and lack of food overcame thousands of his soldiers and his two body physicians fell ill, he would not succumb nor retreat. But toward the end of the year he had to bow to the inevitable, and on the first of January he withdrew his forces.

The fact that the victorious commander of the fortress, the duke of Guise, took care of the remaining wounded, only added to his credit, while Alba, severely blamed by his own sub-commanders, appeared only as the careless destroyer of a splendid army.

Before Metz, Charles V saw his star beginning to wane. In his despair he clung to the unhappy project of placing the Roman crown upon the head of the Infante. With the aid of Brandenburg, and chiefly with the valiant sword of the adventurer Albrecht, he hoped to obtain by force that which was abhorred by the majority of the imperial classes, the family of his brother, and in short, by the whole world.

Meanwhile Moritz, who had been in Hungary since September, did not remain inactive. The expedition against the Turks appeared to be aiming at a more intimate relation with the Roman king, but at the same time it was being negotiated in the electoral camp before Raab, which had nothing whatever in common with a Saxon-Austrian understanding.

King Henry II had no reason to complain of the desertion of his ally, who had signed the treaty of Passau without his consent. While it was under discussion, the electorates of Saxony and Hesse wished to form new alliances with France. Once more the "Hildebrand," as the princes called the king, was offered the German throne, and promised a German army near the Rhine by the following spring. Volrod of Mansfeld went to the French court as mediator of the elector.

Far more peculiar were the negotiations of the duke of Ferrara, which were intended to bring about an alliance between Moritz and the Porte. The elector was to overthrow the Austro-German power of the Hapsburgs with the aid of the Turks, and himself obtain the Hungarian crown under Turkish overlordship. Many attempted to find a trait of greatness in the bold and indiscreet Wettinian, for the scheme of overthrowing Charles and Ferdinand certainly did not lack daring. Moreover, many less energetic natures, as for instance the elector Joachim and the Bavarian duke, held similar ideas. Moritz was willing to enter into an agreement with King Ferdinand, mainly in behalf of the protection of the imperial lands against the Turkish attacks; and the emperor and other princes should also participate. Ferdinand accepted the proposition with great enthusiasm, while the emperor who was about to create in South Germany a substitute for the

dissolved Suabian Confederacy, looked askance upon this Saxon alliance.

Again we observe the striking contrast between the two brothers,—Charles placed confidence in John Frederick and the young duke of Württemberg, while Ferdinand, who was ill-disposed toward those two princes, regarded it as necessary to assure himself of the aid of Moritz. In the background there remained the dangerous tension because of the Roman royal election. The Infante, who had financially furthered the French military expedition of his father, was eager to reach the goal of his ambition, while Ferdinand and Maximilian meditated solving the question by force. Ferdinand openly declared that he would assist the elector if the old Ernestine attacked Moritz. It was this weapon of which the emperor had made use and we cannot acquit him of his grave guilt in betaking himself to Holland after his French expedition, instead of attempting to establish peace in Germany. Once more it was his duty to fulfill his imperial task, at the moment when the civil war in its most horrible features again scourged the empire.

The margrave returned and found his Franconian adversaries well equipped, while he firmly determined to carry out his "proper rights." His confidant, William of Grumbach, had urged the opening of the struggle against the parsons and the occupation of the Bamberg territories, even though

"it rained with monks and they could shake knights and servants from the trees."

It was significant that the South German princes preferred to enter into alliance with each other in behalf of the protection of public peace, instead of furthering the emperor's project of a Suabian alliance. Here, too, we observe that fear because of the Spanish succession was more effective than anything else. Aside from the interim nothing troubled the emperor more than the project of which, according to Duke Christopher, even "the peasants in the inns were talking."

These two projects,—the leading back of the Protestants to the old Church, and annexing Spain to the Spanish universal monarchy,—were the climax of his life's work. Protestant and Catholic imperial classes were once more brought to understand fully their common interests through the imperial policy. Thus, besides Bavaria and Württemberg, the electors of Mainz, Trier, and the Palatinate, and the duke of Jülich, formed the so-called Heidelberg Association (March 29, 1553), chiefly to protect their estates against any attacks. The endangered friends were to have the privilege of demanding 6,000 men,—half as much as the Schmalkalden assistance. The well intentioned princes, however, were unable to fulfill their next task, a peaceful settlement of the struggles between the margrave and the bishop. Neither their

mediations nor the mandates of the imperial court could prevent the breaking out of hostilities which did not create a second Peasants' War, but which by far surpassed in atrocity that frightful democratic revolution.

After a victorious skirmish against the citizens of Würzburg, near Pomersfelden (April 11), Albrecht once more marched through Franconia, burning and sacking. He could boast that the people of Nürnberg did not understand destruction like himself, for wherever he kindled a fire the remnants could easily be swept away by a broom. We can well compare the number of destroyed cities, castles, monasteries, and villages with that of 1525. In the country of Würzburg alone more than 300 places had been wiped out of existence. Whatever was spared by the flames was thoroughly "picked out."

Lofty were the thoughts of that noble criminal; once at a wine party he spoke of the Bohemian royal crown. More serious, however, was his intention of obtaining assistance through a North German princely alliance. The margrave knew his old friend and most dangerous adversary, Elector Moritz, could be misled neither by lies nor honeyed words, and thought it more profitable to assume a leading rôle as champion of order against princely anarchy.

The whole of Germany seemed to divide itself

into two parties. While the Heidelberg Association was not quite willing to interfere with arms, Moritz and the Roman king met at Eger in order to adopt a common policy against the margrave. Moritz had previously sent his brother to Denmark, where he told King Christian of the momentous change that would follow the imminent death of the emperor.

And what of the emperor? His behavior during this crisis had already roused deep distrust. He sat at Brussels, content to fight with his weapons of paper, with letters and mandates, although he had long since learned their slight efficacy. Gradually he loosened the fetters which tied him to the margrave, and told Albrecht that imperial violence against the bishops could not be thought of. Then, in March, there was a declaration that the cessation of the promises which the bishops had been forced to make had not been annulled after his reconciliation with Albrecht. None the less, his own treaty five months before expressly annulled and destroyed all that had taken place against the pledges of the bishops. By his "imperial dignity and by true words" he had promised never to proceed against his concessions made to the margrave. In the present appeal to all imperial classes to assist the bishops in obtaining their lost property, Albrecht's name was tacitly overlooked, as well as in an edict which promised to punish severely the

equipment of any in the name of the emperor, but without the imperial command, and which was also directed against the margrave. This miserable subterfuge could only strengthen the widespread belief that the emperor was making common cause with Maximilian and did not seriously care about public peace.

The fact that Charles always emphasized the necessity of a peaceful settlement was of no value whatever in face of the general excitement and the horrible devastation in Franconia. An emperor who seriously aimed to preserve peace for the empire must not only talk more emphatically but he must *act* resolutely. The Spaniard upon the imperial throne liked to see the most revolutionary elements among the German princes shed their blood in internal turmoil, the Treaty of Passau pass into oblivion, and the misery of the civil war drive the majority of the imperial classes to favor his political reformatory plans.

Was it that his often blamed apathy again played a dominant part? What would happen should his worst opponent, Moritz, continue victorious? In the summer of 1553 the negotiations, which were carried on at the French court by the count of Mansfeld upon the command of the Saxon elector, had made much progress. Henry II seriously thought of the Roman crown, led to do so by the bad health of the emperor, and he hoped to see

Moritz invade Holland with a powerful German army.

Of the preparedness of his ally he learned from Mansfeld, who had returned to Germany. But first of all the feud with the margrave had to be settled. At the head of his bands the much dreaded Albrecht went to the north, where Duke Henry of Wolfenbüttel was opposed to a number of noblemen whose estates he had confiscated after the Schmalkalden War, and also to the city of Brunswick. Albrecht thought he could rely upon the assistance of the Protestants; for who had more rigidly "taught the priests of Baal," and more pitilessly attacked the "devil's empire?" But also the feeling of John Frederick against the hateful cousin, and the imperial attitude of the Brandenburg Hohenzollerns encouraged him to seek safety in northern Germany.

We observe a very characteristic shift among the parties, which well displayed the supremacy of political interests over religious ones. While, during the revolution of the princes, the Protestant cities valiantly resisted the attacks of their noble co-religionist, we now find Elector Moritz closely allied with the notorious opponent of the Reformation, the "wicked Heinz" of Wolfenbüttel, and with the ultra-Catholic King Ferdinand, and at the same time in contact with the Franconian bishops whose closest friends and allies were the Protes-



tants of Nürnberg. At the head of the Heidelberg Association stood the Catholic Albrecht of Bavaria, and the Lutheran Christopher of Württemberg. The margrave, however, was aided not only by his relatives, including Countess Elizabeth of Henneberg, formerly the duchess of Brunswick, but by the Protestant opponents of Henry of Brunswick, and the Catholic Erec of Calenberg, a son of Elizabeth, and it was an open secret that the emperor undertook nothing against him. Landgrave Philip, who was strongly opposed to Saxony's joining the "godless parson," unwillingly accepted John Albrecht of Mecklenburg and his brother-in-law. Not only Protestant indignation, but territorial feuds, kept the Mecklenburger aloof from his ally Moritz, although he strove to separate the elector from his Catholic ally Henry.

The margrave was notified of the rejection of the elector in his camp near Petershagen. Eight days later, on the 9th of July, 1553, the chief antagonists met at Sievershausen and Peine, between Hanover and Brunswick. Albrecht's position was more favorable and his infantry was superior, but the battle developed chiefly as an equestrian one, in which the princely leaders threw themselves into the midst of the strife. The bands of the margrave were believed by their enemies to have a few little banners with Burgundic (imperial) crosses; the army of the allies was aided by Bohemians.

The hero of the hour was Elector Moritz, whose wild valor was seconded by his Saxon nobility, the people of Brunswick led by their three dukes, and Hessian cavalry. The "aged lion" of Brunswick had lost his two sons, Karl Victor and Philip Magnus; the young Frederick of Lüneburg was slain as the bearer of the electoral banner, and Moritz himself paid for his foolhardiness with his life.

Before the last attack the deadly bullet reached him. At first he thought he would recover, and was still occupied with the reports concerning victory when the captured banners which were brought to his tent were lowered before one who was about to die.

His painful agony had lasted two days when the prince passed away, on the 11th of July, in possession of his full consciousness. He was only thirty-two years of age. In his last moments he remembered his wife and daughter and sent them loving messages; then, having forgiven his enemies, he breathed his last. Duke Henry of Brunswick would have hanged the margrave upon the nearest tree had he been able to capture him.

So early was extinguished this life, rich in deeds, that we are unable to form a just opinion of the highly gifted and ambitious man. We are not justified in drawing conclusions from the particularistic viewpoints which his policy so markedly displayed. In many respects he was a man like

Albrecht, Achilles and other strong characters. But the more important events of the Reformation, the struggle with a powerful man like Charles V, the religious contrasts,—all drove forward a prince in the vigor of his prime when he became the first man of the empire.

Although he considered his opportunities very carefully, a royal crown was hardly attainable. The French sometimes saw in him a future emperor in accordance with their ideals. He himself had declared that he would not emerge as the last from the chaotic confusion of the revolution of the princes. Although, throughout his wild life, the moral power of the Reformation did not mean much to him, yet he showed himself a real son of Lutheran Germany while facing death. Whatever was realized by the Augsburg religious peace, the introduction of German Protestantism into the imperial constitution was due to this Wettinian, who knew how to overcome the greatest calculator and best judge of men by means of an infidelity which reminds us of the ancient national hero Herman.

We cannot agree with a recent historian who called Moritz a "scoundrel." The savior of Protestantism had worthy companions, despite his princely egotism and infidelity, not only among the Italians of the Renaissance, but amid German emperors and nobles of centuries long gone by. His best instructor was the imperial opponent whom he

imitated so happily, and deceived after having got the best of him.

It was unfortunate for the German Protestants that the great struggle in behalf of the new doctrine against the Roman Church, had assumed such a wretched character. For Margrave Albrecht raised once again the banners of the war against the priests, immediately after the death of his greatest opponent. The majority of Protestant princes and North German cities struggled to come into close touch with him. Landgrave Philip hastened to bring about a reconciliation, having taken part in the war against his will; and even the new Saxon elector August entered into an agreement with the margrave despite the warnings of the Roman king. It was determined to reunite the old houses of Brandenburg, Saxony and Hesse; a Saxon Confederacy, greatly different from the project of the Roman king, seemed to be brought about, while the Heidelberg Association remained strictly neutral, although Ferdinand had joined it in the name of Tyrol and Vorarlberg.

The South German Confederacy, where the bishop of Arras was called the black Arras, should have proceeded against the violator of peace because of his Spanish attitude, since he was believed to represent the imperial plans regarding the succession. But the duke of Bavaria could truthfully say that not everybody would like to bite the margrave.

Duke Christopher of Württemberg was a zealous enemy of Albrecht's enemies,—King Ferdinand and Henry of Brunswick.

Albrecht, who received assistance from everywhere, expressed his hopeful attitude with his customary cynical humor. "Tell your parsons at Würzburg and Bamberg," he wrote to one of his colonels; "they should hold services in honor of four priestly princes, Duke Moritz, Duke Karl and Duke Philip Magnus, as well as the duke of Lüneburg. I still live, and live longer, if God so will, than all parsons might like. Their Messias, Duke Moritz, had flown away." Rude verses sang of the imminent tortures of priests and parsons. The aged duke of Brunswick was the only one who clung to the shamefully treated Franconian bishops and the people of Nürnberg. He undertook also to turn his inconsequent younger cousin against the margrave Erec Steterburg, causing great fear among the citizens of Brunswick, who witnessed the victory of their hostile lord from their towers and walls.

The succeeding siege of the city led to an agreement between the prince and the defiant citizens, when Henry was called to the south by the urgent requests of the Franconian allies to make an end to the despairing battle of the margrave in behalf of country and people.

While on his way, the aged John Frederick was

obliged to pay a large sum because of his sympathies for the Brandenburger. In words and publications the hunted margrave accused the faithless persons and the bloody rabble of Nürnberg, which would have been glad to destroy all the aristocracy of the empire. These Protestant princes, however, who would have joined him openly after a decisive victory, did nothing in his behalf aside from their attempts to mediate, and the emperor kept away from him entirely. On December 1 the imperial court excommunicated him. He once more gave orders to kindle a fire for the priests during Christmas and New Year, "that the children should leap in the womb of their mothers."

At any rate six months elapsed before unhappy Franconia was released from the struggle in the course of which both parties had raged with equal savagery. On June 13th, 1554, Albrecht, who had escaped from the besieged city of Schweinfurt, was overtaken at Schwarzach near Kitzingen, and decisively defeated. A week later Plassen Castle fell after valiant resistance, while the exiled prince to whom his Württemberg friend refused shelter fled to Paris. John Albrecht of Mecklenburg, who had approved but did not sign the Treaty of Passau, only escaped a similar fate by ceding territory to his cruel brother Ulrich.

The German princes had made peace with each other, without the participation of the emperor.

A final reform of the empire and permanent tranquillity were to be brought about by means of an imperial diet, and not a revolution. Inevitably much time and toil were needed before the calling of the diet. The prince still suspected that the emperor desired nothing "but the beginning of the old Spanish ninny-song and the directing of it toward a definite aim."

As early as February, 1554, Charles V told his brother why he would give up this favorite plan. Since the death of the youthful king of England (July 6, 1553), and the succession of his oldest sister Mary, whose claims the brother attempted to render invalid in behalf of a Protestant cousin, Johanna Grey, a thorough reestablishment of Catholicism was to be expected in the already lost insular kingdom. Imperial policy set in with all its power in January, 1554, when the elderly queen was betrothed to her young cousin, the Infante. The wedding was celebrated in July, being preceded by many heretic courts and followed by a planned suppression of all religious innovations.

On November 30, 1554, the English parliament, in the presence of the royal couple, obtained for itself and the whole kingdom the papal absolution from heresy, the schism and its results. Cardinal Pole was destined solemnly to take back to the old Church his native home, which had once expelled him.

This was the new turn of events which induced the emperor to withdraw his thoughts from German affairs. He did not pursue the changed course with the vigor and tenacity of his former years, for his late disappointments had greatly affected the weary man. On the contrary, the thought of abdication assumed a more and more definite character. Through his English marriage Philip obtained the Spanish possessions in Italy and the title of king of Naples. The personal relations to this son, for whose greatness the emperor always labored, assumed a pleasing, intimate character. A rumor spread among the Spanish environments of the young prince of the disability of the sick monarch to reign. The duke of Alba, who had accompanied the Infante to England, was the right man for the rising sun, and Granvela, too, was active in his behalf. Step by step, Charles V rid himself of the highest power after he saw one hope after the other come to naught. His confidant, von Maele, related how the emperor revealed all his thoughts and feelings to him, and how the narrator always recalled those hours with horror.

Queen Maria, filled with antipathy against the cruel and dull nephew, told her imperial brother in the summer of 1555 of her intention to withdraw from the governorship in the Netherlands. This forced a decision affecting the emperor.



On October 21st, at a meeting of the Knights of the Golden Fleece held in Brussels, he renounced the sovereignty of the Order in behalf of his son. Four days afterward he offered the government to the latter: Those assembled were deeply moved when the emperor began to speak and declared himself wholly unable longer to fill his high office, and implored forgiveness for the injustice he had done. His eyes were filled with tears when he asked his son to care for the empire, which henceforward he would rule. Charles did not forget, however, to entreat the classes to destroy all heretics utterly.

In January, 1556, he formally renounced the Spanish crown, but not until September did the ships weigh anchor and bear the dethroned monarch to his beloved Spain. In his splendid solitude at the monastery of San Yuste, the aged and decrepit ruler was absorbed with the great European conflicts; while he could renounce the government he could not change his innate political nature. And even now the ghouls of heresy haunted him; in Spain, in his own environment, the Lutherans obtruded, and while the Inquisition equipped its pyres, he deeply regretted that he had neglected to quench the great German Reformation with the blood of its leader, when the opportunity was his. The thought of Luther, upon whom he had declared war in vain, and the remembrance of Rome, which had fought against him and was now fighting his son,

disturbed the world-weary emperor to the last of his days.

Nevermore was Charles V able to recognize the results of the struggles of the German parties which had been acquired with enormous difficulties. In the summer of 1554 he had authorized his brother to settle with the imperial classes, though not in the name of the emperor, and only as Roman king was Ferdinand allowed to act. Charles placed upon him a responsibility which he never would have assumed himself. He was in doubt regarding the religious question that had been discussed at Villach before the Treaty of Passau. While Ferdinand was as good a Catholic as Charles, the situation of his territories, their close connection with Germany, and the need of Hungarian assistance, did not permit the foolhardy attempt of fighting the rights of Protestantism.

Thus was brought about, much against his will, that so-called peace which settled the decisive battles between Protestants and Catholics, but in reality it was postponed for two generations. The religious peace of Augsburg (1555), was due to the exhaustion of the contending parties, and was not an agreement concluded between victors and defeated. In truth, it became an interim which was destined to bring more harm and misery to the German nation than the imperial reform of 1548. If we recall the

original aims of the great German movement the result appears to be a lamentable one.

Nevertheless it was the most decisive break with the system of the Middle Ages, "the first successful attempt," says Ritter, "to firmly establish equal rights of two confessions in a great state of Latin Christianity." We understand the tenacious contention of the Catholics for an unlimited freedom of confession for all classes and subjects.

In the diet the Catholics were in the majority. But there, too, as well as concerning the imperial laws, Reformation had broken all fetters. The name of the Protestants originated in the struggles against the principles of the majority. Moreover, Catholic and even ecclesiastical classes had recognized the imperative necessity of religious peace, in the Treaty of Passau before it was changed by the emperor. Because of the contrast to the Spanish policy of the emperor, and the common defense of princely liberty the confessionally separated members of the empire had once more come in closer contact with each other. All this took place under the strong pressure of political and mainly warlike conditions, and when that pressure diminished its effects were partly removed.

First of all the war of the margrave prevented the calling of an imperial diet which had been discussed at Passau. After the date was fixed upon

for the 13th of November, 1554, the old indifference of the imperial classes and distrust in the ability of their own members once more revived, and suspicion of the emperor was renewed. King Ferdinand, who toward the end of the year found no classes at Augsburg, could not open the diet till February 5. None of the electors appeared and of the ecclesiastical princes only the cardinal bishop of Augsburg (Otto Truchsess) and the bishop of Eichstädt, and of the worldly princes only those of Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, and the young archduke Karl, presented themselves.

The royal proposition soon showed what was to be expected from the Protestants. Ferdinand would discuss public peace before the religious question, and recommend the decision of the latter to a council or a colloquy. In other words, he wished to avoid the establishment of the much dreaded religious peace.

Many Protestant princes still believed in the possibility of a settlement of the theological differences. Duke Christopher favored the royal proposition of a colloquy, while the instruction of the electorate of Brandenburg regarded the imperial interim as the suitable soil upon which Catholics and Protestants could reunite as had been originally planned. Elector Joachim determined to obtain the papal confirmation of the bishopric of Halberstadt for his son Sigismund, whom Rome

had already recognized as archbishop of Magdeburg.

Nothing was more hideous than the Machiavelism with which Protestant princes recommended themselves or their adherents to the pope as being good Catholics, in order to obtain this or that bishopric. Elector August of Saxony performed such a comedy with the bishopric of Meissen during the diet.

With these contemptible plottings the decisions that were adopted at Naumburg, at a meeting of the most distinguished Protestant imperial classes, strongly contrasted. This assemblage,—which was attended by Elector August, the lords of Brandenburg and Hesse, sixteen princes and thirty nobles altogether,—represented a sort of counter diet, with the exception that it was attended by more princes than was the imperial meeting.

It was here that the position of the Protestants was settled; on March 12 it was determined to cling to the Augsburg Confession, and to reject by a majority of votes any decision affecting religious questions. Elector Joachim hastened to renounce the unfortunate idea of an interim. Thus the Protestants obtained a firm basis for the negotiations at Augsburg.

Meanwhile the electoral council at Augsburg had decided to discuss the burning subject of permanent peace at any cost, whereas the princely council

strongly opposed it and the cardinal of Augsburg even protested.

More impressive than this protest was the statement of the princes of Naumburg, while at the imperial diet itself Christopher of Württemberg, as "leader of the band," defended the Protestant demands against the Catholic majority of the princely council. Finally it was agreed that all ecclesiastical princes with the exception of the cardinal should approve of a permanent religious peace, even without a previous settlement. It was agreed that this peace should be "permanent, steady, unconditioned, and lasting for ever and aye." The Protestants accepted it too, after the main contention had been granted them; namely, the safety of the Protestant estates and ecclesiastical régime. The episcopal jurisdiction over Protestant estates was suspended and the confiscation of ecclesiastical estates sanctioned, provided they were not controlled by people independent of the empire, and did not belong to Protestants at the time of the Treaty of Passau.

Only the question of a future change of the powerful conditions of the two confessions once more renewed the irreconcilability of the contrasts between them. The Protestants were obliged to raise the question if they did not wish to renounce offhand every possibility of further development. Their position was not favorable, and they were

convinced that, in the case of great movements, a standstill meant retrogression, though they did not think so much of the ideal nucleus as of the practical results of the Reformation, of the material and legal increase of their own power. Upon the whole, they regarded their faith as the single true one, and hence desired it to be the only one, as did the Catholics from their standpoint.

On the other hand, unlike the Catholics, they had no wish to interfere with the individual freedom of faith, which had to be protected against the oppression of the old Church. It was therefore not the result of selfish motives, but the fundamental characteristic of the Reformation as a struggle for liberation, when the Protestants desired to do away at the diet of Augsburg with all legal obstacles that prevented a further growth of their doctrine. They demanded full freedom to develop themselves, the unconditioned privileges of Reformation for all, even for the ecclesiastical imperial classes, and free exercise of religion for the Protestant subjects of Catholic classes, but the Catholic subjects of Protestants should be granted only freedom of conscience.

This disparity Palsgrave Otto Henry excused quite naïvely by saying that "our confession has been based upon Christ and his words, and is therefore totally true and beyond doubt," hence public idolatry should be forbidden.

It need not be said that the opponents were unwilling to grant those demands, in which they saw the gradual secularization of ecclesiastical territories and the Protestantization of Germany, with the doubtful continuation of the old Church. To such self-destruction the Catholics naturally could not consent. Of course the papal legates who, after the departure of the cardinals Morone and Truchsess to the conclave, were opposed to the whole work respecting peace, complained bitterly of the fear of the poor Roman king and of the ecclesiastical princes.

Although Ferdinand thought of breaking off the diet and postponing the decision, and although the Catholic classes abhorred the renewal of hostilities, one cannot say that the Protestants would have attained their aim. Their statement that ecclesiastical principalities should not lose that character nor be made hereditary, if an archbishop or a bishop should embrace the Augsburg Confession, was of no avail.

After a conflict which lasted for months, King Ferdinand declared that the Protestants had left it to him, since he possessed just as good a faith as they, to regulate the ecclesiastical restriction; they should "taste a bit of power, since he and his imperial brother had had many a hardship in granting the religious peace." Elector August of Saxony deserved merit for inducing the electorate of Brandenburg and others of his co-religionists to yield.



Thus Germany's future for centuries was decided. That ecclesiastical restriction which compelled the prelates who embraced Protestantism to renounce, together with their hierarchic dignity, their worldly dominion and their imperial feuds, preserved for the Holy Roman Empire the worst attributes of its holiness,—the worldly states,—and thus postponed the much needed operation which the ailing commonwealth had to undergo. According to the course that German national history had taken we may see in this unfinished secularization the gravest political sin of neglect in the whole period of Reformation.

The restriction was embodied in the religious peace, although the Protestants did not regard it as binding and they did not have to accept the Württemberg proposition to protect deposed Protestant prelates. On the other hand, free exercise of religion by Protestant subjects was granted by a special declaration of the Roman king, which was not laid before the imperial court and hence did not exist for it.

Although these decisions regarding ecclesiastical qualities contained insolvable contradictions and needs must create differences of opinion on account of the ambiguity of the publications, the promises of the Protestant magistrates to protect those clergymen who depended upon the empire, whose estates the state confiscated, could also become a

source of misunderstandings. The idea was untrue and unjust that in imperial cities of mixed religion both confessions should be protected in accordance with their possessions. At this diet was emphasized the fact that the political rôle of the German cities was well nigh gone and their position was confined to the privilege of listening to and accepting the decisions of the upper classes.

The religious peace published on September 25, 1555, therefore contained, according to Ritter, exceptional laws with regard to whose sense or validity the parties held differing views. "Whatever had gained firm legal form out of the dreadful battles and endeavors of the Reformation, was once the essence of parity, which wholly upset the medieval dogma regarding the unity of belief, and did away with the barbarian ancient laws against heresy for German Catholics and Protestants." The subjects as well as the magistrates were allowed to choose between the old Church and the Augsburg Confession, and had to leave the country if they did not prefer the religion of their lord. This period filled with struggles, the period of fighting theologians and theologian princes, failed to recognize or realize those ideals of religious purpose, and the sublimity of thrilling words and signs, such as had hovered before Luther as the coming Reformer. Just as the religious evolution of Protestantism, and we may say also of Catholicism,

strove after a strict and pure formulation of the ecclesiastical doctrine, after separating and not dispensing with the existing contrasts, so in the field of politics the princely state ruled as the authority of the future, struggling for freedom toward the empire, and at home for universal power.

We have already learned how the German principality expanded and strengthened through the Reformation; the well known saying: *Cuius regio, eius religio* embodied the final result of an evolution which had attained its constitutional sanction through the religious peace.

But other questions were settled at Augsburg. We shall only mention the new division of territory (1555), in behalf of a prompter and more rigid execution of the verdicts of the imperial court, which deprived the ruler of his control over public peace, and became the foundation of a changed war constitution for foreign entanglements. The organization of districts according to classes was henceforth to wield the sword inwardly and outwardly, instead of it being done by the supreme lord of the country. The imperial court, which secured its final organization in 1555, was controlled and supervised chiefly by the imperial classes. Thither had led the monarchic reformatory efforts, in behalf of which the mightiest ruler of Europe had devoted the greater part of his life and his powers. Near the end of his reign the empire had

gone a step further toward the particularistic dissolution and disintegration. Instead of the imagined Spanish universal monarchy which should drag Germany into the spell of its despotism, the Austrian imperial House now stood by the side of the republic of imperial classes, not national in the full sense of the word, but still a preferable foreign government, and greatly indebted to the German princes.

On the 14th of March, 1558, in the presence of Catholic and Protestant imperial princes, Ferdinand I was crowned German emperor, the ceremony being celebrated at Frankfort in the Church of St. Bartholomew. Rome did not protest against the religious peace, and remonstrances against the half-heretic empire died away.

Peace at any cost seemed to have become the motto of Germany in 1555.

## VII

### THE DARKENING SKIES

**F**ROM the beginning of the great religious war in Germany, until the conclusion of peace at Münster, scarcely anything of importance occurred in the political world of Europe in which the Reformation did not have the most prominent share. All events of world-wide importance which took place in that period were connected with the amelioration of creed wherever they were not actually derived from it, and every state, however great or small, had felt more or less, directly or indirectly, the influence of the struggle.

Practically all the use which the Spanish dynasty made of its tremendous political power was directed against the new opinions of their professors. Through the Reformation a civil war was caused which under four stormy governments shook France to her very foundations, drew foreign fighting forces into the heart of this kingdom, and for half a century made it the scene of the most deplorable confusion. The Reformation rendered the Spanish yoke unbearable to the Netherlanders and awakened in them the desire and the courage to

break that yoke; it also gave it the strength of fulfillment. All the malicious things which Philip II planned against Queen Elizabeth of England were merely a revenge which he took because she had protected his Protestant subjects against him, and placed herself at the head of a religious party which he aimed to destroy. The schism of the Church had for its consequence in Germany a continuous political separation, which, as a matter of fact, meant for this country more than a century of confusion, but on the other hand it proved a lasting check against political oppression.

It was mainly the Reformation which drew the northern powers, Denmark and Sweden, for the first time into the European system of states, because the Protestant federation was strengthened by their entrance, and this federation became to them indispensable. States which before had hardly noticed each other began to have important points of connection through the Reformation and formed bonds of political sympathy. In the same way as citizens among themselves, and rulers with their subjects, assumed other relations through the Reformation, so the relative positions of whole states were changed. And thus it was that the ecclesiastical separation, through some strange vicissitudes, led the states to a closer alliance among themselves.

Terrible and destructive indeed was the first effect

of this common political sympathy,—a Thirty Years' War, which, from the interior of Bohemia to the mouth of the Scheldt, from the banks of the Po to the shores of the Baltic Sea, devastated and depopulated whole countries, destroyed harvests, laid towns and villages in ashes; a war in which many thousands of fighters met their death, which extinguished the glimmering spark of German culture for half a century, and threw the gradually improved morals of the people back into the old barbaric savagery. But Europe emerged free and unsubdued from this appalling war, in which for the first time she had found herself a homogeneous family of states; and this relation of states between one another, which was practically formed in this war for the first time, would in itself be gain enough to reconcile the world to its terrors. The hand of industry has imperceptibly eradicated all the pernicious traces of this conflict, but the beneficent consequences which accompanied it have remained.

Religion accomplished all this. Through religion alone was made possible what happened; but it was not for the sake of religion alone that it was undertaken. If private advantage and the interest of the state had not quickly joined it, the voice of the theologians and the people would never have found such willing princes; the new teaching would never have had such numerous, brave and persistent champions. A great share in the ecclesiastical

revolution was undoubtedly due to the victorious power of truth, or of that which was mistaken for truth. The abuses in the old Church, the vulgarity of many of her teachings, the exaggeration in their demands, naturally had seemed revolting to a mind which was already won by the premonition of a better light, and made it favorably disposed to embrace the improved religion. The charm of independence, the rich booty of the ecclesiastical chapters roused in the princes the desire for a religious change and increased the weight of inner conviction with them to no small extent, but statecraft alone could not have urged them to it.

If Charles V in the exuberance of success had not impugned the empire sovereignty of the German rulers, a Protestant league would hardly have taken up arms in behalf of the freedom of faith. Without the lust of power of the Guises, the Calvinists in France would never have had a Condé or a Coligny as their leader; without the institution of the tenth and twentieth tithe, the holy see would never have lost the United Netherlands. The rulers fought in self-defense or for aggrandizement; the religious enthusiasm enlisted the armies for them and opened the treasures of their people. The great mass of the people, where it was not the expectation of the spoils which lured them to their colors, believed that they were shedding their blood for the truth by sacrificing it to the advantage of their princes.



And what a benefit to the people that this time the advantage of the princes was identical with their own! To this accident alone were they indebted for their liberation from the papacy. And what good fortune for the princes that the subjects fought for their own cause by championing theirs! During the period in question no prince in Europe governed with so absolute a power that he could disregard the good will of his subjects while he was pursuing his political schemes. But how difficult it was to win this good will of the nation for his political schemes and start it into action! The most convincing motives which are marshaled by statecraft often leave the citizen calm and uninterested. In this case there was nothing left for a clever ruler but to connect the interest of the cabinet with any other which was closer to the hearts of the people, if such a one already existed; or, if it did not, to create it.

This was the case with many of those rulers who took part in the Reformation. Through a strange linking of circumstances it happened that the segregation in the Church coincided with two political factors without which it would presumably have had a totally different development. These were: the suddenly arising superiority of the Austrian dynasty which was menacing the freedom of Europe, and the active zeal of this dynasty for the

old religion. The former roused the rulers, the latter armed the nations for them.

The abolition of a foreign jurisdiction in their states; the supreme power in ecclesiastical matters; the stopping of the steady flow of money to Rome, and the rich spoils of the ecclesiastical chapters, were advantages which must have been alluring to every sovereign; why, so one could ask, did they not influence the princes of the House of Austria just as well? What prevented this dynasty, and particularly the German line, from lending a willing ear to the urgent demands of so many of its subjects and from improving itself after the example of others at the expense of a defenseless clergy?

It is hard to believe that the conviction of the infallibility of the Roman Church should have had a greater share in the pious steadfastness of this dynasty than the belief of the contrary in the revolt of the Protestant princes. Several reasons combined to make the Austrian princes the supporters of the papacy. Spain and Italy, from which the Austrian power drew a great part of its strength, were devoted in fanatical attachment to the holy see. The slightest approach to the abominated teachings of Luther and Calvin was to estrange the hearts of his subjects irretrievably from the ruler of Spain; a revolt against the papacy could cost him his kingdom. A Spanish king had to be an orthodox prince or relinquish the throne. The same con-

strait was imposed upon him by his Italian states, which he had to treat with even more consideration than his Spaniards, because they endured the foreign yoke with more impatience and could shake it off more easily. To this was added that these states placed France in rivalry with him and the pope his neighbor—reasons enough to refuse assistance to a party which destroyed the prestige of the papacy, and to demand of him the most active zeal for the old religion.

These general causes, which applied to every Spanish monarch, were increased by special ones in the case of certain of the rulers. Charles V had in Italy a dangerous rival in the king of France, into whose arms this country threw itself at the moment when Charles voiced some suspicious heretical principles, and in the development of his pet schemes Charles needed the help of the Catholics and a quarrel with the Church would have been almost suicidal. When Charles V found himself with the alternative to choose between the two religious parties, the new religion had not yet succeeded in gaining his respect, and besides there seemed in those days still a chance for an amiable agreement between both Churches. In his son and successor, Philip II, a monastic education combined with a despotic and gloomy character constantly to feed an irreconcilable hatred against all creed innovations, and they could hardly be lessened by

the fact that his worst political opponents were also the enemies of his religion. Since his European countries, scattered through so many foreign states, were everywhere open to the influence of foreign opinions, he could not afford to look with indifference upon the development of the Reformation in other countries, and his own personal state interest demanded his espousal of the cause of the old Church in order to inhibit the sources of heretical contagion. Thus the most natural course of events placed this prince at the head of the Catholic faith and of the league which the papists formed against the innovators.

The German line of the dynasty seemed to have been somewhat freer in this respect, but they were handicapped by other conditions. The possession of the imperial crown, which was unthinkable upon a Protestant head (for how could an apostate of the Roman Church wear the Roman imperial crown?), closely connected the successors of Ferdinand I with the holy see; Ferdinand himself was sincerely devoted to the pope for reasons of conscience. Moreover, the German-Austrian princes were not powerful enough to dispense with the Spanish support, which, of course, would be forfeited by favoring the new religion. Their imperial dignity, too, demanded of them the protection of the German organization by virtue of which they maintained themselves as emperors, and which the

Protestant part of the empire endeavored to overthrow. If one adds to this the cold indifference of the Protestants to the embarrassments of the emperors and to the common dangers of the empire, their forcible encroachments upon the temporal rights of the Church, and their hostilities when they considered themselves the stronger party, one can understand that so many reasons kept the emperors on the side of the papacy, and that their own advantage had to be strictly analogous with the advantage of the Catholic religion. As perhaps the whole fate of this religion depended upon the decision which the Austrian dynasty made, one had to regard the Austrian princes throughout the whole of Europe as the mainstays of the papacy. Therefore the hatred of the Protestants against the pope turned unanimously against Austria, and gradually confounded the protector with the cause which he protected.

Besides, this Austrian dynasty, the implacable antagonist of the Reformation, at the same time put the political freedom of the European states, especially of the German states, in no little danger through its ambitious schemes, supported as they were by superior force. This fact could not fail to rouse them out of their security and turn their attention to their self-defense. Their ordinary means would never have sufficed to resist so threatening a power. They had to demand extraordinary ef-

forts from their subjects, and, as these were not sufficient, partly depend upon neighboring support, and through alliances with each other try to conquer a power which singly they were not able to overcome.

But the great political schemes which the rulers formulated to resist the progress of Austria did not appeal to their subjects at all. It is only present advantages and present evils which cause a people to act, and prudent statesmanship dare not wait for that. How fatal it would have been for these princes had not, as luck would have it, another effective motive offered itself, which inflamed the passions of the nation and inspired an enthusiasm that could be directed against the political danger, because it coincided with the same object. This motive was the outspoken hatred against a religion which the House of Austria protected. What the most urgent danger of the state was not able to induce in its citizens was caused by a religious enthusiasm. Only a few poor people would have taken up arms for the state and for the prince voluntarily; for the religion, however, the merchant, the artist and the farmer joyfully took up their weapons. For the state or for the prince they would have shirked even the most trifling unusual task; for his religion each staked his home and life, all his present hopes. Sums threefold larger now flowed into the treasury of the princes; armies threefold

stronger marched into the field; and in the violent emotion roused in everybody's mind by the imminent religious danger, the subjects neither felt the weight of the burden, nor the hardships from which they would, in a calmer state of mind, have sunk exhausted. The fear of the Spanish Inquisition and of Bartholomew nights opened to the prince of Orange, to Admiral Coligny, to the British queen Elizabeth, and to the Protestant princes of Germany, resources from within their people, which are incomprehensible even at the present day.

But with even such great efforts one would have accomplished little against a power, that was superior also to the most powerful prince if he stood by himself. In a period of a yet little developed policy, however, only accidental circumstances could induce remote states to a reciprocal assistance. The difference in the constitutions, in the laws, in the language, in the customs, and in the national character, which segregated the nations and countries into as many different entireties and erected a lasting barrier between them, rendered one state unresponsive to the embarrassments of another, if even the national jealousy had not begot in them a malicious joy over the others' misfortune. The Reformation had overthrown this barrier. A more vivid and closer interest than the advantage of the nation or patriotism, and one which was quite independent from civic conditions, began to inspire

the individual citizen and whole states. Such an interest could connect several, and even the remotest states with one another, and with subjects of the same state this bond need not exist at all. Thus the French Calvinist had a point of contact with the reformed Geneva man, the Englishman, the German, the Dutchman, which he did not have with his own Catholic fellow citizen. So in one very important point he ceased to be the citizen of one individual state and to limit his attention and activity to this single state. His horizon widened; he began to predict his own fate from that of foreign countries which were of his creed, and to make their cause his own. Only now the regents dared to bring foreign affairs before the assemblies of their principalities, only hoped to talk to willing ears and find quick aid. These foreign affairs had become local ones, and readily one offered to the religious affinity a helping hand which he would have refused to the mere neighbor, and still more to the distant foreigner abroad. Now it was that the man from the Palatinate left his home to fight for a French co-religionist brother against the common religious enemy. The French subject drew the sword against a Fatherland which maltreated him; and went to bleed for Holland's liberty. Swiss were arrayed against Swiss, Germans against Germans, all preparing for the battle to decide on the banks of the Loire and of the Seine the succession





**Luther.**  
**Miniature by Lucas Cranach. Berlin.**



to the throne in France. The Danes crossed the river Eider, and the Swedes passed the Belt to break the chains that had been forged for Germany.

It is difficult to say what would have become of the Reformation and the freedom of the German empire if the dreaded dynasty of Austria had not antagonized them. However so much seems evident, that the Austrian princes, on the way to the Universal Monarchy, had handicapped themselves through nothing more than the stubborn war which they waged against the new opinions. In no other case except this was it possible for the weaker princes to compel the extraordinary efforts from their principalities, on the strength of which they were able to resist the Austrian power. In no other case would it have been possible for the states to unite against a common enemy.

The Austrian power had never been greater than after the victory of Charles V at Mühlberg, when he vanquished the Germans. With the Schmalkalden Federation, German freedom was, it seemed, defeated forever; but it revived again in Moritz of Saxony, Charles's dangerous enemy. All the fruits of the victory at Mühlberg were lost in the congress at Passau and in the diet at Augsburg, and all preparations for an era of temporal and spiritual oppression ended in a half-hearted peace.

In this diet at Augsburg Germany was divided into two religious and two political parties. Until

then the Protestants had been regarded as rebels; now it was decided to treat them as brethren, not that they were recognized as such, but because they had compelled their opponents to do so. The Augsburg Confession from this time on could hold itself side by side with the Catholic Creed, though only as a tolerated neighbor with provisional rights. Every ruler had the privilege to make the religion which he himself confessed the only and predominant one in his own country, and to forbid the other; every subject had the right to leave the country in which his religion was suppressed. Thus, for the first time, the teaching of Luther enjoyed a legal right and if in Bavaria or in Austria it was crushed in the dust, there was some consolation in the thought that it stood high in Saxony and Thuringia. But it was left to the rulers alone to decide which of the two religions was to be adopted for their domains and which should be suppressed; the subjects had nothing to say in the matter. Only in the ecclesiastical countries, in which the Catholic religion remained irrevocably the prevailing one, a free religious practice was accorded to the Protestant subjects (if there were any in those days), and this only through a personal assurance of the Roman King Ferdinand who established this peace, an assurance which, when opposed by the Catholic part of the empire, never came into legal force.

Not only opinions separated the minds, but upon

these opinions depended riches, dignities and privileges, a fact which considerably aggravated the religious separation. If one of two brothers, who had hitherto enjoyed the paternal fortune in common, left their home, the necessity arose of settling with the brother who remained at home. The father had made no provisions in case of a separation, as he could not have anticipated it. From the charitable donations of the ancestors the wealth of the Church had been amassed within a thousand years, and these ancestors belonged as much to the departed as to the one who remained behind.

Did the hereditary right rest with the paternal home only, or with the individual? The donations were made to the Catholic Church simply because there was no other church in those days, and to the first born because he was at that time the only son. Now, did the law of primogeniture obtain in the Church as among the nobility? Did the patronage of the one part hold good when the other one could not confront him? Could the Lutherans be excluded from the enjoyment of these possessions, in the donation of which their forbears certainly had helped, simply because in the days of these charities there did not exist the difference between Lutherans and Catholics? Both religious parties have contested this disputable subject with apparent sound reasons, and are still contesting to-day; it certainly is as difficult for the one as for the

other to prove his respective right. The law has only decisions for conceivable cases, and perhaps ecclesiastical donations did not belong to this category, at least not if one extended the requests of their donators upon dogmatic principles. How was it possible or conceivable to make a donation to a changing opinion?

If the law cannot decide, then force does it, and so it happened here. One part retained what could not be taken from him, the other defended what he still possessed. All the episcopates and abbeys which had been made secular, previous to the peace, remained with the Protestants; the papists however provided that in the future no more should be secularized. Every possessor of an ecclesiastical chapter which was under the direct jurisdiction of the empire prince, elector, bishop or abbot, forfeited his benefits as soon as he joined the Protestant Church. He had to vacate his possessions, and the chapter prepared for a new election in the same way as if his position had become vacant in a case of death. To this sacred anchor of ecclesiastical reserve, which made the whole temporal existence of a prince dependent on his confession of creed, the Catholic Church is moored even up to the present day, and what would become of her if this anchor should break? This ecclesiastical reserve was stubbornly resisted on the part of the Protestant rulers, and although they embodied it at last

in the peace treaty, it was done with the express clause that the parties had not come to any settlement over this point. Could it be more binding for the Protestant part than that assurance of Ferdinand to the advantage of the Protestant subjects in ecclesiastical chapters for the Catholics? Thus two disputable points remained in the peace treaty, and these were also the cause of the war.

Such was the case with the religious freedom and the ecclesiastical property; it was not in any way different with the rights and dignities. The German empire system was based upon one single Church, because there was only one in existence, when this system was formed. The Church had separated, the diet had been divided into two religious parties, and yet should the whole empire system follow exclusively one of them only? All previous emperors had been sons of the Roman Church, because the Roman Church had hitherto in Germany been without a rival. But was it the relation to Rome which made the emperor what he was to Germany, or was it not rather Germany which represented herself in her emperor? To the whole of Germany, however, also belonged the Protestant part, and how did the latter represent itself in an uninterrupted series of Catholic emperors? In the supreme court of the empire the towns were judges over themselves, since they provided the judges. The fact that they did so, and that equal justice

should benefit the entirety was the object of its institution. Could this object be realized unless both religions were represented in it? That at the time of the institution there was only one creed prevailing was an accident, that no class should oppress the other in a legal way was the essential object of the institution. This purpose, however, failed if one religious party was the exclusive judge over the other. Was it permissible to sacrifice an object if it was changed by an accident? At last, through great efforts the Protestants had been successful in their fight for a seat in the supreme court, but as yet they did have an equal number of votes.

Whatever one would like to say about the equality which the religious peace at Augsburg introduced between the two German churches, it is an incontrovertible fact that the Catholic emerged the victor. All that the Lutheran Church received was—toleration; all that the Catholics gave, they sacrificed to necessity, not to justice. It was not yet by any means a peace between two equally respected powers, only an agreement between the master and an unsubdued rebel. From this principle all the procedures of the Catholic Church against the Protestant seemed to be derived. It was still a crime to join the latter, because it was punished with grave losses, such as the “ecclesiastical reserve” provides for revolting clerical princes. In the years following the Catholic Church rather exposed itself to



lose all by force, than to concede one little advantage voluntarily and legally; for there was always hope of retrieving that of which it had been robbed, and at any rate it was only an accidental loss; but a relinquished claim, a prerogative conceded to the Protestants, would have shaken the foundations of the Catholic Church.

At the conclusion of the religious peace the Church did not lose sight of this principle. Whatever it granted to the Lutherans in this peace compact had not been totally given up. Everything, so it said, was only to hold good until the next general church assembly, which would grapple with the task of reuniting both Churches. Only then, when this last attempt had failed, should the religious peace resolutions be applied in an absolute sense.

This religious peace, which was to subdue the sparks of the civil war for ever, was practically only a temporary palliative, a work dictated by need and force and not by the law of justice, and not the result of clearer ideas regarding religion and religious liberty. For a peace of that nature the period was not yet ripe, and the minds were as yet too dimmed. How could one party expect from the other what it was unable to accomplish itself! What was a salvation or a gain for each party in the Augsburg peace, had been gained by power, by that accidental relation of power in which they

faced each other at the conclusion of peace. That which had been won by force had to be defended by force; that relation of power consequently had to be continued into the future or the purpose of the peace was defeated. Sword in hand the line of demarcation had been prescribed between the two Churches, sword in hand the line had to be guarded, or woe to the party which disarmed too soon. A desperate prospect for the tranquillity of Germany, which loomed up in the peace itself.

A short period of calm ensued—an ephemeral bond of harmony seemed to unite the separated members in a homogeneous body of the empire; but the separation had struck a vital part, and it was too late to restore the initial harmony. Although the legal limitations had been definitely established by the peace, they seemed to be interpreted in many different ways. In the midst of their most violent quarrel it had imposed silence upon the contending parties; the fire had been covered, not extinguished, and unsatisfied claims remained on both sides. The Catholics thought they had lost too much, the Lutherans believed they had gained too little; both consoled themselves with the idea that the peace which they did not yet dare infringe was not in accordance with their intentions.

The same powerful motive, which had made so many Protestant princes so strongly inclined to embrace Luther's teaching—the possession of the

ecclesiastical chapters—was after the conclusion of peace no less effective than before, and chapters that were not yet in their hands had to be taken soon. The whole of Lower (northern) Germany had been secularized within a short time, and if it was different with Upper (southern) Germany this could be ascribed to the resistance of the Catholics, who there preponderated. Each party pressed or oppressed, wherever it was the more powerful, the adherents of the other; especially the ecclesiastical princes, as the most defenseless members of the empire, were in constant fear of the aggrandizement desires of their non-Catholic neighbors. Whoever was too weak to resist power with power took his refuge under the wings of justice, and the spoliation suits against Protestant rulers accumulated in the Supreme Court, which was ready enough to pronounce sentences, but in no position to enforce them. The peace which conceded to the princes of the empire a perfect freedom of religion had also provided ostensibly for the subject, by giving him the right to quit with impunity the country in which his religion was suppressed. But the dead letter of the peace could not protect him against the outrages which the sovereign could heap upon a hated subject; nor against the ineffable hardships through which he could render the emigration exceedingly difficult; nor against the artfully contrived snares in which malice, coupled with power, was able to

entangle the victim. The Catholic subjects of the Protestant masters complained loudly of the violation of the religious peace, and the Protestants clamored still louder against the oppressions of which the Catholic authorities were guilty.

The unity among the Protestants would probably have been sufficient to keep both parties equally wary, and so prolong the peace; but to make confusion worse confounded, this harmony soon vanished. The teachings which Zwingli had spread in Zürich, and Calvin in Geneva, soon began to gain ground in Germany and to divide the Protestants among themselves, so that they hardly recognized one another in anything except the common hatred against the papacy. The Protestants of this period were no longer those who fifty years previous had presented their Confession at Augsburg, and the cause for this change was to be sought in that Augsburg Confession. This prescribed a positive limit to the Protestant creed, before ever the awakened spirit of exploitation would accept such a limit, and the Protestants unwittingly forfeited part of the gain which the revolt against the papacy had secured for them. The same complaints of the Roman hierarchy and the abuses in this Church, the same disapproval of the Catholic dogmas, would have sufficed to fix the converging point for the Protestant Church, but they sought this point in a new positive creed system, and placed in this the

distinctive mark, the advantage, the essential nature of their Church, to which they referred the agreement made with the Catholics. Only as adherents of the Confession did they consent to the religious peace; the members of the Confession alone had a share in its benefits.

The Protestants could not have given a more welcome pretext to their common enemy than this division among themselves, and no more refreshing spectacle than the exasperation with which they persecuted one another. Who could construe it into a crime on the part of the Catholics, if they deemed the arrogance ridiculous with which the "creed improvers" claimed to promulgate the "only real religious system?" And if they borrowed from the Protestants themselves the weapons to be used against them; and amid such a contradiction of opinions, clung to the authority of their creed, for which they at least could show a venerable age, and a still more venerable majority?

The Protestants, with this separation, fell into a far worse predicament. The religious peace had been concluded solely with reference to the members of the Confession, and the Catholics now pressed for an explanation as to whom this confession should recognize as their real creed companions. The Lutherans could not include the Reformed Church adherents in their union without placing a burden on their conscience; on the

other hand, they could not exclude them without converting a useful friend into a dangerous enemy. Thus this fatal segregation opened a way to the machinations of the Jesuits to sow distrust between the two parties and to disturb the harmony of their measures. Hampered by the double fear of the Catholics and of their own Protestant opponents, the Lutherans missed the right moment to compel absolutely equal rights with the Catholic Church for their own—a moment which was not to recur till two and a half centuries later. And they would have escaped all these embarrassments, the revolt of the Reformed Church would have been quite harmless for the common cause, if they had sought the converging point in the removal from the papacy alone, and not in Augsburg Confessions, or in measures of concord.

Not all movements of the Catholics had the aggressive intention imputed to them by the opposing party; much that they did was dictated by self-defense. The Protestants had shown in no ambiguous manner what the Catholics were to expect if they should have the misfortune to be the defeated party. The desire of the Protestants for church property did not presage any consideration, and their hatred neither magnanimity nor toleration.

But neither were the Protestants to be blamed if they had slight confidence in the honesty of the

papists. Through the treacherous and barbarous treatment which the Catholics meted out against their co-religionists; through the ignominious subterfuge of Catholic princes to be absolved by the pope from the most sacred oaths; through the abominable maxim that a word of honor given to a heretic need not be kept,—the Catholic Church had lost her honor in the eyes of all upright people. No assurance, not even the most solemn oath from the lips of a Catholic could satisfy a Protestant. How could a religious peace have done it, which the Jesuits throughout Germany described as a mere temporary convenience, and which was solemnly repudiated in Rome?

The general church assembly to which this peace had referred had meanwhile taken place in Trient, without having united the contending religions, without even having undertaken one single step toward such a union, and, finally, even without the attendance of the Protestants. The latter were now solemnly condemned by the Church, whose representative the council pretended to be. Could a profane agreement which had even been forced by armed intervention give them sufficient security against the ban of the Church, an agreement which was based upon a provision which the conclusion of the council seemed to repeal? The semblance of right was no longer lacking, provided the Catholics felt themselves powerful enough to violate

the religious peace,—from then on the Protestants were protected by nothing except a wholesome respect for their armed strength.

Several circumstances served to increase the distrust. Spain, upon which power the Catholic part of Germany was leaning, was at that time engaged in a terrible war with the Netherlands, which had drawn the best of the Spanish forces to the borders of Germany. These troops could be sent quickly into the empire if a decisive blow should require their presence. Germany in those days was a sort of war arsenal for nearly all European powers. The religious conflict had massed soldiers there whom the peace treaty threw out of employment. Many independent princes enlisted armies which they afterward lent, either from greed for profit or from party spirit, to foreign powers. It was with German troops that Philip made war on the Netherlands, and with German troops the Netherlands defended themselves. Every one of those enlisting campaigns in Germany always frightened one of the two religious parties, who feared it was meant for its suppression. An itinerant delegate, an extraordinary papal legate, a meeting of princes, any unusual event, might mean destruction for the one or the other party. Thus Germany stood for about half a century, alert, and grasping the hilt of her sword.

Ferdinand I, king of Hungary, and his excellent



son, Maximilian II, held in this serious epoch the reins of the empire. Sincere, and with heroic patience, Ferdinand had mediated the peace at Augsburg, and had wasted a lot of trouble in the thankless task of trying to unite both Churches in the Trient council. Abandoned by his nephew, the Spanish Philip, at the same time oppressed in Transylvania and Hungary by the victorious Turks, how could this emperor have conceived the idea of violating the religious peace, and destroying his own laborious work? The enormous expenses of the never ending Turkish wars could not be defrayed by the scant contributions of his own domains; he needed the assistance of the empire, and the religious peace alone held that together. His financial problems made him no less dependent upon the Protestants than upon the Catholics, and consequently imposed upon him the task of treating both parties with equal justice,—a gigantic problem, with its many conflicting demands. He staved off the coming cataclysm and his son Maximilian followed in his footsteps. Necessity had taught the father consideration for the Protestants, necessity and fairness dictated the same course to his son. The grandchild had to pay dearly because he neither regarded fairness, nor obeyed necessity.

Maximilian left six sons, but the eldest, Archduke Rudolph, inherited his estates, and succeeded to the imperial throne; the remaining brothers had to be

satisfied with insignificant appanages. Only a few dependencies belonged to a branch of the family which Charles of Styria, their uncle, held. These were united with the remaining legacy under Ferdinand II, his son. With the exception of these countries, the whole great power of Austria, therefore, was gathered in one hand, and unfortunately that hand was a weak one.

Rudolph II was not without virtues which would have gained for him the love of his fellowmen if it had been his lot to be a private citizen. His character was mild, he loved peace; and the sciences, especially astronomy, natural history, chemistry and the study of antiquity, occupied his whole mind. At a time when the serious situation demanded the most strenuous attention, and when his exhausted finances necessitated painful economy, his hobbies and studies took him away from the affairs of his government, and stimulated a highly pernicious extravagance. His taste for astronomy led him into astrological reveries to which a melancholic and timid nature like his was particularly susceptible. This fact, in connection with the years he had spent in Spain, opened his ear to the evil advice of the Jesuits and to the suggestions of the Spanish court which finally dominated him unrestrictedly. Attracted by hobbies which were unworthy of his great post, and terrified by ridiculous prophecies, he disappeared according to Spanish custom from

among his subjects, to hide himself behind his lapidary pursuits, his antiquities, in his laboratory, and in his royal stables, while the most dangerous disruption was about to shatter the German state, and the flames of revolution threatened to ascend the very steps of his throne. Admittance to his person was prohibited to everybody without exception; the most urgent matters were unattended to; the prospect of the rich Spanish heirloom vanished when he postponed his suggested marriage to the Infanta Isabella; the most terrible anarchy threatened the empire, because he, although without heirs himself, could not be induced to have a Roman king elected. The Austrian princes refused him obedience, Hungary and Transylvania revolted against his sovereignty, and Bohemia followed their example. The descendants of the greatly feared Charles V were in danger of losing a part of their possessions to the Turks, and the rest to the Protestants, and to be defeated by a formidable league of princes which was about to be formed by a great monarch in Europe against them. What could the German empire expect of a prince who was not able even to maintain his own patrimonial dominions against an internal enemy? In order to check the total ruin of the Austrian dynasty his own House united against him, and a powerful faction threw itself into the arms of his brother. Driven from all his hereditary states, there was

nothing more to lose than the imperial throne and death intervened just in time to spare him this last disgrace.

It was Germany's evil genius who gave her a Rudolph as emperor in this epoch, when only a subtle prudence and a mighty arm could save the peace of the empire. In a calmer period the German body of states would have helped itself, and in a mystic obscurity Rudolph, like so many other of his rank, could have concealed his shortcomings. The pressing need of the virtues which he lacked brought his incapacity to light, and Germany's predicament demanded an emperor who could give weight to his decisions from his own resources.

The Austrian princes, it is true, were Catholic and, in addition to that, supporters of the papacy, but a good deal was wanting to make their territories Catholic countries. Into these domains the new opinions had penetrated, and, favored by Ferdinand's embarrassments and Maximilian's kindness, they had spread rapidly and successfully. The Austrian countries showed in a small scale what Germany was in a large one. The greater part of the nobles and knights were Lutheran, and in the towns the Protestants had gained the preponderance. After they had succeeded in bringing some members into the country district, one post and one college after another were taken quite

imperceptibly by Protestants, and the Catholics were removed from them. Against the numerous class of nobles and knights and the delegates of the towns, the voices of a few prelates were too weak, and the biting sarcasm and offensive contempt of the rest helped to drive them out of the diet altogether. Thus the whole of the Austrian diet was Protestant, and the Reformation made wonderful progress. As the rulers were dependent on the country estates for the taxes, they used the financial embarrassments in which Ferdinand and his son found themselves to force one religious freedom after another from these princes. To the nobles and knights Maximilian finally granted the free practice of their religion, but only in their own territories and castles. The fervent zeal of the Lutheran preachers transgressed this limit set by wisdom. In contravention to the express interdiction several of them preached in the country towns and even in Vienna, in public, and the people crowded in masses to this new evangelism which was "seasoned" by the use of obscenities and abuses. Thus fanaticism was fed continually and the hatred of the two closely allied Churches poisoned by the sting of their impure zeal.

Among the hereditary countries of the Austrian dynasty, Hungary and Transylvania were the two most insecure possessions and the most difficult to maintain. The impossibility of holding them

against the near and superior power of the Turks had already prompted Ferdinand to the inglorious step of granting the Porte the sovereignty over Transylvania by an annual tribute—a damaging confession of weakness and a still more dangerous incitement to the restless nobility. The Hungarians had not submitted to the House of Austria unconditionally. They maintained the election freedom of their crown and demanded defiantly all the principal prerogatives which are inseparable from this election concession. The close proximity of the Turkish empire, and the ease with which they could change their master with impunity, strengthened the magnates even more in this defiance. Dissatisfied with the Austrian government they threw themselves into the arms of the Ottomans; not satisfied with these, they returned to German sovereignty. The frequent and rapid transition from one government to another had also communicated itself to their way of thinking; as uncertainly as their country was pending between German and Ottoman rule, their minds also wavered between revolt and submission.

Ferdinand, Maximilian and Rudolph, all three rulers of Transylvania and Hungary, exhausted the vitality of their other countries to maintain these two against the invasions of the Turks, and against internal rebellions. Destructive wars alternated on this soil with short armistices which were not much

improvement. Far and wide the land lay desolate and the maltreated subject cursed and blamed both his enemy and his protector. The Reformation had penetrated into these countries with some success but it was handled in a careless manner, and the political spirit of faction became more dangerous because of religious fervor. The Transylvanian and Hungarian nobility, led by a bold rebel, Boschkai, raised the banner of revolt. The insurgents in Hungary were about to make common cause with the discontented Protestants in Austria, Moravia, and Bohemia and carry all these countries with them in a terrible rebellion. Then the doom of the Austrian dynasty was certain and the destruction of the papacy in these countries unavoidable.

For some time the archdukes of Austria, brothers of the emperor, had watched the ruin of their dynasty with rising anger; this last event brought them to their feet. Archduke Matthias—Maximilian's second son, governor in Hungary and Rudolph's heir presumptive—offered himself as the support of Hapsburg's deteriorating power. In his youthful years, and blinded by a false desire of glory, this prince had, against the interest of his House, lent a willing ear to the invitations of some Netherland rebels who called him to their country in order to defend the liberties of the nation against his own relative, Philip II. Matthias, who in the

voice of a single faction thought he heard that of the whole of the Netherland people, followed this call to their home. However his success was exceedingly poor, and he withdrew from his unwise enterprise without glory. But all the more creditable was his second appearance in the political world.

Not receiving any answers from the emperor to his repeated demands, he called the archdukes, his brothers and cousins, to Pressburg, and discussed with them the steadily growing peril to the dynasty. Unanimously they intrusted him, the eldest, with the defense of their heirloom which a mentally unfit brother had neglected; Matthias opened negotiations with the Porte and the Hungarian rebels, and succeeded in saving the remainder of Hungary by concluding a peace with the Turks, and adjusting Austria's claim to the lost provinces through an agreement with the rebels. But Rudolph, as jealous of his sovereign power as negligent in maintaining it, held back with the ratification of the treaty which he regarded as a punishable encroachment upon his sovereignty. He accused Matthias of collusion with the enemy and of treacherous intentions against the Hungarian crown.

The activities of Matthias had been anything but free from selfish motives, but the demeanor of the emperor accelerated the carrying out of these plans. Assured of the support of the Hungarians, to whom he had brought peace, and of many influential



Austrians, he now ventured to come out more openly with his intentions and, with his armed forces ready, to remonstrate with the emperor. The Protestants in Austria and Moravia, who had been ready for a long time for the revolt, loudly and openly espoused his cause, when promised religious freedom. A formidable conspiracy had suddenly risen against the emperor. Too late he resolved to make amends for his faults; in vain he tried to break up the dangerous alliance. Hungary, Austria and Moravia paid homage to Matthias, who was already on his way to Bohemia to seek the emperor in his castle and to sever the nerve wires of his power.

The kingdom of Bohemia had caused Austria just as much trouble as Hungary, only with this difference: In Hungary it was politics, and in Bohemia religion, which perpetuated the strife. A century before Luther the first conflagration of the religious wars had broken out in Bohemia, and it was in Bohemia that, a century after Luther, the sparks of the Thirty Years' War were fanned into flame. The sect which Johann Huss had founded had lived ever since in Bohemia, agreeing with the Roman Church in ceremonies and doctrine, with the only exception of the sacrament of the Holy Communion, which the Hussite took in both forms. This privilege the church council in Basel had granted to the followers of Huss in a separate

agreement (the Bohemian Compact), and although the popes later repudiated the concession, the Hussites continued to enjoy it under the protection of the laws. As the use of the cup constituted their sole important mark of distinction, they were called *Utraquists* (taking the Holy Communion in both forms), and they were exceedingly jealous of this name, as it reminded them of their treasured privilege. However, the same name was used to designate the far stronger sect of the Bohemian and Moravian Brethren, who deviated from the ruling Church in more important points, and who had much in common with the German Protestants. The German as well as the Swiss religious innovations were quickly accepted by them and they used the name of the Utraquists as a protection against persecution.

Practically it was nothing more than the name which they had in common with the real Utraquists; they were essentially Protestants. Full of confidence in their powerful following and in the emperor's toleration, they ventured to express their true sentiments under the reign of Maximilian. They set up, after the example of the Germans, their own Confession, in which Lutherans as well as the adherents of the Reformed Church recognized their opinions, and demanded that all privileges of the former utraquistic Church should be transferred to this new confession.

So long as Maximilian was alive, they enjoyed immunity, but under his successor things became different. An imperial edict was issued which denied religious freedom to the so-called Bohemian Brethren. As the latter did not distinguish themselves in anything from the rest of the Utraquists, the sentence of their condemnation affected every Bohemian co-confessionist in the same manner. Therefore all of them opposed the imperial mandate in the diet, but without being able to crush it.

Thus matters stood in Bohemia when Matthias, already ruler of Hungary, Austria and Moravia, appeared near Collin to incite the Bohemian chiefs against the emperor. The embarrassment of the latter increased to the utmost. Forsaken by all his remaining hereditary states he placed his last hope in the Bohemian leaders, regarding whom it could be foreseen that they would use his distress to obtain fulfillment of their demands. After a seclusion of many years he appeared again in public in Prague at the Diet; in order to show the people that he was still alive, the window shutters were ordered opened all along the way by which he was coming, proof sufficient of his identity. That which he had feared came to pass. The chiefs, who were feeling their importance, would not agree to any step until they had received full security for their political privileges and religious freedom. It was of no

avail to resort to the old subterfuges,—the emperor's fate was in their hands, and he had to bow to Necessity. He granted their political demands but succeeded in reserving the religious question for decision in the next diet.

Presently the Bohemians took up arms in his defense and a bloody civil war seemed about to break out between the two brothers. However Rudolph, who feared nothing so much as to remain in this slavish dependence upon the Bohemian leaders, did not wait for this, but effected a settlement with the archduke, his brother. In a formal document of renunciation he conferred upon him what he could not take from him any more,—Austria and the kingdom of Hungary; he also acknowledged him as his successor to the Bohemian throne.

The emperor had escaped from one difficulty only to be plunged into another. The religious affairs of the Bohemians had been referred to the next diet and this opened its session in 1609. They demanded the same free religious practice as under the previous emperor; their own consistory; the privilege of the Prague Academy; and the permission to appoint defenders or protectors of the freedom from among themselves. But the Catholics had too strong a hold on the vacillating emperor and he held to his first answer. The session of the diet was closed without having attained its object, and

the chiefs, incensed with the emperor, planned to hold a meeting of their own in Prague, in order to assist themselves.

They appeared at the meeting in great numbers, and notwithstanding the imperial prohibition the deliberations went on almost under the eyes of the emperor. The indulgence which he showed only proved to them how much they were feared and they intensified their defiance; he remained obdurate in regard to the chief object. They carried out their threats and passed a resolution establishing the free practice of their religion in all places, leaving the emperor to his own resources until he should confirm this resolution. They went even further and appointed for themselves the defenders whom the emperor had refused them. Ten members were appointed from each of the three principalities; a military force was established under the chief promoter of this rebellion, the count of Thurn as major general. This serious procedure at last prompted the emperor to yield, as even the Spaniards now advised him to do. Fearing that the exasperated chiefs would finally go to the assistance of the king of Hungary, he signed that remarkable imperial charter of the Bohemians with which they later justified their rebellion under the successors of this emperor.

The Bohemian Confession which the chiefs had laid before Emperor Maximilian, received in this

imperial charter equal rights with the Catholic Church. The Utraquists, as the Bohemian Protestants still continued to call themselves, were granted the Prague University and their own consistory, which was subject to the orders of the archbishop of Prague. All churches which they possessed at the time of the issue of this charter, in towns, villages and hamlets, were to remain their property, and if they ever intended to build new ones in excess of this number, this was to be permitted to the lords, knights and all municipalities. It was this last paragraph in the imperial charter which afterward precipitated the fatal quarrel that ended in the devastation of Europe.

The imperial charter made Protestant Bohemia a sort of republic. The leaders had tasted power, gained through aggressiveness and coöperation. There was nothing left to the emperor but a shadow of his sovereign power; in the persons of the so-called "protectors of the freedom" the spirit of rebellion was given a dangerous stimulant. Bohemia's example and good fortune were an alluring hint for the other hereditary states of Austria, and all of them prepared to exact similar privileges in a similar manner. The spirit of liberty spread from province to province, and as it had been primarily the dissension among the Austrian princes which the Protestants had been known to use with such felicitous result, the alarmed Catholics

tried to reconcile the emperor with the king of Hungary.

However this reconciliation could never be a sincere one. The offense had been too grave to be forgiven and Rudolph continued to nourish a deep hatred against Matthias. He remembered that finally the Bohemian scepter too was to be placed in this hated hand, and the prospect was not much more cheerful, even if Matthias should die without leaving an heir. For there was Ferdinand, archduke of Grätz, the head of that branch of the family, whom he did not love any better. In order to exclude the latter as well as Matthias from succession to the Bohemian throne, he boldly decided to play this heirloom into the hands of Ferdinand's brother, Archduke Leopold, bishop of Passau, whom he liked best of all his paternal relatives, and who, at the same time, was personally the best fitted. The desire of the Bohemians of being free to elect their king, and their sympathy for Leopold, seemed to favor this scheme, in which Rudolph had listened more to the dictates of partiality and desire for revenge than to the best interest of his House. But, in order to carry this scheme through, a military force was needed, and Rudolph succeeded in gathering it in the bishopric of Passau. The destination of this army corps was not known to anybody, but an impulsive invasion which it made into Bohemia without the knowledge of the emperor, because the

pay of the soldiers had not been forthcoming on time, as well as the excesses which were perpetrated there, roused the whole kingdom against the emperor. Vainly he assured the Bohemian principals of his innocence; they would not believe him. He was unable to check the outrages of his soldiers; they would not listen to him. On the assumption that here it was the intention of setting the imperial charter at naught, the "protectors of the freedom" armed the whole of Bohemia, and Matthias was recalled into the country. After his Passau troops had been defeated the emperor, deprived of all help, remained in Prague, where he was watched in his castle like a prisoner. Meanwhile Matthias had entered the town amidst the rejoicings of the people, and Rudolph was weak enough to acknowledge him as king of Bohemia. Thus did fate punish this emperor: he was compelled to give his throne to his enemy while he was still alive, a throne which he had even begrudged to him after his own death. His cup of sorrow and humiliation was not yet full. He was forced to discharge his subjects in Bohemia, Silesia and Lausitz from all their duties, and he signed this document of renunciation, bitterly denouncing the ingratitude of the people. All had forsaken him. When the signature had been affixed, he threw his hat on the floor and bit the pen which had performed the ignominious service.



While Rudolph lost one of his dominions after another, the imperial dignity was not maintained any better by him. Each of the religious parties in Germany endeavored to expand at the expense of the other. The weaker the hand which held the scepter of the empire, and the more Protestants and Catholics left to themselves, the more their attention had to be drawn to one another, and the more the general distrust increased. It was enough that the emperor was governed by Jesuits, and guided by Spanish advices to give the Protestants cause for fear and a pretext for hostilities.

The affairs of the diet remained unfinished, either in consequence of the negligence of the emperor or through the fault of the Protestant princes of the empire who had decided not to contribute anything to the common needs until their own complaints had been attended to. These were made preferably about the bad régime of the emperor, the religious peace, and the new presumptions of the aulic council which, under Rudolph, had begun to extend its jurisdiction to the disadvantage of the supreme court. Usually the emperors had decided unimportant cases in the last resort alone, while the important ones had the attendance of the princes in all legal matters between the chiefs which the law of might could not settle; or the decision was given by imperial judges who followed the court. This office of a supreme judge had been transferred at

the end of the fifteenth century to a regular, continuous and fixed tribunal, the supreme court at Speyer, to which the princes of the empire appointed certain judges. They also assumed the right to investigate periodically the sentences of the court. The religious peace had extended this right of the chiefs,—which was called the right of presentation and visitation,—also to the Lutherans, so that Protestant judges pronounced sentences in Protestant law cases and a seeming equality of both religions was preserved in this supreme court of the empire.

However, the enemies of the Reformation and of the liberty of the princes, watching every circumstance which favored their purpose, soon found a pretext to destroy the utility of this institution. Gradually it came to pass that a private court of the emperor, the “aulic council” in Vienna,—originally intended to advise the emperor in the execution of his undoubted personal imperial rights,—a tribunal whose members were appointed and paid by the emperor and had to look after his interests and that of the Catholic religion, which they confessed,—exercised the highest judicial power over the princes of the empire. Now it happened that many lawsuits between chiefs of a different religion were brought before the aulic council, which really belonged to the jurisdiction of the supreme court, or, previous to the existence of the latter, to the council of princes. No wonder that

the sentences of this court betrayed their origin, that justice was sacrificed in the interests of the Catholic religion and of the emperor, by Catholic judges and creatures of the emperor. Although all princes in Germany seemed to have cause to stop such a dangerous misuse in time, only the Protestants, who were most grievously hurt by it, came forth as defenders of German liberty and justice.

To these general complaints were added a number of events which increased the anxieties of the Protestants to the extent of uneasiness and distrust. During the Spanish religious prosecutions in the Netherlands, several Protestant families had taken refuge in the Catholic imperial city of Aix-la-Chapelle, where they had settled and increased their followers. After they had succeeded by a ruse in getting some of their people into the town council, they demanded their own church, and a public divine service. When this request was denied they simply took charge of the whole town administration. To see such an important town in Protestant hands was too severe a blow for the emperor and the whole Catholic party. Imperial warnings and orders to restore the *status quo* were ignored, and finally the aulic council declared the town in ban, which however was executed only under the succeeding administration.

Of greater importance were two other attempts of the Protestants to extend their territory and

power. Elector Gebhard of Cologne, né Truchsess von Waldburg, fell violently in love with the young countess Agnes of Mansfeld, canoness at Gerresheim, and was loved in return. As the eyes of all Germany were upon this love affair, the brothers of the countess, two zealous Calvinists, demanded satisfaction for the insulted honor of their House which, as long as the elector remained a Catholic bishop, could not be saved by a marriage. They threatened to avenge this disgrace with the elector's own and their sister's blood, if he did not renounce at once his relations with the countess or restore her honor at the altar. The elector, indifferent to all consequences of his act, did not listen to anything but the voice of Love. Perhaps he already leaned toward the Reformed religion, perhaps the charms of his beloved alone worked this wonder,—he abjured his Catholic faith and led the beautiful Agnes to the altar.

The case now became extremely grave. According to the letter of the ecclesiastical restriction the prince-bishop had forfeited all rights in his diocese by his apostasy, and if it ever had been necessary for the Catholics to insist upon the ecclesiastical restriction, it was particularly important with the electorates. On the other hand, relinquishing such high office and dignity was a hard step, and all the harder for a tender husband who would have liked nothing better than to enhance the worth of his

heart and hand by a principality. The ecclesiastical restriction was a disputable article of the Augsburg peace, and it seemed of the utmost importance to the whole of Protestant Germany to snatch this fourth electorate from the Catholics. The example itself had already been given and carried through successfully in various ecclesiastical chapters of Lower Germany. Several cathedral chapter preachers from Cologne were already Protestants and on the side of the elector, and in the town itself a numerous Protestant following was certain for him. All these reasons, which were strengthened by the persuasions of his friends and relatives and by the promises of many German courts, decided the elector to retain his diocese, despite his changed religion.

However, it soon became evident that he had undertaken a struggle which he could not finish. Already the emancipation of the Protestant divine service in the Cologne territories had met with great opposition on the part of the Catholic princes and the cathedral chapter clergy. The intervention of the emperor, and the ban from Rome which condemned him as an apostate and divested him of all his ecclesiastical and worldly dignities, armed his chiefs and his chapter against him. The elector gathered a military force, and the chapter people did the same. A civil war now began which, because of the distrust and hatred between the re-

ligious parties in Germany, could easily end in a general cataclysm. The Protestants were furious because the pope had arrogated to himself apostolic power and had dared to divest a prince of the empire of his imperial rights. Even in the heyday of Rome's greatness this assumption of the popes would have been opposed, and it became an insult at this time when papal prestige had sunk to so low a level as in 1610. All Protestant courts of Germany championed this cause before the emperor; Henry IV of France, then king of Navarre, did not leave a stone unturned in his attempt to defend the right of German princes to manage their own affairs. The case seemed to augur well for the freedom of Germany. Four Protestant against three Catholic votes must turn the preponderance of power to the Protestant side, and bar the way to the imperial throne from the Austrian dynasty for all time.

But Elector Gebhard had embraced the Reformed religion, not the Lutheran, and this single circumstance constituted his misfortune. The hostility existing between these two Churches would not admit that the Protestant princes looked upon the elector as one of them, and gave him their stanch support. It is true, all had encouraged him and promised assistance, but only one prince of the Palatinate, Count Johann Casimir, a Calvinist zealot, kept his word. He hastened with his small

army to the Cologne territory, regardless of the emperor's order, but without success, as the elector himself, stripped of the most necessary resources, could not do anything in his own behalf. Rapid progress was made by the newly elected archbishop, who was supported by his Bavarian relatives and the Spaniards from the Netherlands. The troops of Gebhard, without wages and proper leaders, voluntarily surrendered one place after another to the enemy; others were forced to capitulate. Gebhard himself held out a little longer in his Westphalian territory, until he had to give way there also to the superior forces. After several unsuccessful attempts in England and Holland to enlist help, he retired to the chapter of Strasburg, to die there as dean of the cathedral,—the first victim of the ecclesiastical restriction, or rather of the discord among the German Protestants.

A new quarrel arose in Strasburg. Several Protestant canons from Cologne, who were under the papal ban at the same time with the elector, had taken refuge in this bishopric. As the Catholic canons in the Strasburg chapter hesitated to allow them, as outlaws, the enjoyment of their prebends, the Protestants took forcible possession of them, being supported by the large number of Protestant citizens of Strasburg. The Catholic canons escaped to Alsatia-Zabern, where they continued their chapter as the only rightful one under the protec-

tion of their bishop, and stigmatized those who had remained in Strasburg as impostors. Meanwhile the latter had been reënforced by the admittance of several Protestant members of high rank, so that they could afford, after the death of the elector, to appoint a new Protestant bishop in the person of Prince Johann Georg of Brandenburg. The Catholic canons, far from sanctioning this choice, postulated the bishop of Metz, a prince of Lorraine, who at once celebrated his elevation by opening hostilities against the territory of Strasburg.

As the town of Strasburg took up arms for the Protestant chapter and the prince of Brandenburg, and the opposing party with the help of Lorraine troops attempted to capture the chapter possessions, a protracted war ensued which was characterized according to the spirit of those times by the most barbarous deeds of devastation. In vain the emperor intervened; the chapter remained divided between the two parties, until at last the Protestant prince renounced his claim on payment of a moderate sum of money. Here also the Catholic Church emerged as the victor.

Still more serious for the whole of Protestant Germany was an event which occurred soon after the Cologne quarrel in Donauwörth, a Suabian imperial city. In this otherwise Catholic town the Protestant party had become, under the reign of Ferdinand and his son, the ruling one in the civil



administration, so that the Catholic inhabitants had to content themselves with a secondary church in the monastery of the Holy Cross; they refrained from public ceremonies and processions in order not to provoke the Protestants. Finally a fanatical abbot of this monastery dared to defy the voice of the people and inaugurate a public procession, with floating banners, carrying the cross in front, but he was soon compelled to give up the idea. When this same abbot, encouraged by a favorable imperial decree, repeated this procession a year later, the people resorted to open force. The fanatical mob blocked the gate to the returning monks, knocked their banners to the ground, and chased them home with shouts and insults. The emperor sent a punitive commission to pronounce judgment, or to settle the dispute amicably if possible. The commissioners were attacked and thereupon the imperial ban was declared against the city, the execution of which was intrusted to Duke Maximilian of Bavaria. Fear seized the defiant citizens on the approach of the Bavarian army and they laid down their arms without resistance. Total abolition of the Protestant religion within their walls was the punishment for their crime. The town lost its privileges and was converted from a Suabian free imperial city into a Bavarian country town.

This event, small in itself, was accompanied by

two circumstances which demanded the most careful attention of the Protestants. The aulic council, an arbitrary and thoroughly Catholic tribunal whose jurisdiction had been disputed by them in the most emphatic manner, had pronounced the sentence, and the execution had been turned over to the duke of Bavaria, the chief of an alien district. Such unconstitutional steps indicated what might be expected in the future from the Catholics. Further reprisals could easily be based upon secret agreements, and end with the total suppression of their religious liberty.

Under conditions where might is right and all security rests upon force alone, the weaker party will always be the most active in placing itself in a state of defense. This was the case in Germany. If anything really important had been planned by the Catholics against the Protestants, a sensible calculation told them that the first blow would be struck in the southern part of Germany, and not in the northern section, since the Protestants of Lower (northern) Germany were united, and lived in a long, uninterrupted stretch of country and could easily support one another; but the Upper Germans, separated from the others and surrounded on all sides by Catholic states, were exposed to every invasion. If, furthermore, as could be surmised, the Catholics should make use of the internal discord of the Protestants, and direct their attack

against a single religious party the Calvinists, as the weakest link and outlaws under the terms of the Augsburg peace, would obviously be in more imminent danger, and the first blow must fall upon them.

Both facts existed in the territory of the electoral Palatinate. No German country has gone through such rapid religious changes in so short a time as the Palatinate in those days. In the short space of sixty years this country, an unfortunate plaything of its rulers, subscribed twice to the Lutheran creed, and left it twice for Calvinism. Elector Frederick III was the first to shake off the Augsburg Confession, which his firstborn son and successor quickly restored to its ruling position. Throughout the whole country the Calvinists were deprived of their churches and their preachers, and even the school teachers of this religion were deported across the borders. In his last will and testament the zealous Lutheran prince punished them by appointing only strictly orthodox Lutherans as guardians of his young son. However, this unlawful testament was destroyed by Count Casimir, his brother, who assumed the guardianship and the whole administration of the country, according to the provisions of the golden bull. The nine-year-old son of the elector (Frederick IV) was given Calvinist teachers, who had been instructed to drive out the Lutheran heretic creed with blows, if needs must, from the soul of their charge. If the prince received this

kind of treatment one can easily imagine what the subjects had to endure.

It was in the reign of this Frederick IV that the Palatinate court showed itself particularly active in urging the Protestant princes of Germany to take measures against the Austrian dynasty, and, if possible, to inaugurate a general convention. Besides the fact that this court was guided by French counsels, whose basic principle was always directed by hatred against Austria, the elector's own safety compelled him to assure himself in advance of the doubtful protection of the Protestants against a near and superior enemy. Such an alliance, however, was exceedingly difficult, since the aversion of the Lutherans against the Reformed was hardly less than their mutual abhorrence of the papists. Attempts were made to unite the religions in order to facilitate a subsequent political union, but all efforts failed, usually ending in making both more obstinate in their opinions. So there was nothing else to do than to deepen the fear and distrust of the Protestants and through this means bring about the necessity for such an alliance. It became a matter of good policy to talk of the growing power of the Catholics and exaggerate the danger, to attribute accidental events to a preconceived plan, to distort innocent occurrences through malicious interpretation, and to construe the whole attitude of the Catholics as due to conformity and a pre-

arranged system from which they were probably very remote.

The diet at Regensburg in which the Protestants had hoped to be able to carry through a renewal of the religious peace, had ended in a failure, and to the former complaints had been added the suppression of Donauwörth. The longed for alliance now took place with incredible swiftness. In Auhausen in Franconia, the elector of the Palatinate, Frederick IV, the Palatinate count of Neuburg, two margraves of Brandenburg, the margrave of Baden, and Duke Johann of Württemberg, that is to say, both Lutherans and Calvinists, entered into an alliance (1608) for themselves and their heirs, called the Evangelian Union. The purport of it was that the united princes were to assist each other with word and deed against every offender; that every member who was beset by a war should receive military assistance at once; that to each of them in case of need the territories, towns and castles of the other members were to be opened for his troops; that in case any territory was acquired by conquest, it should be divided among all the members in proportion to the contribution which they had made to the common weal. The management of the whole Union was intrusted in times of peace to the electoral Palatinate, but with restricted power; financial contributions were needed to defray expenses, and a fund was established. The

religious differences (between Lutherans and Calvinists) were to have no influence upon the Union, and the duration of the compact was fixed at ten years. Every member pledged himself to acquire new members. Electoral Brandenburg was easily induced to join; electoral Saxony disapproved of the union. Hesse could not come to a decision, while the dukes of Brunswick and Lüneburg also had their misgivings. However, the three free imperial cities—Strasburg, Nürnberg and Ulm—were valuable acquisitions for the Union because their money was very much needed, and their example might be strong enough to induce other free cities to follow them into the partnership.

The Catholics watched the Union suspiciously; the latter was as much on guard against the Catholics, and the emperor kept his eyes on both,—on all sides were fear and exasperation. To make matters worse, there arose at this moment a problem of succession, through the death of Duke Johann Wilhelm of Jülich in the Jülich-Cleve country.

There were eight pretenders to the throne and solemn treaties forbade a division of the territory. The emperor, who would have liked to confiscate it as a vacant tenure, could be looked upon as the ninth claimant. Four of them, the elector of Brandenburg, the Palatinate count of Neuburg, the Palatinate of Zweibrücken, and the margrave of Burgau, an Austrian prince, demanded it as a